THE PATRON AND THE PANCA

village values and Pancayat Democracy in Nepal

Bengt-Erik Borgström



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Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

The problem

My aim in this study is to spell out how the broad ideals of planned development as expressed by the ruling élite in Nepal in the official ideology translate into local reality and how they are themselves changed in the process. This transformation is effected by the kind of social structure that makes up the Nepalese society. That is to say, the ideals themselves may exist apart from social reality but they can only give rise to actions in a specific social setting.

The ideals are the broad objectives towards which the country is striving through the medium of planned development. Being ideals they claim to be general moral goals, while the instruments such as technology, expertise and money are morally neutral and find their rationale in the practical ends they are made to serve. Or, put in other words, the ideals are held up as the rationale behind the policies that are being realized in Nepal. Through analyses of the various fields of social life it is possible to determine whether the conditions obtaining in each correspond to and are hence compatible with these ideals. Thus, this is in a way a study of social change, but it should be made clear from the beginning that I do not adopt the type of framework in which one reconstructs a base line that defines conditions that are said to have existed before changes set in, and then traces these changes in a before - after fashion. Rather I use a two-fold approach.

Firstly, in order to establish a basis on which the investigation and its conclusions may rest it is necessary to have an idea of the social organization in Nepal. I therefore outline those aspects of social relations which seem to me to be relevant for an understanding of the role that the official ideology plays in Nepal today.

Secondly, I ascertain to what extent life as it exists is compatible with the ideals and I follow the process through which they are implemented. That is to say, I give a synchronic picture of social relations seen in relation to the official ideology. At the same time obstacles to the kind of change that is said to be preferred are pointed out and conclusions are reached about the whole problematic through a discussion of these concrete results seen in relation to the first part of my approach, i e the organization of Nepalese society.

The contribution of social anthropology

One may ask what special competence a social anthropologist has to carry out such an undertaking and the answer must be the standard one: his capacity for understanding interconnections between various analytically separate fields of social life, gained by a familiarity with the society he is describing, itself gained through an extended period of study within it. Many antrhropologists are aware that this approach is limited in the number of persons and role relationships which it can handle, and have sought ways of adopting it to make possible the study of complex societies. So far, however, no satisfactory method has been developed to connect the micro and macro levels of organization. Small-scale studies continue to be regarded as anthropology while the largescale ones tend to become political science. Thus, Weingrod (1967) in examining two books dealing with political parties in India finds that one, written by an anthropologist, Bailey (1963), is very illuminating when it comes to dealing with the local level and the informal ties that exist between people engaged in party politics, but that it is much less revealing when the analysis is moved up to the district level. On the other hand, the book written by a political scientist, Weiner, (1957) has its strength in its analysis of formal interrelationships, but that it loses from not making clear informal ties and relationships between the actors.

The same difference in treatment of the material can be seen from the way two books on Tanzania, concerned with the same kind of problem as this study, select different foci for their analysis. Both books deal with the problem of the extent to which the official ideology in Tanzania has had an impact on rural areas. Ingle (1972) is a political scientist and he concentrates on how the political systems at the different levels from the most inclusive national level down to the local level are integrated and to what extent they are able to realize the plans. The other book is written by two anthropologists/sociologists, van Hekken and van Velzen (1972). They focus on local obstacles to change, particularly the danger that informal alliances between party officials and influential villagers may impede change in the direction demanded by official ideology. They work in an anthropological manner by observing what is happening and use case studies as the basis for their arguments.

The unit under study

Thus, I travel a well-trodden anthropological path in this study, which concentrates on an area in the southern part of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal, called Kitini. Within the area I deal with the households that make up a village pancayat (local administrative unit). I have made this selection of households not because I think that relations between people in Kitini in any way stop at the border of the pancayat, but because the most significant aspect of the new development philosophy in Nepal is the so-called partyless democracy which is built on representation by individuals elected by the adults in the village pancayat to higher units in a tier system where the national pancayat is at the top. It is through this structure that planned development is meant to take place. In this way the politico-administrative field becomes of utmost importance and it is in this sense that the pancayat is a unit, its inhabitants coming together at election time to select those who are to govern it and be its representative on the higher bodies in the pancayat system. But in the fields of economic life and social organization the pancayat must not be thought of as a unit. These cover a far greater area and within the pancayat there are also parts which are isolated from others in these terms.

Outline of the study

The subjects and organization of the various chapters in this study (dealing with social organization, economics and formal politics) is more or less forced on the material, since these are the fields in which planning is envisaged. There are the ideals of economic change, leading to economic equality; there are the ideals of the involvement of every citizen in running the country by taking part in the election of representatives to the administrative bodies; and there are the ideals of education and equal opportunities for all in the social sphere regardless of caste, creed or colour. Thus, I have followed the lead implicitly given by the planners themselves and tried to work out how these ideas are translated into local reality.

In chapter two I give an outline of Nepal, and its history, and discuss the ideals of planned development in their context. I include in this part a sketch of the way the ideals are presented by focussing on the elements of tradition surrounding them, as well as the way in which obstacles to development are visualized by the

ruling ideology. I also give background information about the local community which is the object of the study.

Chapter three deals with aspects of social organization in the sense that I concentrate on how people interact, how they view themselves and others. Here again, it is possible to relate the forms of organization to a state of affairs that should obtain according to the official ideology. In this context I examine the role education has in shaping the students' minds according to the new ideology.

In chapter four I discuss the economic field with regard to the central government's ideals. I start with relations within the agricultural sphere, and move out to extra-agricultural employment and business. The focus is on inequality in life-chances, that is to say, I deal with the situation in which individuals of various categories start their economic life, and here I also deal with patterns of recruitment to jobs and other forms of economic opportunities. Loans are treated as an indicator of social relations and attitudes towards the government in the economic field.

Chapter five is concerned with administration and the formal political process. What is important here is recruitment to administrative posts through elections. This is perhaps the field of social life where differential importance and power of various social categories is most clearly discernable. Again, the local situation is compared to what it ought to be according to official ideology.

In chapter six I sum up the findings of the other chapters and discuss the general character of the problem of the relation between ideology and social structure.

CHAPTER TWO

Geographical outline

The kingdom of Nepal occupies an area on the southern slopes of the Himalayas stretching from the North Indian plains in the south right up to the highest mountain peaks in the world to the north. It extends some 500 miles in the east-west direction, and its area is roughly 54 000 square miles. Geographically it is divided into three or in some versions four eco zones from south to north. The southern lowland which is part of the Gangetic plain is known as the Terai. It is very fertile and produces most of the paddy which is exported from Nepal, sending it mainly to India.[1]

Then comes a hilly region, which extends up to 10 000 feet. This is where the majority of the Nepalese population lives. The area consists of a system of ranges, and two of the most important valleys in Nepal are found here: the Kathmandu Valley and the Pokhara Valley. The climate varies with elevation but is predominantly subtropical. Finally, the Himalayan region stretches from 10 000 feet up to 29 000 feet. Most of the human settlements of this region are to be found below 14 000 feet. Higher up, frost is too great a problem and agriculture becomes virtually impossible. The hillard mountain ranges are cut across by rivers, the valleys of which have always been important for human settlement and communication.

The Kathmandu Valley

The Kathmandu Valley has always claimed the central place in the history of the kingdom of Nepal. It is situated at an altitude of about 4 500 feet, covers an area of roughly 250 square miles, and is almost round in shape. It is an extremely densely populated area, with the population continuing to grow partly through natural increase but also through migration from the hills. Inside the Kathmandu Valley the biggest centra are the towns and villages of the formerly dominant Newar group (see below); among the former Kathmandu itself, Patan and Bhaktapur, and among the latter Chapagaon, Kirtipur and Thimi. Then there are a host of smaller Newar villages scattered all over the Valley.

About 50% of the Kathmandu Valley's population 500 000 people is made up of the Newars, who dominated the area politically up to 1768, when their three kingdoms were conquered by Prithvin Narayan Shah, the king of Gurkha which was situated in the middle of what is to-day the kingdom of Nepal. He had gradually extended his kingdom until he reached the Kathmandu Valley, which he then also incorporated, making Kathmandu his capital. The Shah kings, who have ruled Nepal ever since,are descendants of high caste Indians who immigrated into Nepal several hundred years ago. They were Hindus and their society was based on caste.[2] The Newaris, who also had a caste system, and the other etnic groups residing in the Kathmandu Valley were incorporated into this caste system. This incorporation is mainly one of termininology and does not form a coherent system. Thus the people of Nepal are not all Hindus. Buddhism, which is often mixed up with tribal religious elements, has many adherents (Höfer,1971). Nepal was, however, created as a Hindu kingdom, and remains so even today.

The language of the conquerors was Nepali (which is very closely related to Hindi), and this eventually became the official language. Today almost all citizens of Nepal are bilingual, speaking their mother tongue as well as Nepali. The Newars of the Kathmandu Valley have tried to keep their traditions alive but feel increasingly undermined in this respect by the Hindu ruling classes. The Newars themselves comprise both Hindu and Buddhist groups. Apart from the conquering Aryans and the original Newars there are also tribal peoples scattered in the Valley, the most numerous of which are the Tamangs (see below).

The ruling group among the conquerors was divided in the Indian manner into the two varnas of Brahman and Kshatriya, priests and warriors. The Kshatriya varna is represented in Nepal mainly of the caste of Katri-Chetris which is powerful in the political life of Nepal to-day.

Historical outline[3]

The Kings succeeding Prithvin Narayan Shah were weak rulers and this favoured the nobility who were able to increase their influence over the affairs of state. Eventually in 1846, the King was reduced to a mere figure-head as a result of the usurpation of power by a Chetri named Jang Bahadur Rana. Using his office of Prime Minister, he turned the whole country into his personal fief. This office, together with that of Commander-in-Chief and other high posts in the army and bureaucracy became hereditary within the Rana family.

The various levels in the administration and the army were staffed by Ranas ranked according to their purity of blood.[4]

Throughout its history Nepal has been an independent country even if its independence during the British pediod in India was circumscribed in several ways. For example, the Nepal government had to accept the posting of a British Resident in Kathmandu after its defeat in the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814-16. The Ranas followed a policy of not antagonizing the British and were able to avoid being colonized. They accomplished this by following a policy of: virtual seclusion of the country from outside influences; keeping the people in total ignorance by a fanatical policy of Hinduization, in which Hindu rules became the laws of the country, upholding caste restrictions; consciously avoiding any kind of education for people apart from the trusted few close to the Ranas themselves.

But despite this rigidly enforced policy, opposition grew, to a great extent inspired by the struggle against the British in India. Thus, the reform movement Arya Samaj did probably have some impact on Nepal. In addition there were soldiers returning from the first and second world wars, who brought back knowledge about the world outside.

One of the first signs of a liberalization came in 1918 when the then Prime Minister Chandra Shamshere inaugurated Tri-Chendra college in Kathmandu. He is reported to have remarked that this was the beginning of the end for the Ranas.

As opposition became stronger the Ranas were forced to make other concessions. The first traces of economic planning were seen, and some changes in the constitution were tried. The latter were immediately reversed by the last Rana Prime Minister in a final effort to come to grips with the situation and once again reassert Rana autocracy.

But in autumn 1950 two incidents took place which put an end to Rana rule. The King, Tribhuwan, fled to the Indian Embassy, and was allowed, after pressure had been put on the Ranas by the Indian government, to fly to India with his family. At the same time, the Nepali Congress, a political party with close ties to the Indian Congress Party and with its head-quarters in India launched a number of attacks across the border. A third factor was that these incidents happened to coincide with the Chinese takeover in Tibet, which made India very concerned about the future development in the Himalayan region, and made it press for a quick

solution to the troubles. This was achieved in February, 1951. The ousting of the Ranas did not mean their disappearance from the scene in Kathmandu. They formed part of the new government together with the Nepali Congress, and the former Prime Minister became the head of the Cabinet. The King was reinstated as ruler, and came to assume more and more power, skilfully manipulating the dissension that existed between the Ranas and their former opponents, as well as divisions amongst the latter.

After the death of King Tribhuwan in 1954, his son, Mahendra, took over, and he continued the policy of his father of achieving his end by playing off the politicians against each other. By now there were several parties from the Communists on the left, to orthodox Hindus on the right; and secessions and fusions were common amongst these groups.

The general elections that were held in 1959 seemed to change all this. The Nepal Congress won and formed a government under the leadership of B.P. Koirala. A new constitution was adopted under which the King was to become a constitutional monarch. However, the King decided to overthrow the government. In a surprise move he arrested the Prime Minister and suspended parts of the constitution. The leftist leanings which Koirala and the growing Communist party represented were ended.

In 1962, King Mahendra announced a new constitution for the country, under the name of Pancayat Democracy. This gives the King very wide powers and abolishes all organized political opposition. Representatives are to be elected for assemblies called pancayats which are the executives of the self-governing people in a local administrative area. From these executives, which are called Gaun (village) or Nagar (town) pancayats,[5] representatives are elected to higher bodies (see below). King Mahendra died in 1972 and was succeeded by his son, Birendra, who has retained the Pancayat system with some modifications.

Development of trade[6]

The policy of the Ranas, from Jang Bahadur onwards was to keep British economic penetration at a minimum. One of the reasons for Jang Bahadur to keep the British merchants out seems to have been that hos own relatives were active in business through third persons and they did not want competition. This tradition of the Ranas to be active

in business and industry as well is still noticeable, and although they have been ousted from the heights of political power they are still a formidable part of the economic élite.

The commercial position of Nepal suffered a sharp decline as a result of the Younghusband expedition to Tibet in 1904. The result of this undertaking to pacify the Tibetans was to move the trade between the subcontinent and Tibet from Nepal and Kathmandu to Darjeeling. Thus many of the Nepalese businessmen lost their profitable position as intermediaries.

Unfortunately the absence of adequate documents and studies in the field of economic history make it difficult to assess the consequences of British competition for the indigenous cottage industry in Nepal. It must have had some influence making the market less profitable. Another factor that must have effected Nepalese industry was the agreement of trade treaties between Nepal and British India. The most important single instance here is probably the Anglo-Nepal Treaty of 1923, which favoured the British side and increased the flow of British goods into the country. That unequal trade terms were not only an evil scheme devised by the imperialist British became clear at the time of trade negotiations between India and Nepal, which ended in the trade agreement of 1950, in which India granted few concessions to Nepal. In the same way more recent treaties on trade between the two countries have improved Nepal's situation only marginally.

On the basis of this short exposition of the political and economic development of Nepal it is clear that when the Pancayat Democracy came into force through the new Constitution in 1962, it was in a country with a long history of despotism and isolation from the kind of deep-going penetration by the West that for instance India had undergone. Politically it had been virtually the private property of a ruling family for more than a hundred years, economically it was still almost completely based on subsistence agriculture. It was only in the 1930s that a new kind of development started in this field. But this did not originate as the result of a new economic outlook, and the institutions it created were few. Similarly, formal education was virtually non-existent, and compliance with social requirements of the over-arching ideology of Hinduism - including caste-based inequalities - was legally enforced. Buddhism was the other numerically important religion, but it was relegated to a position of inferiority vis-à-vis Hinduism. Thus, for instance, it declined considerably among the Newars during the Rana rule (Rosser, 1966:78).

It was thus a formidable legacy of inequality that the past had bequethed to the rulers of the post-1951 era, and it is obvious that one cannot expect any thorough-going changes in the few years that have passed since the Ranas were toppled. From the point of view of the social scientist, however, it is enough to be able to discern in which direction the process is moving.

Personal relations and the organization of the Nepalese state

The argument of this study is that the way Pancayat Democracy has worked in Kitini can be understood from examination of the fact that in the Kathmandu Valley social relations are organized on a personal basis rather than through corporate groups. This statement does not imply any absolute dichotomy between the two forms. On the contrary social life can be seen as having a tendency to be organized in one direction or the other, in different contexts. Thus structures of personal relations and of corporate groups (or groups for short) are best viewed as falling at different points on a continuum which has these two analytical concepts as its poles.

The most important consideration determining where a society will fall on this continuum is, as Lloyd (1965) argues, related to the mode of recruitment to the political élite. To what extent are interest groups corporate and able to control the activities of their representatives, and to what extent is the ruler powerful enough to intervene directly in the lives of his subjects and promote them individually? In the former case relations would be based on corporateness, in the latter they would be personal.

Should the prevalent mode of recruitment change in a certain society, for instance as a result of political upheavals, this will be accompanied by a shift in the society's position on the continuum. Miller (1954) gives a good example from Malabar, India, of how personal relations were predominant in the structure of the traditional princely state.

With the coming of the British and the consequent removal of the local authority (destroying the patron-client network), intra-caste relations assumed greater importance as they provided the base for

organization across the borders of the formerly self-contained principalities which was required by the new political unit that had been established. The new situation was characterized by a greater inaccessability of the centre of power from the point of view of people in the rural areas, which also meant a new made of recruitment to the élite; a mode that left out the formally locally important persons. Thus, according to Miller there was a shift from complementarity between castes to a stress on the internal solidarity of each caste. Interests could not be safe-guarded through appeals to a patron (and ultimately the ruler) any more, they had to be defended through group action.

Miller's example also hints that the factor of size may be of some importance. It would be reasonable to argue that relations in the capital close to the ruler are closer to the pole of personal relations on the continuum, while in the peripheral areas, where the central authority is perhaps only encountered when tax is to be collected, groups will be more important.[7]

One can of course argue that even in a situation where groups are important, individuals from various groups will have relations of different kinds with each other. This argument highlights the importance of looking at the total political unit. The point made here is not that in a society characterized by relations between groups, individuals do not interact. What is important is to look at society from the outside, as it were, and determine by which mechanisms the total structure of political and economic life is realized. Is it done through groups or through personal relations or through both?

In Nepal, the ruler could (and can) promote or demote castes (or individual families) in the hierarchy, as, for instance, Greenwold (1975) has shown. Furthermore, the institution known as cakari, whereby subjects tried in various ways to assert their loyalty to the ruler and thereby catch his attention in order to gain favours for themselves is very well known in Nepal. Especially during Rana times there were big gatherings of people outside the residence of the Prime Minister every day. As many families as possible used to try and have one member constantly stationed there (it is said that there were people who had done cakari continuously for up to ten years). These people came not only from Kathmandu. They were sent from different parts of the country by families who could afford to spare a member for unproductive work and support him in the capital. Thus it is clear that

personal relations with the ruler (and at lower levels with his favourites) have been an important means of social mobility in the Kathmandu Valley. Moreover, Nepal is made up of small principalities that were formerly independent, and it is very likely that the situation was similar within these units. There is, however, also reason to believe that, as these outlying areas are to an increasing degree being incorporated into Nepal, with Kathmandu as its centre, the networks of former personal relationships directed towards the local ruler are being transformed into group relations in the local context as the local élites have to make themselves acceptable to the élite in Kathmandu in terms of ritual status in order to establish personal relations with the latter (see chapter six).

The possibilities of establishing personal relations in Nepalese society are also brought out in two important institutions: (a) the structure of the Nepalese caste system and (b) the existence of ritual kinship (mit). The caste system in Nepal can be divided into three major ranked categories with a further ranking of the castes within each category. At the top are the so-called twice-born castes (tagadhari) who have the right to wear the six-fold sacred thread (janai). Below them come the drinking castes (matwali). These two groups together form the "pure" category of the broad division into pure and impure castes. The latter are made up of the Untouchables (pani nacalne) and they form the lowest category of the caste system.

This caste structure is, however, shot through with ways of establishing individual relations across the caste barriers. This is partly a feature of the caste system itself. Through the grading of categories within each caste individual families are able to rise of see themselves fall in this internal hierarchy. This grading also makes individual promotion from one caste to another possible through advantageous marriages. Offspring of couple married without the proper Vedic rituals (in the case of Hindus) will be considered ritually inferior to other members of the caste. However, through marriage (on the part of sons, since all castes in Nepal are patrilineal) with full status members the family will be able to revert to full status within a few generations (Fürer-Haimendorf, 1966a). Similarly, among the Newars a member of the farmer caste, Jyapu, who is able to secure a job in the bureaucracy, or become a merchant, fields where the Newar caste of Srestha is very important, will be able to gain Srestha status for his descendants through marriage into

lower rungs of the Srestha caste. Thus, recruitment of some members to a caste differs from that in India. In the latter a rise or fall in status is normally a group affair with one caste trying to assert ritual superiority over another. In Nepal, on the other hand, the named categories within the various castes exist before the event, so to speak, and individual families fall or rise through marriage. If a man marries a woman of lower but clean caste his children will fall into a lower category and be known by that caste name (among the Brahmans marriage to a widow carries the same stigma while marriage to an Untouchable woman means loss of caste altogether for the man). In all these marriages below one's own caste status the children are punished, as it were. For them to return to full status they have to resort to hypogamy. If the family is able to find a woman from a higher status group within the caste or in the higher caste to which one aspires and a marriage with full Vedic rituals can take place the success of one's attempt at caste climbing is all but assured.[8] Such a strategy is possible if the woman's kinsmen think that the prospective husband is a useful resource economically, politically or has good connections within, for instance, the bureaucracy.

Another institution of great importance in establishing relations between individuals across caste boundaries is that of ritual kinship (mit).[9] This relationship may be entered into by individuals who belong to different class within the same caste (and thereby perhaps to various categories within it) or to different castes. In fact, there is a tradition that mit relations with individuals from castes lower than one's own are beneficial to one's health. Two people who are mit to each other are supposed to treat each other as equals irrespective of caste. In the same way, people who are senior to one partner to the relationship become senior to the other, and those who are junior to the one become junior to the other.

There are two main ways of establishing a mit relationship. One is through a ceremony in the presence of a Brahman priest or guardians of the two persons entering into the mit relationship. The other is through a public announcement by the two individuals concerned that from that time they are mit. And just as is the case with marriages mit ties can be used strategically to gain favours.

Because of these particular individualizing feats, the importance of the caste group for understanding social process is to some extent diminished and inter-personal relations are consequently accentuated. However, as will be seen throughout this study, this is not to say that caste is irrelevant. It is of great advantage to belong to the tagadhari category, less so to be a matwali, and disadvantageous to be a pani nacalne in the society of Nepal. In this way group membership defines to a great extent what an individual can expect to attain in the form of material success and ritual rank. Personal relations cut across castes and are not aberrant phenomena in social life or necessarily related to political and economic dependence. They exist as recognized parts of social organization and point to the importance of personal relations in general. These personal relations can be thought of as a continuum from relatively horizontal relations between kin or friends, both parties helping each other when they are in a position to do so. In this relationship both partners are equal. At the other extreme of the continuum relations are vertical in a patron - client fashion, with one party permanently in the position of patron or broker.[10] Basically the argument is that in Nepal goods is obtained mainly through personal relations and that this fact is shown in the way society is organized.

Relations of influence at the Central level

Since the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley by Prithvi Narayan Shah the tagadhari castes, together with the traditional Neware administrative caste, the Srestha have enjoyed a privileged position in the capital as regards access to the centres of power. Thus, Rana (1971:8f) mentions the fact that the incumbents of administrative posts from the level of Undersecretary and upward are filled with people who in 90% of cases are drawn from these castes.[11] Furthermore, most of these come from Kathmandu (Rose and Fischer, op.cit:70), whereas individuals from outside the Kathmandu Valley, even when belonging to these castes have difficulty obtaining posts in the administration and in gaining promotion. This points to the fact that recruitment to the administration is not based on a generalized feeling of "high-casteness" in the sense that any high-caste person can get a job. The point is, however, that only tagadhari castes and Sresthas occupy the roles of employers, either directly or on behalf of an organization, and of brokers The ties that are used are very clearly defined particularistic loyalties through the extension, as it were, of family loyalties and obligations into the public sphere. In the administration the higher officials have

personal relations to those below, who are supposed to pay their respect as well as run errands for, give gifts and political support to their superiors, who reciprocate by using their influence to favour their clients, helping them, for instance, to gain promotion.

This creates a situation where each agency or institution existing at the macro-level will in itself be a system of personal ties in the form of patron - client relationships, and these may extend down to the micro-level at particular points of time as, for example when a farmer is able to get in touch with someone inside the relevant institution who refers the matter to his patron for a favourable decision on the farmer's behalf (see chapter four).

At the top, on the other hand, the ultimate patrons form a national élite through ties that cut across the agencies and the institutions.[12] Despite the fact that they are divided by factionalism (an inevitable result of person-oriented politics) they can be seen as a ruling group by virtue of their command of land, trade and foreign aid, as well as their control of the State apparatus. And from this élite there flow ties of patronage to lower levels. The ultimate focus of this system is the King at the top of the hierarchy.[13]

Apart from showing itself in the administration the three-caste dominance of Brahmans, Katri-Chetris and Sresthas tan be seen in the fields of commerce, where the Sresthas in particular are very prominent, and of local politics throughout the country. The latter instance is shown by Chauhan (1971:244) in his analysis of the caste membership of the Pradhan and Up-Pradhan pancas (Chairman and Vice-Chairman) of 80 Gaun Pancayats.The Brahmans, Katri-Chetris and Newars had 52 Pradhan pancas and 56 Up-Pradhan pancas, while the traditionally underprivileged castes, which form the vast majority of the population in Nepal, have made little progress in the field of political representation.[14]

It is obvious that the ideals of planned development are opposed to the network of dominance by a few castes. Paradoxically, the same people who will be charged with the task of carrying out the tasks of creating the new society that is being envisaged in these ideals are thereby asked to liquidate their own position as an élite.

The organization of the state: concluding remarks

Put in a comparative perspective Nepal seems to come close to what Lloyd (op.cit.) in his typology of African kingdoms calls "open: government by political association". This system is characterized by hereditary kingship, and the possibility (theoretical in the case of Nepal) of all save some who are defined as not eligible, slaves, outcastes etc., to become part of the political élite. The King has real power, corporate groups are weak and the small village is the norm. Promotion depends on the favour of one's superiors and hence patron-client relationships will form. The political élite is fragmented, all struggling for influence with the ruler, who in turn plays the power-seekers off against each other.

It is likely that Nepal during Rana times came closer to what Lloyd calls "closed: government by royal aristocracy", where members of the ruling lineage are appointed to all important posts in the political structure, with the result that there is intense competition between the members (something that characterized Rana rule).

Pancayat Democracy: aims and objectives

One of the greatest problems facing the rulers in Nepal arises from the fact that the country is split into many ethnic groups with different traditions, cultures and languages, spread over a wide area, separated from each other by mountains which are extremely difficult to cross. In fact, the population is distributed over countless small valleys between and within the mountain ranges that make up most of the country. As a result the feeling of nationhood is weakly developed so necessarily it has received top priority on the agenda of the ruling groups. Thus, the King proclaims "we are all Nepalese", which brings forth a kind of enthusiasm among official commentators which would be difficult to understand if one did not know how many potentially divisive forces exist in the country. Similarly, every Nepali has to wear a topi (Nepalese hat) on entering the Singha Durbar (Central Secretariat), as a symbol of personal identification with the nation.

The same eagerness to do away with internal divisions can be seen in the way religious differences are dealt with by the interpreters of the official ideology. Nepal is a Hindu kingdom, but this does not,

according to certain political philosophers, exclude the Buddhists who form the bulk of the rest of the population, or relegate them to an inferior position, since Buddhism is declared to be ultimately the same as Hinduism (K.P. Pradhan, 2026 Nep. date, i.e., 1969/1970:172 f). In the same way, it is accepted that Nepal is a theocratic state, while retaining all the elements of a secular state (ibid.:174). In this way differences are obscured by formulae which express the claimed unity of the peoples of the nation. This unity is also expressed in the symbol of the King as the ruler of the country and the rallying point of the people's loyalty to their country. The King has a special symbolic meaning to the Hindus as being the reincarnation of Lord Vishnu; but when this is mentioned is is usually also pointed out that he chaired the Buddhist world conference held in Nepal celebrating the 2500th anniversary of Buddha's birth.

The basis of the ideology of Pancayat Democracy is the tradition of village pancayats, seen as the epitome of democracy, in which the whole village came together and solved its problems in an atmosphere of unity and harmony. The facts of caste division and the power of high castes over low are forgotten in this idealization of the village. This model is similar to the Gandhian vision of the self-sufficient village community, and it was established as the basis for the doctrine of social development when parliamentary democracy was abolished by the King. Pancayat Democracy is said to be in explicit contrast to parliamentary institutions, suited to the particular character of the Nepali people as the best avenue for their self-expression. This view is tied in with a desire for development which has been a marked feature of the post-Rana era, and consequently modifications have been made from the notion of a purely traditional system. Caste is no longer a valid reason for discrimination and inequality before the law; posts on the pancayats from the lowest Gaun (village) pancayat to the Rastriya (national) pancayat are filled by elections based on universal suffrage, at the lowest level, and from among the representatives sent from lower to higher bodies. The Rastriya pancayat is a partial exception to these rules since the King can nominate 15% of members and others are nominated from elections among the so-called class organizations (farmers, women, youth, ex-servicemen, workers).

Pancayat Democracy is described as a system uniquely tailored to the Nepalese tradition and it envisages the working together of all individuals in the country without regard to caste, creed or colour. To

make this kind of participation possible through a mobilization of the public aimed at a society based on the ideal of the welfare state, it is stated that every individual should enjoy the right to economic prosperity and that no-one should have to fear exploitation by others. In order to make progess along this road to a society free from exploitation emphasis is laid on the education to which every citizen is entitled, and on the carrying out of development work in which the Gaun pancayats are to be given a great deal of the responsibility.

Broadly speaking, then, it is possible to divide the aims of Pancayat Democracy into those based on economic development, administered through the pancayat system and the five class organizations, and the enjoyment of civil liberties and the right to education.

However, no serious consideration of how progress in the field of social justice is to be achieved without changing the given structure of social relations is given. It is deflected by making the moving forces impersonal. Instead of discussing the possibility that transformation may be impeded by vested interests at the various levels (local, district, national) or facing the fact that desire for change on the part of some may be prevented from materializing in the existing form of society, official ideology makes it a matter of "rallying the forces of development" or "unleashing the forces of development", as if unity among the different segments of the population was a kind of spell that would magically bring forth and activate something called "the forces of development".

This ambiguous language in the rhetoric of Pancayat Democracy, sometimes looking forward and sometimes receiving strength from the history of Nepal, reminds one of the discussion on tradition by Rudolphs and Rudolphs (1967). They argue that traditional concepts can be used for modernization, and give examples from Indian history. Used in this way tradition may be a language with which to make change comprehensible to the people and to retain their loyalty. At the same time, however, the concepts of tradition may be used in such a way as to make a static situation appear as the beginnings of change, i.e., they are used in a purely rhetorical way. Appeals are made to the good old ways and it is claimed that through co-operation in the manner of the idealized past a better future is assured. In this way tradition assumes a conservative influence, since the social structure of which it is an expression, in the Nepalese case super- and sub-ordination of castes, for instance, continues to exist and is in fact strengthened by appeals to tradition unsubstantiated by visible strategies to change

the present authority structures.

The latter use of tradition seems to be characteristic of the Nepalese élite as an over-arching approach to implementing Pancayat Democracy. It is also resorted to in areas where little or no progress has been made in relation to the stated goals, above all in changing the rural social structure. In spheres where some change has been effected, appeals to tradition are much less noticeable. Thus, the de jure establishment of everyone in Nepal as a citizen of the country with equal rights before the law is a break with old customs,giving lower-caste people the possibility, at least in theory, of bypassing the local élite and taking their grievances directly to the agencies of the government, where they may expect to be treated in the same way as high-caste people would be. This is done in a language that is different from the traditional, expressing, as it does values different from those of caste society. Similarly, the extolling of the businessman means a conscious break with the denigration of the usurious money lender and merchant; and again the former big land owner is to be the land lord-turned-industrialist. Appeals to these categories of people are made in an instrumental language freed from the rhetoric directed at the mass of the people, who are told to work for the aims of Pancayat Democracy through adherence to traditional values that are said to be genuinely Nepalese.

The appeal to tradition may, then, be a way of motivating people to change, but it may also be an excuse for not doing anything constructive, and it may act as a conservative influence on the rate and direction of change that is being encouraged by the King and those at the pinnacles of power in the Pancayat system.

This leads naturally to the question as to what extent the uses of tradition are a way to make people understand desired changes, and to what extent they are a shying away from crucial questions about the form of development that is going to take place. That is to say, the frequent use of "tradition" seems to point to a certain ambivalence or contradiction in the minds of the élite. They want development and prosperity, but they also want to retain the existing social structure. These considerations lead to a strong emphasis on economic planning, evident in, for instance, the five-year plans, in which relatively little attention is paid to the human side of development. This is relegated to a few statements about the desirability of equal opportunity for all, in short to what I have called the "aims and objectives" of

Pancayat Democracy, but nowhere is a strategy outlined that tackles the problem of how it is going to be achieved.[15]

This disparity between the ideals of progress and equality and a reality fraught with contradictions is to a certain extent summed up and symbolized in the position of the King. He is the pivot of both practical politics and ideological fervour taking care of the activities of government in his role of enlightened despot, and also symbolizing the unity of the country. He legitimizes both progress and traditionalism through the constitution handed down to the people and his position as the incarnation of Lord Vishnu. Thus, he is in the uncomfortable position of trying to hold the country together through the ideological power ascribed to him by the dominant Hindu system, a system which is based on inequality expressed in the language of caste. At the same time, however, he is publicly committed to progress through science and an increasing involvement of Nepal with the world at large, commitments that will progressively undermine his position as a ruler with a divine mandate.

This ambiguity in the position of the King has led him to prop up his position by relying on what Chauhan (op.cit.) calls "the traditional forces", which are the élite embodied in the bureaucracy, the police and the army. These three institutions have been constantly favoured by the King since the overthrow of the Ranas, and subject to continuous expansion. Assured of their loyalty, the King can proceed cautiously with reforms under the revolutionary slogan of Pancayat Democracy as holding high the banners of social, economic and political equality.

The politico-administrative system

The present system of administration in Nepal was organized as a result of the royal coup in 1959, and the creation of the Pancayat system in 1962. In this new political and administrative system political parties were banned, which meant that those who wished to be elected to administrative positions had to rely on their own efforts alone to get into office. The ideals of Pancayat Democracy were expressed in the way representation by, and administration of, the people was to take place. The system called for several levels from the local village or town up to the national level, where most representatives were selected from the lower levels and some nominated by the King, while others in turn were nominated by so-called class organizations (see below).

Elections to the various levels were supposed to take place on an individual basis where the candidates would be judged by the electorate solely on their merits without any interference from party organizations which, in the view of the legislators, might lead to factionalism and corruption. Hence, the theory was that at the local level people selected incumbents without outside pressures being put on them, and from among the successful candidates representatives were selected to be sent to the next level and finally up to the national level. This system would then express the will of the people from the composition of the local pancayat up to the national pancayat.

At the local level there are two kinds of pancayats, Gaun (village) and Nagar (town) pancayat. Here I shall only be concerned with the former.

The Gaun pancayat is elected by universal suffrage. To be allowed to vote a person has to be at least 21 years of age and not suffering from a mental disease.

Those entitled to the vote can also take part in the general meeting held twice a year called the Gaun Sabha, which is the ultimate arbiter in questions concerning the governing of the Gaun pancayat. It even has the power of forcing members of the Gaun pancayat to step down. A quorum is constituted by 20% attendance of its members.

The gaun pancayat is divided into nine wards for administrative purposes. For each ward a member of the Gaun pancayat is elected by the residents from that ward who qualify for the Gaun Sabba. These members are called panc. In addition a Pradhan panc (Chairman) and an Up-pradhan panc (Vice-Chairman) have to be elected. This is done with the whole of the gaun pancayat forming the constituency. Thus, the Pradhan panc and the Up-pradhan panc are thought of as representing the whole of the gaun pancayat, and they do not represent the wards in which they live. The length of tenure for the Pradhan panc and Up-pradhan panc is three years, while the pancas hold their positions for four years.

The finances of the Gaun panchayat (which are audited by the Gaun Sabha) are derived from grants from the government, taxes and fines which the Gaun pancayat itself may impose (see below),and loans.

There is also an official on some Gaun pacayats who is called Gaun Sewak (the Gaun pancayat of Kitini had such a position). He is a secretary to the Gaun pancayat and appointed and paid by the government. However, he is not a full member of the Gaun pancayat and he has no right to vote in the meetings.

The Gaun pancayat has both administrative and judicial functions. These two functions are divided between branches of the government at the next level, the Jilla, or district level. The administrative branch, which is called Jilla Sabha is made up of representatives from the Gaun and Nagar pancayats in the district. These representatives are elected from among the Gaun pancayats in the district. These representatives are elected from among the Gaun or Nagar pancayats by the members themselves. The Jilla Sabha then elects its own Sabhapati and Up-Sabhapati (Chairman and Vice-chairman) and nine members. There is also a secretary of the Jilla pancayat. He is the Chief Development Officer who is under the Ministry of Home and Pancayat. He was no right to vote, and acts as a supervisor on behalf of the government. Above the Jilla level there is the Ancal (zonal) level. There is an Ancal Sabha consisting of all the members of Jilla pancayats and elected members from the various class-organization (see below) as well as representatives of graduate students from the Ancal. There are 14 Ancals in the country. The executive body at the Ancal level is the Ancal Samiti (zonal committee), which is made up of all the Chairmen of the Jilla pancayats within the Ancal, all the Chairmen of the Jilla class organizations within the Ancal and five nominees by the government. They have a tenure of two years. The Ancal Sabhas elect the same number of representatives from among themselves as the number of districts within each one of them to the Rastriya (National) pancayat, currently 90. At this level 15 representatives come from class organizations and four others must be graduates. Then 15% of the above representatives are added through nomination by the King giving a total of 125 representatives in the Rastriya pancayat.

The administrative machinery is brought into contact with these elected bodies through the association of civil servants from the Jilla level and up, and the government and the King make their presence even more strongly felt by nominating members to the Rastriya pancayat. In this way the theory of pure representation from below is somewhat tarnished but at all levels up to the Ancal level these government representatives are kept in the background having no right to vote. In the case of the Chief Development Officer at the Jilla level, however, it is clear that he has a strong say in what is going on and a lot of responsibility on his own, while the Gaun Sewak of the Gaun pancayat has no special powers of his own.

As was noted above the judiciary functions of the Gaun pancayat is taken over at the Jilla level by a court, Jilla Adalat, which hears

civil and criminal cases. Above it there is the Ancal Adalat and then the Sarbocca Adalat (Supreme Court). Then there are two courts of which one, Mal Adda (Land Administration Office) is the most important here. It is concerned with minor cases with regard to revenue, and above it is the Assistant Commissioner (who is under the Ancal Commissioner). The highest authority on revenue is the Kar Adalat (revenue court). The revenue courts have no connection with the Gaun pancayat. The latter's jurisdiction is at the level below the Jilla Adalat.

The administrative duties of the Gaun pancayat include the building and upkeep of roads, health and sanitary matters, administration of movable and immovable property, promotion of agriculture in various ways, the provision of drinking water, the encouragement of handicrafts, the improvement of education, provision of voluntary labour for specific projects, co-operation with the Jilla pancayat in development matters and encouragement of the co-operative movement.

The judicial functions of the Gaun pancayat include such things as questions related to field boundaries and forced labour (it was formerly customary that tenants or debtors did a few days' unpaid work for the landlord or creditor). In addition it can handle cases involving property or money not exceeding Rs.100, and fine culprits not more than Rs. 25 or send them to prison for not more than 3 months.

Under the Pancayat system there are also five so-called class organizations farmers, women, workers, youth, ex-servicemen, which are to work for the interests of the categories of people when they represent. They are also supposed to work in harmony with the pancayats, but the forms of this co-operation are not spelled out.

At the local level the class organizations consist of an executive of eleven people. They elect one member to represent the organization at the Jilla level. Then an unspecified number of representatives from each class organization (altogether 15) are voted into the Rastriya pancayat. These elections are prepared, like all elections to the Rastriya pancayat by the Ancal Committee in each Zone, where the class organizations are represented.
In this way the class organizations form autonomous structures up to the Ancal Committee level.[16]

The Pancayat system defines the structure within which competition for influence over administrative positions takes place. And it also defines

the spirit in which such competition should take place by assuming the homogeneity in social terms of the people who live within the boundaries of the gaun pancayat. This homogeneity would make for a fair selection of the persons most fit to become members of the Gaun pancayat and administer in the interests of all as well as influence administration at higher levels by sending their representatives to them.

The unit of study

The locality which is being studied here called Kitini is situated in the southern part of the Kathmandu Valley on the northern slope of a ridge that leads up to the foothills which surround the entire valley. The western part of it is the lowest with the ground slowly rising to the east and to the south, the extreme south-eastern parts being a few hundred feet higher than the lower parts.

The distance from Kathmandu is about 12 kilometres and easy communication is made possible by an all-weather road. Since this is a very beautiful area of the Kathmandu Valley, with a government sponsored botanical and fruit garden, many people go there from the capital to picnic at weekends. The area was also a summer retreat for the Ranas who used to spend their time there during the monsoon season. A legacy of this time is still to be found in the several buildings that are now occupied by the Jesuit St. Xavier School, which is a boarding school taking students from all over Nepal. It is run by western Jesuit Fathers and was started during the last year of the Rana régime. In the same area there is an important Hindu temple called the Godawari pond where a celebration is held every twelve years attracting large crowds from all over the Kathmandu Valley. Then there are two minor industrial enterprises, and a small fish farm, which was begun at the same time as the botanical and fruit garden. Both industrial enterprises are relatively old establishments which have had varying periods of activity and dormancy (see chapter four). One produces limestone and the other is a marble cutting factory. All these institutions above are situated in the eastern end of Kitini which is, then, the most important with regard to economic undertakings and a local centre for people coming from Kathmandu. Going westwards, that is following the road towards Kathmandu, one passes clusters of houses spread out at varying distances from the road. These clusters are rather small and interspersed with solitary buildings, and it is not

until one is about halfway through Kitini (about a kilometre or so) that one begins to see larger settlements. The main settlement, straddling the road, belongs to the locally dominant caste group (see below), and this is also where one finds the pancayat house, the symbol of the new political system and the "government" building of the gaun pancayat. Further away to the south and higher up on the slopes one can discern the two hamlets of the Tibeto-Burman Tamangs (see below). To the west of Kitini there is the big Newar village of Badegaun, to which the few Newars living in Kitini are bound through kinship and religion.

In most cases each cluster of houses belongs to people of one caste, the clusters having spread out across the countryside in an irregular pattern. Although there are often one or more households from other castes living in such a cluster, these are still known by the name of the caste which makes up the majority. These clusters may comprise any number of houses from five to fifty. In addition there are many houses which do not belong to any such cluster. These clusters and solitary houses are connected by the many paths which follow the edges of the paddy fields or wind their way up the hill slopes. Apart from the main road, there is no other motorable road in the area. Most of these paths are even impossible to travel on by bicycle. And in the monsoon the become muddy and slippery and difficult to use, even on foot.

Caste composition of Kitini

For heuristic purposes I treat the castes in Kitini as belonging to three socio-cultural systems: that which has been dominant in Nepal since the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley by Pritvi Naryan Shah; that of the indigenous Newars; and that of the Tamangs, which is an important group in Kitini by virtue of their numbers. These three socio-cultural do not exist on the same level, however. The dominant socio-cultural system encompasses the others in the sense that they have to interact with other groups and castes in terms of the rules set by the dominant system. This is, for instance, true in the field of caste ranking. In this way these three systems are not absolutely distinct ; while it is possible to distinguish the Newars and the Tamangs in terms of social organization and culture both have contact with the dominant system, since they are, in the final analysis, members of it as citizens of the state of Nepal. In the following ana-

lysis one has, then, to remember that while the presentation of the three socio-cultural systems may give the impression that they are rigidly separated, this is in fact not so. The ties that bind them together must be kept in mind; these ties will be explored in this chapter and in those that follow.

There are three small castes in Kitini which are marginal to these three socio-cultural systems. They are the Gurung and Pahari castes represented by three households each and the Nagarkoti with six households. They are all matwali castes with Tibeto-Burman languages, and organizationally part of the Gurung, Pahari and Nagarkoti castes respectively. However, they are also tied to the dominant socio-cultural system in the religious sphere by regularly using Brahman priests for their worship, while the Tamangs and the Newars each use their own ritual specialists.

In this exposition I shall not consider these three castes but rather concentrate on the three socio-cultural systems which make up more than 97% of the population in Kitini. To begin with I shall discuss the dominant system:

The most important caste in Kitini in terms of numbers and political and economic power is that of the Katri-Chetri, especially one Katri-Chetri clan, the Silwal. According to their own tradition the Silwals settled in Kitini some 13 generations ago, and if this is true they were before Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered the Kathmandu Valley. The other possibility is that they came with him and settled after the conquest. Being Katri-Chetris, and hence pursuing a military career they were given land as remuneration for their services in the army. Today the Silwals generally own more and better land than do members of other castes, the main exception being the inhabitants of one hamlet of Silwals which is situated rather high up on the ridge that form the southern part of Kitini. Here the land is of poorer quality, being mostly dry land (pakho), as compared to the predominantly irrigated lands (khet) owned by the other two Silwal hamlets. This division into hamlets in the case of the Silwals is based on kinship. Although they all consider themselves related having the same immigrant Brahman ancestor, they are not clear as to the exact relations between these hamlets.

The Katri-Chetris are one part of the ruling stratum in the dominant socio-cultural system. The other part is made up by the ritually caste, the Brahmans, who furnish the priests (purohit). These two castes constitute the twice born, (tagadhari) and are associated

culturally with the cluster of Untouchable (pani nacalne) castes of Damai (tailor), Kami (blacksmith) and Sarki (cobbler), who also claim Aryan descent. In between these caste categories the matwali castes fall, as I pointed out above. These are all of Tibeto-Burman stock. However, in Kitini there are two castes which do not fit into this neat system, namely the Mahanta and Kamar groups. Both are descendants of ascetics and are Aryan. The Mahantas rank higher often being associated with religion through their work as caretakers of temples. The Kamars, on the other hand, have lower ritual rank (at least in Kitini) because they beg as part of their ascetic tradition. Thus, they are forced to accept food from various castes, something that lowers their ritual standing. The twice-born consider the Mahantas as being lower than they themselves, while the Mahantas agree that the Brahmans are ritually purer, while denying that the Katri-Chetris are of higher rank. However, most Mahantas accept cooked food and drink from both the twice-born castes, while the latter do not accept these things if offered by Mahantas.

Households from the Damai, Kami and Sarki castes, in Kitini only the Kami and the Damai traditionally serve households from other castes, whom they call bista, by doing a certain amount of work each year which is paid in kind by the latter from the yearly harvest (for details and exceptions to this rule, see chapter four). The bista households are drawn from almost all other castes and the relationship is an enduring one. The Silwals are, however, more important than the other bistas in this context, since they contributed the land on which the service castes settled, so that the latter were tied not only with bands relating to service, but these were reinforced by ties pertaining to ownership and use of land as well.

The Sarkis also had bistas, but these ties have now ceased to exist, due to the fact that their services in shoe-making are no longer in demand. Work for a bista household should be distinguished from work which is paid according to market price. The service castes perform tasks within their speciality for anyone who pays for it, but this does not imply an enduring relationship.

One matwali caste, the Magar, occupies an ambiguous place within the dominant socio-cultural system. The Magar tribe is concentrated in parts of middle Nepal and there are two households in Kitini who belong to this tribe. But the majority, more than 30 households of those who call themselves Magars adopted this caste name only a short time ago. They were formerly known as Ghartis, a term denoting people from

castes below the twice-born who had lost their free-born status mainly as a result of inability to pay debts, or descendants of such people.[17] In 1926 the Ghartis were freed by the then ruling Rana Prime Minister, Chandra Shamshere, and a law was made that they should be given compensation. Some of the Ghartis in Kitini are former serfs of high-caste people, mainly Silwals of the area, while others came to Kitini after 1926. During the last 15 years these Ghartis have tried to raise their rank by adopting the name of Magar, something which has met with mixed success (see chapter three). Because of its mixed origin it is difficult ascertain whether it is really a truly matwali caste, but since they have chosen the name of a matwali caste as their new name they are included within that category.

The second main socio-cultural in Kitini is that of the Tamangs. They are a tribe speaking a Tibeto-Burman language and found all over central Nepal. They are Buddhists.[18]

Around the Kathmandu Valley there seems to be the general pattern that the Tamangs settle higher up the hills than other castes. This is due to the fact that they formerly practised slash-and-burn agriculture. With the introduction of terrace cultivation, however, this settlement pattern has left them with land of poor quality to till, and the result is that they have to find other sources of employment, since agriculture alone cannot support them. The Tamangs in Kitini are concentrated in two quite large hamlets and a few smaller concentrations, as well as having individual houses scattered over the area. Tradition has it that one hamlet, Lower (talo) Poudel, was the first to be established. When these Tamangs could not find women to marry they called some other Tamang families to come and settle there. These newcomers settled somewhat higher up on the hillside, just east of the original settlement. This hamlet is now called Upper (mathi) Poudel.

The third broad socio-cultural system, broad in the sense that it is an extension of that dominating numerically in the Kathmandu Valley as a whole, although not in Kitini is that of the Newars, who are represented in the latter by only eighteen households. Most of these are in the western part of Kitini which borders on the big Newar village of Badegaun, to which these scattered Newar households in Kitini belong culturally and organizationally.

The Newars have a caste system of their own, but they are mostly regarded by outsiders as forming one group and are relegated to the matwali category as defined by the ruling Hindu cultural system. The exceptions to this are the Newar castes which are defined as Untouchable within the Newar caste system. They are also treated as Untouchables by other castes in Nepal.

In terms of religion the Newar are divided into Hindus and Buddhists, the former section having prospered at the expense of the latter during the period of Rana rule, while there has been a more pronounced orientation towards cultural autonomy and an increase in the vitality of Newar Buddhism during the post-Rana period, as I mentioned above.

These three socio-culturally defined systems are also characterized by the fact that they are to a certain extent spatially distinct. The Tamangs are found mainly in the southern part of Kitini high up on the hill side; the Newars to the west; while the dominant system takes up most of the area with the Silwals strung out in distinct hamlets extending from west to east. The service castes of Kami and Damai are to be found close to the settlements of the Katri-Chetris, while the Brahmans form distinct hamlets in two places, to the east and to the west. The Sarkis also live in a hamlet to the east above the Silwal hamlets. The Mahantas live in an area between two Silwal hamlets, and the Magars are concentrated in the western part, largely in one hamlet, but they are also found close to the settlements of the Katri-Chetris.

The settlement pattern is, then, characterized by small hamlets usually dominated one caste and with houses scattered all around these hamlets. There is thus not the type of nucleated settlement structure that characterizes Newar villages.

As a result of the introduction of the Pancayat system. Kitini has been divided into wards for administrative and electoral purposes. An outline of the division into castes of the constituent households in each ward may give a better picture of the settlement pattern. The ward boundaries go between the hamlets and in this way it is possible to assess the strength of each caste in the respective wards.

Ward number one lies to the extreme west of Kitini with wards two, three and four comprising the lower northern half of the area and

ward five to the extreme east. Wards six, seven, eight and nine, then, cover the upper southern half of Kitini (see map).

Table 1 shows the distribution by wards of the various castes in terms of the household unit. The household is defined through its economic aspect as a unit of consumption. Figures are given for the Newars both for the whole socio-cultural system, and, within brackets, for the castes that are part of it.

Table 1

Caste	Wards									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Katri-Chetri, excl.Silwal	6	3	4	3	8	0	0	0	5	29
Silwal	4	23	30	2	13	2	0	0	23	97
Tamang	0	0	0	13	8	38	42	0	2	103
Brahman	9	0	0	4	16	9	0	15	2	55
Sarki	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	24	0	33
Magar, excl.Rana Magar	11	0	7	2	6	0	0	0	6	32
Rana Magar	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Newar	11	4	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	18
(Srestha)	(8)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(10)
(Jyapu)	(2)	(4)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(7)
(Tandukar)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)
Kamar	14	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	16
Mahanta	0	0	0	6	1	10	0	0	0	17
Kami	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	9
Damai	0	1	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	6
Nagarkoti	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6
Pahari	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Gurung	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
	74	36	43	35	55	60	42	41	43	429

The Tamang and Newar socio-cultural systems are distributed over a fairly small area while the dominant system is found in most wards. However, even within this system most castes are concentrated in a few wards in the manner discussed above.

There is, then, in Kitini both a division into what I have called socio-cultural systems and into a hierarchy of castes, where the highest and the lowest castes belong exclusively to the dominant socio-cultural system, while the middle castes cut across all three such systems. This hierarchical division is the result of the enforced association of the socio-cultural systems on the terms of the leading castes of the dominant system, and is therefore a definition that is imposed from the above. This means that the Tamangs and Newars are competent in the culture of the dominant socio-cultural system, while the members of the latter may not and need not be competent in Tamang and Newar culture.

As will be seen in chapter three, the various socio-cultural systems all have their own forms of organization and association, while interaction across the boundaries of socio-cultural systems and castes is largely expressed in the cultural forms of the dominant system. A notable exception to this is the internal division within the Newar socio-cultural system, where relations are patterned by the Newar caste system. The latter is largely ignored by the dominant socio-cultural system, and hence not valid in interaction between socio-cultural systems.

CHAPTER THREE

In this chapter I shall discuss in greater detail the internal organization of each of the three socio-cultural systems and how people within them relate to each other and to people of other systems. The kinds of interaction patterns and loyalties that people in Kitini have will obviously say something about the extent to which the expressed ideals of Pancayat Democracy correspond to social reality there. In this context education is an important variable: I shall discuss recruitment to schools and whether schooling has change the outlook of the students so that it has become distinguishable from that of other people.

This is, then, a chapter about the way people see their society, and how this is related to the way this society is organized. I shall be concerned mainly with the dominant socio-cultural system and that of the Tamangs since they form the vast majority in the Kitini area. The values and the ordering of the world in a conceptual sense by the dominant system do of course leave their imprint on the other two socio-cultural systems in inter-group communication. This is expressed in the fact that the Tamangs and the Newars are ranked as matwali castes and that they accept this ranking speaking of themselves as jat (caste) inferior in rank to the twice-born (and to the Mahanta). They also see themselves as superior to the Untouchables. That is to say, when they interact in day-to-day activities in Kitini they do so to a great extent under conditions set by the dominant socio-cultural system (or rather, by the ruling stratum of that system).

Household composition

All castes in Kitini have the same kind of household composition in various stages of the developmental cycle. Here a household is taken to be the unit of consumption. A few households consist of one person only, in most cases an old man or a woman. Then there are about 40% of the 429 households in the Kitini area which make up this study that are made up of a couple and their unmarried children. In most cases these couples are fairly young with small children. The rest of the households are more complex with a couple and their married children and perhaps grandchildren, or some other combination of consanguineal and affinal kin living under the same roof and farming the same land. The biggest household in Kitini is that of a Brahman with 13 members of three generations.

Normally a man has one wife, but in cases of barenness on the part of the woman the law permits that the man takes a second wife, and there are some households where there are men with two wives. Most land is held individually under raikar tenure (the individual can alienate and transfer land, but the state is considered the ultimate owner).[1] This means that the land of the parent household is divided when a son decides at the time of marriage or afterwards to set up a household of his own. Such a splitting of the household should ideally be carried out under the auspicies of the Pradhan Panc, the Gaun pancayat member of the ward in which the household lives, some older men whom they hold in high esteem and some relatives or neighbours. Then the members of the household put all items owned by the household on display after which the people that have been invited start to allot the household members (the parents as one unit, the sons and unmarried daughters above the age of 35 individually) shares from the property. First the youngest member is asked to pick one share. After him it is the eldest son's or daughter's turn. The parents take what is left after the children have taken theirs. If there are daughters below the age of 35 who are not yet married, ornaments, money, grains or other things are set apart for them to make up their dowry. What these things are to be is also decided by the invited people. If there is no property that can be set aside for this purpose a piece of land will be marked out to fill the same purpose in the sense that one of the siblings or the parents who will bear the financial burden of the marriage will be allowed to use the land.

After dividing the movable property the land is similarly divided. If the household is in debt or has lent money this is also split up among the household members.

Often the splitting of the household takes place in stages with the division of land being the last stage. In most cases it is the eldest son who moves out first followed by his younger brothers, while the youngest may stay on to take care of the parents. In such cases the youngest may inherit the parents' share on their death.

Marriage[2]

The rules of marriage associated with Indian Hindu society, such as caste endogamy and, at least for the higher castes, the prohibition of widow remarriage are much less strictly enforced in Nepal. Thus, even Brahman widows sometimes remarry. And as I said above there are categories within the castes that determine the rank of children born

from such unions or from unions of men and women from different castes. Thus, for instance, a child by a Brahman man and a lower caste woman (excluding the Untouchables, since cohabitation with them is prohibited for men of clean caste) are known as Katris. They retain their father's clan name and may as time goes on be accepted as of the same rank as the slightly more elevated Katri clans issuing from Brahman - Chetri parents. As for a Chetri man marrying a woman of lower clean caste, the children are known as Chetris, but there is some ritual discrimination against them. There is thus a difference within the caste as to ritual purity, but families which are ranked lower are able, through marriage into pure Chetri lines to revert to full Chetri ritual rank after a few generations, as was seen in chapter two.

Every boy born to tagadhari parents who were married with full Vedic rites should be invested with the six-fold janai (thread) at brata-bandha (initiation rite for boys). Among the Katri-Chetri this janai signifies jharra status. Boys born from a union between a Katri-Chetri man and a woman of lower but clean caste is called thimsal and invested with a three-fold janai.

Generally it is the clan, closeness of kinship and gotra[3] which regulate marriage among the Hindus. A person should not marry within the same gotra: that is a common rule. But some castes allow marriage within the same clan if a suitable number of generations have passed from the apical ancestor. Thus, among the Mahantas the passage of seven generations is given as the minimum number.

Among the Newars intermarriage between various castes is also quite common, although, just as is the case within the dominant Hindu system, endogamy is held up as the ideal. But here, too, the rule is that children of an Untouchable (pani nacalne) woman and a clean caste man (within the Newar caste system) will be regarded as pani nacalne. Intermarriage between the clean castes of Srestha and Jyapu are, on the other hand, allowed and practised. The children of such unions will be considered as belonging to the father's caste. Just as is the case with the dominant socio-cultural system, a marriage between individuals from different castes cannot be celebrated with the full ritual.

Divorce is, in contradistinction to the ideal upheld by the Hindu dominant socio-cultural system, quite common and widows remarry. In fact, the Newar ideology denies the fact of the existence of divorces and widow remarriages, since the woman is considered to be married to the god Narayn and hence can leave the man with whom she

is living without breaking up her marriage to her real husband, the god.

Tamang marriage is regulated by clan exogamy and cross-cousin marriage. The latter rule shows itself in Kitini through the tendency of clans to prefer a limited number of other clans as sources of marriage partners. Thus in a list of 79 marriages which I collected the four biggest clans (which account for 75% of the Tamang population in Kitini) showed clear preferences for each other and another clan not found in Kitini. These marriages take place both within and between the hamlets in Kitini (11 and 13 marriages respectively), and with villages situated in most cases to the south and west of the Kathmandu Valley (55 marriages). Not only do the clans seem to prefer a limited number of other clans into which they marry. These ties are also concentrated to a small number of settlements. Women from other groups, except Untouchables, may be included through marriage as members of the Tamang community. Widow remarriage is allowed. A brother of the deceased is then the potential husband.

Territory and corporateness

In the dominant socio-economic system the household is the effective unit both in economic matters and in the ritual sphere. Apart from general feelings of solidarity between brothers there is no higher institutionalized pattern of corporate action. The clan is not localized and the members of the lineage are often spread out, and despite consciousness of belonging to a brach of the lineage (hanga) the household is to a great extent independent in its day-to-day activities, although there is co-operation between various related households at, for instance, peak seasons of the agricultural year. In the ideological sphere there are periodic reassertions of the kinship ties when households come together. The most important of these concerns the celebration of Dewali, when the deity known as kul devata is worshipped.[4] The kul devata is the protector of the kingroup. Some clans (thar) worship their kul devata at a joint celebration, where all households come together, while others do so in a more individualistic way, each household going to the place of celebration for worship and then go back home for a meal. In this case only the knowledge that the other households do the same thing on the same day furnish the feeling of belonging to the same thar. The Silwals, for instance, celebrate their Dewali in this way nowadays. But only a few years ago some of them used to take a meal to-

gether at the temple. The local kinship group is also made visible on such occasions as births and deaths, when members are considered to be in a state of ritual pollution for different lengths of time depending on genealogical proximity to the individual involved. The case is different with the Newars and the Tamangs. Among the former most festivals are inter-caste (within the Newar caste system) and community based. However, the specific Hindu festivals among them are based on the household.

The Newars have also instituted co-operation through guthis. A guthi is an association for religious and economic purposes. Some of these guthis are based on kinship, others on locality, cutting across kinship and caste divisions.

As was said above the Newars in Kitini live close to the big Newar village of Badegaun with which they are associated both culturally and organizationally. Only two Srestha households, living close to the other extreme of Kitini are from another part of the Kathmandu Valley, namely Thimi to the east. They have settled as shopkeepers in Kitini and still have their land in Thimi. They also go there for the important guthi festivals.

The Tamangs hold their feasts on a hamlet basis under the leadership of elected officials of the Tamang community (see below). Their two most important calendrical feasts are the Buddhist New Year and the celebration of the feast of Caitrapurne in spring. Among the Tamangs in Kitini the latter of these two festivals was by far the biggest in terms of preparations and in the scale of feasting. In secular matters there is no institutionalized co-operation between lineage members. Land is held individually under the raikar land tenure system. This is in contradistinction to the traditional form of Tamang land tenure, where land was vested in the descent group. This form of landownership was called kipat[5] and is still prevalent among the Rais and Limbus in eastern Nepal. The Tamangs in Kitini are today mostly tenants and agricultural labourers.

The caste (jat) is never a functional unit in any of the three socio-cultural systems in the sense that people come together for common activities. Caste is a reference point in determining rank and hence in determining the character of social interaction between persons defined by it as essentially superior or inferior.

Tamang organization

The Tamang, as was pointed out earlier, are the only caste in Kitini with a comprehensive caste organization. The two main hamlets of Upper and Lower Poudel form in this respect two distinct units, each having a set of Tamang posts of authority. Among these there are both individuals acting in the capacity of officials and assemblies convened to settle specific problems. Thus respected individuals from the eldest generation are invited to take part in religious ceremonies, or to settle quarrels. The most important role in this ad hoc assembly is called Kheppa (old man).

The most important elective office is that of Cokho. He supervises when communal work is to be carried out, and it is also his duty to be present at the settling of quarrels (acting together with the old men). In general, he is the authority on religious and civil matters. It is legally possible to overrule the Cokho's decision when he acts as a judge, but according to Tamang informants this has never been done.

The ideal is that a Cokho's son should succeed him, and failing this any close relative in the male line. If there are no suitable candidates within the patriline, the Cokho may choose anyone else as his successor. It seems to be the case that a Cokho does not make his choice of successor public and according to informants it has happened that after the death of a Cokho several persons have come forward and claimed that they have been chosen. However, whether such rival claims are being staked or not, it is the villagers who have the final say as to who shall be the new Cokho, which is decided at a general meeting. And they also have the power to depose a Cokho who is not to their liking. This has in fact happened twice in Upper Poudel during the last decade. When the Cokho died one of his sons was selected, but deposed within a short time. Another son was tried, but even he was considered wanting and eventually a son's son was tried and he is still acting as Cokho.

The official known as Ghaurai acts as chairman at the election of a Cokho, and chairs the meeting for deposing a Cokho. In normal circumstances he works together with the Cokho, and takes orders from him. He is selected in the same way as a Cokho, and like him he can be deposed.

There should be at least one Lama (priest) in each hamlet. When the Lama is performing a rite he is attended by a Katak,who is a member of the group of Ghanbas, whose duty it is to see that there are no

disturbances during religious ceremonies and that everything functions as it should. The Lama who belongs to the most senior family of priests in Kitini has a duty to protect the crops against hail and bad weather. He does this for neighbouring pancayats as well and is paid in grain by each household whose standing crop he protects. This he does not do only for Tamangs. He goes to every household and nearly all of them accept the efficacy of his ritual power.

The Lama is succeeded by one of his sons, usually the eldest, but none of the sons has to become a priest.

The Lamas are not drawn from any particular clan, but according to some informants many of them came from the clans of Lopcen and Singar.

The Tamba has religious functions, such as exhorting newly married couples and boys at the time of their initiation ceremony to lead good lives. Then there are also, outside the structure of offices, ritual specialists called bombo,a kind of jhankri (shaman). There are at present three bombos in Kitini.

The Tamangs of a hamlet come every year to their Lama and Ghaurai to perform a couple of days' work on their fields (beti).For this they are paid some maize flour and a meal. In the case of the Ghaurai this work seems to be connected with the fact that he used to collect land taxes in his hamlet for the administration.

The Tamangs in Kitini keep to themselves to a great extent ;their traditional authorities are still obeyed in most matters. These officials command the loyalty of not only of not only the older Tamangs, but that of the young generation as well. The threat of being denied social intercourse is very real in the minds of the Tamangs and they will therefore not ignore a decision which they feel the whole hamlet accepts. Should, however, the customary procedures of settlement of a dispute fail, it is brought to the attention of the Gaun pancayat, the aggrieved parties calling the ward member or some other panc, whom they feel will be sympathetic towards them.

The Tamangs do not only show a great deal of solidarity among themselves, but they are also regarded as alien by most other castes. A person from an Untouchable caste may be inferior, a Newar different, but they are not outside social life in the extent that the Tamangs are. And this is related to the fact that both the pani nacalne person and the Newars are part of larger socio-cultural systems extending to the centres of political and economic power in Kathamndu, while

the Tamangs are simply a tribe with no such systematic connections. This quality of being marginal is in turn enhanced by their strong corporate organization. But despite the fact that the Tamangs are seen as a closed group when viewed from the outside, it is still true that there exist deep divisions within this group between different segments of the population. This is brought out both in daily life and at the time of feasting.

Cleavages within the Tamang socio-cultural system

The Tamangs of Upper and Lower Poudel never celebrate a collective feast together, although they are neighbours and, in many cases, kin. This independence of hamlets among the Tamangs is to be seen at the big festival of Caitrapurne when the Tamangs assemble at the local Hindu temple Naudhara (nine taps) to sacrifice a buffalo and to feast. This is also a day when the Hindus do puja (worship) at the temple, but to them it is not the big occasion that it is to the Tamangs. On the occasion which I observed they assembled in groups from the two Poudels, with the Tamangs from other parts of Kitini joining one or the other of the two main hamlets. Each hamlet brought its own buffalo and when the first hamlet had finished sacrificing the other forced its buffalo up the steep steps and in through the narrow door-way of the dilapidated temple. Those present sat down in two groups according to their hamlet, with a distance of about 100 yards between them, and in such a way that they could not see each other. Within each hamlet close kin were seated together. Despite the fact that virtually all those present were in some degree intoxicated: no attempts were made to associate with those of the other hamlet group.

It was only towards evening when people strolled on the open square in front of the temple, the music started in earnest, and the dancing, mostly by men, began, that there was some mixing between the dancers, musicians and the audiences from the two Tamang hamlets. And as the night wore on, the music grew louder and people slowly started for home, one happy group, hopped, skipped, jumped and swayed, dancing and singing, towards home.

In this group, for the moment at least, the bonds of music and laugheter had overcome the divisions of hamlet distinctiveness.

This feast can be seen, then, both as a manifestation of unity and division among the Tamangs. They are all there at the same place

of feasting at the same time and they all follow the same procedures. Furthermore, those who perform the necessary rituals and organize the activities are known by the same titles in both groups. At the same time, the two hamlets separate spatially and there is no communication between them during the feasting. This division is not fortuitous. There is an element of enmity and strife between the two hamlets. Despite intermarriage between the two hamlets, the enmity can be easily discerned in the way members of the two groups each characterize the other. There are also incidents that take place now and then which both express a latent hostility and serve to exacerbate it. Thus, the explanation for a violent fight between two wives of a Tamang man was that one came from Upper and the other from Lower Poudel. The slightly embarrassed husband pointed out that women from the two hamlets can never live under the same roof. Moreover, these hard feelings are not confined to the women. There have been two occasions when the family of the Cokho of Lower Poudel has attacked the house of the senior Lama family of Upper Poudel, and each time it has come to blows and stone-throwing. The reason for the latest attack was, according to the attackers, that the Lama family had started cultivating a piece of land over which there had formerly been a path, and had thus impeded traffic along that path.

Despite these manifestations of separation and sometimes outright fighting, however, there is still a somewhat ambivalent feeling as to what the other hamlet really means to one's own. Although there is criticism of the other hamlet, the feeling is that one has to remember that after all they are kin and neighbours.

Within each hamlet, on the other hand there is a strong ideological commitment to unity and to free interaction between the various members in daily life or when they come together for celebration. However, on at least one occasion I noticed a kind of division in the recreational sphere which for that moment mirrored to some extent the division in occupation among Tamangs. The occasion was the celebration of an initiation ceremony for boys. The Tamangs see this rite, which they call Chewar, as corresponding to the Hindu bratabandha, and this Hindu influence is strengthened by the fact that the Tamangs invite Damais to perform music on the occasion. Despite these similarities there are several differences between the Tamang

and Hindu initiation rites. Thus, the Tamang boy does not have to play the role of a beggar during the ceremony which the Brahman or the Katri-Chetri boy will have to do. In the same way, the Tamang is not invested with a sacred thread (janai) in the Chewar. Another difference is related to the place of the tupi, the tuft of hair that is left when the head of the person being initiated has been shaven for the ceremony. Among the Hindus the tupi is placed in the middle of the head, while the Tamang boys have it on the right side of the head to start with. Then, their head is shaven again when the hair has grown and a new tupi is left on the middle of the head.

The Tamangs celebrate a feast on the night following a Chewar; food is served and there is also some drinking. The eating and drinking may start during the ceremony itself, but the Chewar and the accompanying feast are thought of as two separate events. During the feast there is singing and dancing by the Tamangs (the Damais do not play on this occasion) but all the songs are sung in Nepali and not in Tamang.

After one such feast which had observed been going on for a few hours two groups of people formed with about seven to ten individuals in each. According to the Tamangs present one of the groups consisted of people from the marblequarry while the other consisted of what they called officeholders, i.e., people permanently employed in unskilled positions as piuns (errand boys), watchmen etc, by the government. The formation of such cliques was seen as contrary to good behaviour in a feast like this, and the other Tamangs put it down to too much drinking.

As for the women it was noticeable how they kept to themselves and stood at the side, although they took part in the singing. Here, then, one could follow the "sanskritizing" aspect which grew less important the more the feasting gained momentum just as it did on Caitrapurne. Yet at the same time divisions which are not normally recognized do crop up, while those which are thought to be part of everyday life, segregation between men and women are of course not commented upon.

The Gharti-turned-Magar

The reason for the Ghartis starting to call themselves Magars is according to themselves that it would help them in getting into the army. And the leading figure among them did in fact rise to the rank

of Captain. He was also instrumental in forming a guthi among them. This guthi is concerned with financing religious events among the households, such as Dewali, marriages, funerals and so on.

The households that joined the guthi took the clan name of Thapa, while the other former Ghartis who opted to remain outside took the clan names of Bhujal and Gharti.[6]

The guthi meets twice a year for pujas and feasting. To meet the cost of the feast they collect money and rice as well as other foodstuff from the members in advance. The money is used to buy a goat which is sacrificed and then eaten on the same occasion. The membership of this guthi has decreased over the years. Some have left voluntarily while two households have been expelled. At present there are 15 households left out of a total of 26 at the beginning. So far the claim to Magar rank has not meant intermarriage between the former Ghartis and other Magars. They continue to marry Ghartis.[7]

The Captain's status as a former army officer and his knowledge of the world outside Kitini, as well as his age, makes him superior in prestige to any of the other Magars, most of whom are illiterate. In this way he can have absolut control over the guthi and make it work as an agency for raising the status of the former Ghartis in general. It is notable that the ban on eating pork which the Majors adhere to is not respected by the Rana Magars although they are of higher rank. It is an example of how a caste has to "overdo it" in the ritual sphere in order to rise in the hierarchy. This is of course even more the case when there is no material basis such as increased wealth which might buttress the claim. The Magars have to make explicit ritual statements all the time and mainta in a constantly high standard.

The Gharti's claim to Magar status in Kitini is not on the whole the subject of a lot of discussion or strong feeling. Everybody is aware of the fact that they are making this claim, and that results have not so far been very impressive.

People still call them Gharti when talking about them, but on the other hand nobody tries to dispute their claim. It is as if it was a kind of a game that the Magars are playing with the others watching, slightly amused by what they see. This is emphasized by the fact that many of the Magars still live in the same places as when they were slaves, that is to say, next to the homes of their former masters. These former masters have not changed their opinions of their former

servants, and even to-day many Magars help the families and visit the houses of their former masters. Although they are free, their attitudes and symbolic behaviour are those of deference. This is partly due to the fact that although the freed slaves were supposed to be compensated by the government the amount was negligible, or nothing at all. The Ghartis were given formal liberty and nothing more. They remained as poor as before, and the little land they have does not in any way make them independent as a group from the class of landowners who owned them.

In line with what was argued in the second chapter about the importance of personal relations versus groups, it could be maintained that the former Ghartis' claim to Magar rank is tolerated simply because of this relative fluidity in the caste system. Caste is important as defining initial possibilities for material and ritual standing in the community. As the case of the Magars show, they thought it would be necessary to dissassociate themselves from their Gharti past to join the army. And since castes are not corporate groups in the Kathmandu Valley, they could do this without invoking opposition from other castes. The only caste which might have felt like objecting was that of the Rana Magars, but by acknowledging its members as of superior rank the Gharti Magars avoided this possibility. It is entirely possible that some of the new Magars will be able to marry real Magars; in that case they will also be seen as belonging to the superior category which the Rana Magars now occupy alone in Kitini.

Patterns of everyday relations

The dividing lines relevant for an understanding of the patterns of everyday interaction run both between the socio-cultural systems, that is to say vertically, and between castes of different rank seen from the point of view of the dominant socio-cultural system, that is to say the broad division into tagadhari, matwali and pani nacalne castes (plus, in Kitini, the Mahanta and Kamar castes), i.e., horizontally.

But in addition to this one must not forget the importance of the nucleated settlement structure which favours the association of caste

equals. The friends a man picks tend to come from the area where he himself resides, often being relatives and neighbours.

There are three areas and activities that are important in bringing together people from different castes in Kitini, and where inter-caste relations can be observed. These are: the tea shops, the gambling places, and the limestone and marble quarries.[8]

a) In Kitini the tea shops form one of the major centres of interaction between people and here the differences between the various castes are brought out. It is noticeable, that not all kinds of people take part in the deliberations held in these places. This is especially apparent at the biggest shop, not far from the marble and limestone quarries, where the Tamangs go to drink tea and eat boiled vegetables when there is a break in their work. Inside the shop one will find people from the higher castes, i.e., Brahmans, Katri-Chetris and Mahantas, who will arrive for their first cup of tea early in the morning and linger on for hours, coming back after their morning meal, which they take between nine and ten. The Tamangs, on the other hand, just eat their food or drink their tea and then disappear, and there are hardly any exchanges between them and the others. Often one will see the Tamangs standing outside on the road having their tea and then walking off immediately. In the same way the Untouchables who happen to pass may drink a cup of tea, but because of their lowly rank they cannot enter the shop at all, and have to stand outside. They, too, do not talk to the people sitting inside, and they do not stay for a very long time. In this way interaction is determined by the relative caste rank of the people concerned and they behave differently depending on which category they belong to. The high-caste people sitting in the tea shop are neighbours, while the Tamangs come from Poudel, which is relatively far away. Thus, neighbourhood and caste rank together determine behaviour in this field of interaction. The importance of being a neighbour and hence known as an individual person can also be seen when the occasional matwali from the area joins in the discussion inside the shop. But although he can take part, it is still the case that the high-caste individuals define the situation and lead the discussion. The lower-caste individual is clearly in an inferior position. As for the pani nacalne, they are beyound the pale of society anyway, and this prevents their taking part in the exchanges at the tea-shop.

b) Another situation where people from different castes come together is in the activity of gambling.[9] This is a field where the Tamangs are heavily involved, and on pay-days in the marble and limestone businesses gamblers from all over Kitini and even from outside will flock to the two Tamang hamlets. Small groups of men from various castes will huddle together and one-rupee notes (1 rupee = $ 0,10) will change hands while each game is watched by a number of silent by-standers. But it is not only in the Tamang settlements that gambling goes on. This activity takes the time of many men and there are some places in Kitini which are known as centers for it. Here representatives of many castes come together, but there is a bar against the Untouchables. They are not allowed to sit together with members from clean castes, and hence it is impossible for them to take part. But apart from this there are no restrictions as to who can gamble and there are a handful of professional gamblers in Kitini drawn from both tagadhari and matwali castes. Gambling does not, however, bring together a great number of people. Only few people take part in it habitually, and the occasions for mass participation are limited to certain festivals the chief of which is the biggest Hindu feast of Dasain. At this time one can see people coming together to gamble for days on end. This is also the time when stakes are sometimes raised to thousands of rupees, as is the case when some of the few businessmen in Kitini are involved. Gambling in Kitini does not bring people together on a friendship basis, while the opposite is of course true. It may, however, result in other kinds of alliances, such as when a Brahman politician in Kitini used his gambling ties with the Cokho in Lower Poudel for effective political manoevring within that hamlet.

c) A common work situation does not seem to decrease the caste-bounded patterns of interaction. Despite the fact that most castes are represented in the marble and limestone industries although the Tamangs outnumber the others by far it seems that caste membership is a very important feature of the consciousness of these people. Thus, for instance, at the feast that the people working at the marble quarry celebrate twice a year most people congregated in groups according to caste membership.

The workers pay one day's wage for this feast. The money is used for

buying goats which are sacrificed and eaten. When it was time for the feast to begin most of the workers sat in in a semi-circle, with some others sitting in such a fashion as to form an "appendix". On a big rock facing the workers the two Silwal businessmen (uncle and nephew) who run these businesses were sitting together with a Newar from Kathmandu who is the electrician at the marble factory and a friend of theirs. As soon as the preparations had started the younger Silwal left and did not come back until towards the end of the function. His uncle on the other hand remained at the feast for the whole time and he went personally around to see that everybody was being served. The workers were sitting according to caste and the serving started with those sitting above the rock and went anti-clock wise. Those sitting in such a way that they would be served first were Brahmans, Katri-Chetris and some Magars. Then came the Tamangs, while the few pani nacaine formed the little appendix of the semi-circle. On the other side of the rock sitting by themselves were the women, most of them Tamangs, but a few Brahman women as well. They were being served at the same time as the men, starting with the high-caste women, although they were sitting furthest away from the fire where the food was being cooked. The food was served by Brahmans and a few Katri-Chetris.

When everybody had eaten, the cooks together with the older Silwal businessman and the electrician had food together. The younger Silwal businessman did not eat on this occasion.

Apart from examining the pattern of caste formation on an occasion like this, we may note that the behaviour of the two Silwals is significant. The elder of the two is firmly rooted in Kitini both in outlook and residentially, while his nephew is more oriented to social life in Kathamandu, where he even keeps a flat. The elder is also known to lend people money on generous terms, often not asking for repayment; something which the younger would never do. In the same way the elder is often seen at the local tea shop chatting with people there, while the younger never goes there unless he has to buy something. And this close attachment of the elder to the local community was brought out in this feast where he was the one who associated with everybody and also waited until everybody had eaten before he had any food himself, while the younger kept his appearance to a minimum, and took part as little as possible in the proceedings.

Dispute settlement

As was seen above there are no traditional caste organizations in Kitini, apart from that of the Tamangs, which could be used for dispute settlement. The normal way to settle disputes is to call some influential person, from the same or a higher caste; to call several people; or simply to approach one or more neighbours, who are mostly of the same caste rank. The case will then be discussed and a compromise arrived at. These are cases of minor importance, such as the destroying of standing crop by straying cattle, the feeling of trees which belong to someone else, and similar cases. These are fairly straightforward and the sums involved as compensation are usually small. In the same way minor criminal offences will first be dealt with informally. This sketch of informal dispute settlement has an important limitation however. These ways of solving disputes are only resorted to if the relations between the parties are generally good, or if the offence is not of the kind that creates ill-feelings out of proportion to the actual size of the crime or misdeed. This can be illustrated by the case where a Tamang boy had stolen some money from another Tamang family. The matter was reported to the Gaun Pancayat, but the boy's family paid back the money, and since neither party wanted to destroy the relations between them, the case never went further.

The attempts to settle disputes informally may be made at more than one level. A case may start with neighbours and friends of the parties trying to solve the problem. If they are unsuccessful the parties may go to someone who is known and respected by both, usually a Katri-Chetri or a Brahman, who is also politically influential or enjoys some other position such as landlord of the disputants, and they ask him for advice. In this way even informal procedures may appeal to higher mediating bodies, following the avenues of personal relations from equals to a patron.

One should also note the difference between the Pradhan panc as a representative of the government and as a private individual in settling disputes. Members of the Gaun pancayat may be approached to mediate in their private capacities rather than as officials, and in the case of the Tamang ward member also in his capacity as an important figure in the indigenous Tamang caste organization as Cokho. In such cases these individuals play the role of notables in a rural society adjudicating disputes among followers or potential followers.

In this dual system of dispute-solving machineries, the traditional one involving mediators and the new one of Pancayat Democracy, do not always work neatly side by side, however. Especially among the Tamang with

their elaborate caste organization there are possibilities of conflict or of using the other when one fails to deliver the goods. Thus, there was a case in Lower Poudel when the Gaun pancayat member there, who is also the Cokho, forced a Tamang woman from the same hamlet to give him her gold earrings as a fine because of her brewing liquor without a license. Since there was no way of for this woman to get her earrings back by complaining to anyone within the hamlet, which she might have done if the opposite party had not been the Cokho, she was forced to take the matter to the Pradhan panc. Thus, she went to the representative of the legal system the law of which she had broken by brewing liquor illicitly in order to win her case. Had she been able to define the situation as one involving two Tamangs from the same hamlet, the traditional Tamang authorities could have persuaded the ward member to stop acting as a representative of the Pancayat system and instead act as a Tamang. But since this was impossible in this case the matter had to be brought to the Gaun pancayat.This complaint to the Pradhan panc also introduced factional struggle, since he and the Tamang ward member support different political factions (see chapter five). That is to say, there was an opportunity for the Pradhan panc to recruit a new client who might be politically useful later on.

The above description is not intended to give the impression that all disputes and quarrels are either brought to the notice of the formal dispute-settling institutions or informally settled. In some cases a dispute may simply lead to estrangement between the two parties and no solution is even tried. This was the case when a Silwal accused a leading Sihwal politician and mediator of having diverted irrigation water from the former's land. The accusation was made and relations between the two persons are not very good as a result, but there has been no talk of compromise or of fighting the case out in the Gaun pancayat or in the Land Administration Office. On the other hand, in the face of threatening administrative action being taken dispute avoiding mechanisms may be activated as was the case when the brother of the Tamang ward representative had been caught stealing wooden poles from the store of the Forest Department in a Newar village of Badegaun. The Tamang was brought to the Forest Department Office in Kitini and locked in for the night guarded by a Tamang, who is the Cokho of Upper Poudel and an employee of the Forest Department. However, when the Silwal in charge of the local Forest Department Office came to work next morning, he found a big hole in the wall at the back of the house. The watchman maintained that in the night the brothers of the arrested Tamang had come and broken through the wall and released the arrested person. The watchman had cried for help but unfortunately

no-one had heard him, and then he had run to the house of the Pradhan panc who had gone back with him to inspect the place. The Pradhan panc then wrote a letter to the police explaining the case, as told by the watchman.

The police tried to find the prisoner and his brothers but they were all gone and after a few days the police gave up. About a week later one could see the three Tamangs walking about in Kitini again, apparently not fearing any trouble from the police, and nothing came of the case. It is of course impossible to know whether the version given by the watchman is true or not, but many suspected that he might not have cried for help as loudly as he perhaps should have done in order to attract attention. The Pradhan panc naturally had no reason to suspect the the watchman told anything but the truth, and the fact that he has good relations with the Tamangs of Upper Poudel made it easier for him to accept the story. But the important thing to understand is not that there may have been a collusion between the watchman, the prisoners and later, the Pradhan panc. There is absolutely no evidence for this. What is significant, however, is the fact that people, both Tamangs and others deemed it possible that such a collusion could take place. I.e., it would not be contrary to the local way of settling problems that threatened the peace. The unity of the Tamangs as against others is recognized; and the need for a patron to help a client, especially when the administration is brought in as an actor is accepted. Therefore, people could picture this way out of the problem and speculate accordingly.

Friendship and mit in Kitini

Friendship between men from the various caste categories do exist, but here it is more in the way of lopsided friendships where the lower caste friend is the junior partner in the association. He will have to follow the definition of the situation made by his higher caste friend. The relations among the women are also directed by the consideration of caste and neighbourhood. The women are tied to the homestead to a much greater degree than the men and as a result of this they interact more often with neighbours, who are mostly of the same caste rank. However, there are also instances of women from different castes, although nearly all are from within the clean-caste salegory, having formed close allicances of friendship, as a result of being neighbours. In this way the wife of a Magar is a close friend of the young wife in the Silwal household which was once the Magar's master household. This is not a lopsided friendship

in any way, and the two women visit each other frequently. They also have those economic relations with each other which so many women in Kitini seem to have, i.e., borrowing small sums of money from each other to buy things like cigarettes cosmetics and other small articles for themselves. This is a necessary activity related to the fact that the women are under the authority of their husbands in economic matters, and that they would rather turn to a friend than ask their husbands for more money. It seems, though, as if the Tamang women, who earn their own money are a bit freer in this respect. Although they too, spend most of their money on the family, they can at least buy private luxuries without having to ask their husbands all the time.

Another source of community among the women is related to the fact what caste they belong to, they all have to do agricultural work and take care of their household. In this sense their work experiences are more or less the same, as the same time as they are fundamentally anchored to Kitini in the way that many men are not.

There is one festival every year, Tij[10] , when the women of the dominant socio-cultural system come together for worship at the Godawari temple. There they give sacrifices and have a bath. The women arrive alone or in small groups for this festival, the purpose of which is to ensure the future health of the husbands of the women involved. Some of the women stay all day at the temple while others just go there to do what they have to do and then return home again. My observations of the composition 40 groups of women seen returning during the afternoon of the day of celebration of Tij from the temple showed that most of the women in each were from the same caste and/or neighbours. In only four cases did women from clean and pani nacalne castes mix. Mostly the women came back in small groups of two to 10, but at the end there was a group of 16 who had been staying all day and they came dancing and singing. There were women from the whole range of castes, from Brahmans down to Damais included among them.

There would probably be more inter-caste and inter-system interaction between women had it not been for the nucleated settlement structure of Kitini which favours intra-caste relations. The similarity of the situation of women in their daily life regardless of caste coupled to the relatively mild sanctions on inter-caste association would work in the direction of increased contact between women of different categories. As it is now, women are not supposed to stray too far away from the house and if they meet women from the outside they are mostly the wives of their husbands' friends. Men and women work together in agriculture

in groups for short periods, and the Tamang women work with the men in the marble and limestone industries, but the men they meet there are Tamangs so this does not contribute to a widening of their network of relations with members of other castes. Apart from the mixed groups engaged in specific economic activities the women keep very much to themselves both in work and leisure. It would of course be inadmissible for them to sit in the tea shops or take part in gambling. Their social world is defined by their tasks, and by their fathers and husbands.

An important institution both for women and men in the field of interpersonal relations, is that of mit (see chapter two), which joins individuals from different clans within the same caste as well as people from different castes. Mit is common in Kitini. One interesting case is that between a number of Silwals and Tamangs from a village in the hills just south-east of the Kathmandu Valley. These Tamangs come to Kitini once a year in autumn just after the harvest of paddy to visit their mit relations. They then bring with them gifts like ghiu (clarified butter), curd, radishes and other products from their village. In return they get paddy, wheat and maize. However, this exchange is not simply a ceremonial one or expressive of an urge to give to one's mit from what oneself has. In fact, this is a decidedly lop-sided relationship. First of all, the Silwals involved do in fact try to put the exchange on a transactional basis by gauging the value of the gifts brought by the Tamangs and then give grains back on the basis of this assessment. Secondly, the symbolism of the ideally egalitarian mit relationship also works in favour of the Silwals. It is always the Tamangs who come to the Silwals, never the other way around, and while the Tamangs are in Kitini the Silwals treat them as members of a lower caste, refusing to accept cooked food from them.

There is then an aspect of caste membership creeping into the individualized relationship called mit. This means that mit relations between members of the same caste will be most effective in establishing a bond where the exchange of favours can be carried out on a basis of equality. This is brought out in the case of a woman from a hill district to the west of the Kathmandu Valley, who is married to a Silwal in Kitini. In her native village she had a mit relationship with another Chetri girl. After marriage the Silwal women visited her old village very seldom and she had not seen her mitini for eight years when the latter came to visit her in Kitini together with her son, who was looking for a job. The Silwal woman's husband who was a clerk in government service agreed to find the boy a job, which he

did. In return the Silwal family asked the mitini to find a suitable bride for one of the sons of the Silwal. This she did, suggesting a distant relative who then married the son of the Silwal two months later.

The conclusion seems to be that inter personal relations on a basis of the equality of the partners is virtually only possible within the same caste where rank is unimportant. Even mit relationships seem to be coloured by the caste rank of the respective partners. However, it seems to be easier for women to form friendships across caste boundaries than it is for men.

Kitini as a focus of sentiment

Kitini is not simply a place where people happen to live and interact. It is also a place where the most important events in an individual's life take place, and where those persons who really matter to him live. That this should be so is readily understandable in the case of those who stay there for all their lives. But the sentimental attachement is also clearly discernable among those who work away from Kitini. Most of these people work in Kathmandu, some 12 kilometres away. Some people walk this distance twice a day, leaving in the early morning and coming back again late at night. But most of those who work in Kathmandu have a room there and stay away for the whole week or more. In Kathmandu they occupy various positions. Some are in the army, as privates or non-commissioned officers or, in a few cases, as officers. These people are also liable to be transferred to different parts of Nepal. Then there are those who are caretakers, errand boys, guards or petty clerks, and there are also some students. In the town they participate in an urban network of friends, workmates and in some cases kin, but the pull of Kitini is strongly felt and most of them try to go back there as often as possible. Even those who are students and have the greatest opportunity for meeting people with wide intellectual interests, and to whom the centre of the Kingdom should have more to offer than to the other categories, seem to be reluctant to plan for a shift from Kitini to Kathmandu. There are of course a few cases of whole families leaving to settle in Kathmandu, but that has been the case only when they have had extremely good opportunities for jobs and education. Friends and kin who maintain effective relationships in Kitini continue to do so in Kathmandu, but do not seek out others from the same area. New relations which they form in the city, for example at work tend to remain single-stranded.[11] The reasons

for this may certainly vary from one person to another but there are at least two themes which would probably be of importance. First of all, Kathmandu is the centre of a rural society: it is not an industrial but an administrative city. The same criteria of patronage and kinship, which are critical in the village are also critical in the city. This means that an outsider who lacks such ties finds it difficult to gain a place in the social life of Kathmandu. However, this process is easier for better-off people from the tagadhari castes due to the ramifying network enjoyed by the already privileged, and more difficult for those in more menial occupations, especially if they are from the lower caste categories. The Newars are clearly in the best position among the latter in this respect since they are the biggest single group in Kathmandu, but even here there are internal divisions within this category which put people in different situations with regard to social acceptance. Education, too, plays an important role, but since that is often tied to caste rank,it is difficult to assess what impact it would have on its own.

Secondly, most of the people from Kitini who work away from home are from the higher castes, and it would seem that an additional pull for them to return is the fact that at home they are in a very advantageous situation due to their caste membership with all the implications that this has. In Kathmandu they are just high-caste individuals with no firm roots in the urban milieu, while in Kitini they are socially privileged. It should be noted, furthermore, that when people say they prefer Kitini to Kathmandu, they are not talking about the whole place, they are talking about their farm and their kin-group. Thus, different categories of people look to Kitini for different things. It is only at the most general level that they are in agreement about what they mean by their preference for Kitini. This should not be surprising considering the lack of social intercourse between the various castes that has already been discussed.

Caste and occupation

The importance of caste as a criterion for discriminating between people and evaluating their status can also be gleaned by the way they look at occupations in relation to caste. It then turns out that their view of the occupation is coloured by the caste rank of the individual who is thought to be engaged in it. Thus for instance the occupation of soldier is rated as carrying high prestige if the soldier is a Katri-Chetri, while the reverse is true of the imagined soldier

is a Tamang, for instance. Similarly, it is impossible for people in Kitini to imagine a pani nacalne businessman. There are of course occupations or posts that are held in high esteem in their own right such as the office of Pradhan panc ("he is the King of the village"; "he has been chose by all villagers"), of Junior Technician of Agriculture ("he is a government employee and he advises the formers") or of teacher ("he gives education to the village where it is very rare"). But these are all positions to which few lower-caste people can aspire. They require political influence or the scarce resource of education, all of which are the prerogative of the high castes in Kitini. Should a lower-caste person from Kitini happen to occupy one of these posts, he would still be judged by his caste and not by his position in the administrative hierarchy. At the same time, however, there is a trace of an ability to rank some posts in their own terms (such as those above), which may perhaps point to the notion of a nation with its own hierarchy unrelated to caste. This must remain a speculation, however, since the inter- twining of high office with high caste is so strong that it may be impossible to talk about the one without implying the other.

Inter-caste disputes

The above description of Kitini may give the impression that social life is more or less static, and that people are only able to see things in terms of traditional forms. This is of course not so: the society that has been created since 1951, the involvement of people in new kinds of jobs and the increased knowledge about what is taking place all affect people's ways of assessing their own position within the wider setting. For example, knowledge of the way that agricultural legislation affects tenants' rights was a result of conflict between land owners in Kitini (see chapter four). This struggle helped to disseminate knowledge about the new laws and improve the situation of tenants. Such knowledge, of new possibilities of achieving greater independence from former masters, has been used on some occasions. This has necessarily pitted individuals from different castes against each other, but the way this is done gives interesting insights into the necessity of having patrons or brokers interceding on one's behalf. Thus, there was a quarrel between a Magar household and its former master, a Silwal household. This quarrel started in 1958 when the Silwal household built a new house. At the time the Magar household had a small house on a plot of land which had been provided by the

Silwals. The latter considered the Magar house spoiled the view from their yard and they wanted to remove it. The Magars refused and the matter went to court where the Magars were successful. In retaliation the Silwals dug a ditch round the Magar house to make life as unpleasant as possible to the latter.

When the new Pancayat system was introduced in 1962 and a Silwal became the first Pradhan panc things did not become better for the Magars, especially since he was the head of the former joint family to which the adversaries of the Magar household had belonged.

In 1965 the Silwals tried to get rid of the Magar house by forging a letter from the court, ordering the Magars to remove the house within 45 days. The matter was complicated even further when the son of the Magar was beaten in the house of the Pradhan panc, one of the perpetrators being a son of the Silwal household who wanted the Magars removed. The Magar was charged with being drunk and making a nuisance of himself. Help came to the Magars through a Silwal who at that time had just returned from government service in the Ministry of Forestry. He wrote a letter to the Land Administration Office contesting the claim that the Magars should leave their house, and he also hired a lawyer to write a letter to the court about the beating. The result of all this was that the opponents quietly dropped the matter and nothing came out of it in the end. However, the helper had established himself as an opponent of the Pradhan panc, and he was also to become very active in political life in Kitini (see chapter five).

This case shows the virtual necessity for a lower caste person to have the backing of a high-caste individual if he is to stand a chance of winning a lawsuit, for instance, and in this way one could say that the dominant tradition is subtely reinforcing itself through the unequal distribution of education and networks of influence that carry weight with the adminstrative bodies. But this is still far from the former automatic acquiescence in the whims of another person simply because he is a tagadhari.

The Tamangs, too, often express the view that they are as good as the Brahmans and Katri-Chetris, and they make use of the concept of citizen of the state of Nepal in contradistinction to that of being a matwali caste. They will fiercely deny the right of high-caste people to boss over them or have any precedence in social matters. But at the same time their situation as a minority tells them that it is the high-caste people who wield the influence not only in Kitini, but outside it, too, and they acknowledge this by admitting their superior ritual

rank. There seems to have been no case in Kitini in which one caste has been pitted against another on a corporate basis. The case that came closest to such a situation was the 1973 ward election to the Gaun Pancayat in ward 8, when the Sarkis decided they wanted one of their caste as representative rather than the incumbent Brahman. But as things turned out both the Sarkis and Brahmans were torn by internal dissension and there was never a united stand by either group (see chapter five). Personal relations seem to constantly overtake any attempt to organize on a corporate basis that might be undertaken. Caste as a category for defining daily interaction or religious ritual is not translated into group action in a situation of competition.

Schooling and the young

In the post-1951 period formal education has been spreading and an analysis of who has benefited from this in Kitini may perhaps indicate whether the dominance of higher castes in the older generation will be broken to some extent by universal schooling.

There are now a Primary School, a Secondary School and a High School in Kitini taking students both from there and the outside.

At present there are, from primary up to 10th class 103 students from Kitini, out of which 61 are in Primary School. All six in High School come from the higher castes, 27 in the Middle Standard come from this category and 9 from the lower caste categories, including one Damai and one Kami. In Primary School 41 students come from the higher castes and 20 from the lower, including four Damais. There are only five Tamangs going to school, all of them reading in Primary School. Looking at the records of students who have left school one finds that out of 204 students who started in Middle School 129 finished in High School or higher. Out of these 129 five came from matwali castes, none from the Untouchable castes. This shows that education is very much the business of the higher castes, and that it is mainly their children who will be eligable for the kind of employment which needs some kind of education. And judging from the present composition of students in the Middle and High School this is a pattern which does not seem to be in the process of being changed.Of course one can put up a number of reasons why it is like this: children from the lower castes are needed at home for financial reasons; while going to school they do not only not contribute to the household but it is a financial burden to keep them there, and the prospects of getting a higher income and a better job are not so great for these children that their parents

find it worth the sacrifice to keep them there.

The reason why education alone is not sufficent has to do with the way in which recruitment to jobs is effected. Unless one has good contacts, and in order to have good contacts to secure a job in Kathmandu one has to be of high caste if the job is to be of the kind that offers relatively desirable status and remuneration. Conversely, one could expect the higher castes to be more ready to make economic sacrifices for the education of their children (a case which seems to be true), since they have always the possibility to arrange in various ways for a job for the student when he is finished with schooling.

Apart from the division betwen the higher and lower castes there is also the division between male and female students. There is a strong cultural prejudice against girls receiving education, the most common argument being that by being literate they can carry on secret affairs with boys, helped through the medium of writing. It seems that for the few Silwal girls who have received formal education and then married, schooling has meant upward mobility since all but one have married students, mostly from Kathmandu. The only exception married in a village, but this was due to extraordinary circumstances because of which family wanted her married as quickly as possible and they did not have time to look for a suitable partner from the educational point of view.

In some respects the educated woman married in Kathmandu would probably be better off socially than her male kinsman coming to town, since she would be part of her husband's network of kin and friends. This is a strong contrast to the men mentioned above who work in Kathmandu, but see Kitini as their true home.

Another interesting point to note is that among the pani nacalne castes it is only the two castes with bista households i.e. Damai and Kami which have members with formal education, however slight it may be. Children from three Damai and three Kami households go or have gone to school in Kitini, while the much more numerous Sarki caste does not have a single student at school and has never had one. This may be related to the fact that the Dami and Kami castes are in a much better economic situation generally than the Sarkis, being able to continue their traditional occupation of tailoring and black-smithing. However, such considerations cannot be the only reason, since some Sarkis have earned quite a lot of money working for some years in North India (see chapter four). It is more likely that the Kami and Damai castes are not able to employ, their small children with work to the same extent as the Sarkis, who have to depend on casual work and activities

like collecting and selling wood, a field in which children can contribute to a crucial extent to the household.

Despite the fact that the young people from the higher castes to a great extent go to school and become eligible for work in the bureucracy it is not this which tempts them. The dream that virtually everybody has is to become a businessman. This is seen as the only chance to get into a position where one has security of income above one's immediate needs. It is seen as the only way to get away from dependence on farming as well as a low position in the administration. The image of the successful businessman, independent and flamboyant, has a strong attraction, and those who are lucky enough to go to college in many cases choose Commerce. That the youngsters from Kitini are not alone in this respect is witnessed by the overcrowding at this particular branch of the Tribhuwan University in Kathmandu. But those who are not able to get a good education in business can still nourish the hope of becoming successful businessman, since there are no formal restrictions on entering the occupation. With the increased influx of foreigners as well as of foreign goods, the rising inflation and the increase of the population of the Kathmandu Valley, business is seen to be the only way to stay afloat at the same time as it opens the doors to exotic pleasures. No-one seems to be deterred by the cold fact that the small businessman has a very difficult time in the Kathmandu Valley, as is witnessed by,among others, the two Silwals, who are the only full-fledged businessmen in Kitini. Most of the business is in the hands of big Indian businessmen, wealthy Nepalis and the big companies which are increasingly growing in importance in the economy of Nepal. But as long as foreign capital is flowing into the country in the form of grants, loans and money spent by tourists, there will probably be room for a fortunate and skilful few in the business community.

There is, then, a new ethos among the fortunate few who are able to go to school, but these students are mostly from the higher castes. They also show their attachment to the new ideals, and their break with the local community implicit in education by wearing Western clothes. Their only concession to Nepali dress is the topi (Nepali hat) which is mandatory for those employed by the government. The girls dress more traditionally, but sometimes one can see them in slacks and even, when visiting Kathmandu,in dresses.

But even this embracement of new opportunities does not mean a denial of the mores of rural society. There is a break with traditional life

in certain respects,but the village and friends there still remain the hub of one's existence as was pointed out earlier, and since recruitment is so limited and confined mainly to the higher castes, education does not necessarily entail a break with old ways of life, although students will differ from the older generations in that they maintain that distinctions between people made on the basis of caste are wrong. They still associate with their status peers who are now equal in both ritual status and in educational achievement. In fact, the students show the same picture as do other people in Kitini when it comes evaluating occupations in relation to caste. Posts which need education, and the political post of Pradhan panc are highly rated. There is no trace whatsoever that show that education has changed their thinking in the direction of evaluating people on their merits and not on their caste. This is not denying the fact that at least the older students may have a better grasp of new possibilities offered by new kinds of jobs and positions, and other ways of life about which they read (see above). But this has not changed their outlook as to what constitutes a person of importance and high status. Again, the separation of the two elements office and caste is made more difficult by the fact that education and hence high office almost invariably goes together with high caste rank.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter a strong stress on caste seems to be the basis for social inter-action in Kitini. This would seem to contradict the thesis that Nepalese society is to a great extent characterized by personal relations. It is, however, a mistake to assume that caste and personal relations stand in some kind of opposition to each other. In Nepal, as was seen above, a caste is not the equivalent of a corporate group. It is a category determining status in social life. This is also brought out by the possibilities of hyper- and hypogamy inherent in the Nepalese caste system, leading to broad categories which are ranked internally through intra-caste status groups, between which mobility is possible through marriage. Thus, caste boundaries (except those between clean and pani nacalne castes) are relatively fuzzy, which is an indication of the lack of emphasis on castes as corporate groups. But the ideology of Hinduism depicts caste as closed groups, and hence, the establisment of personal relations between castes often take the form of ritual kinship, making acceptable relations which are undesirable from an ideological point of view. But most cases of

personal relations are not institutionalized in this way. They are situational and although important for the analyst, they can co-exist with the ideological view of caste as the main organizing principle, i.e., the ideology centres on caste (groups), while the activating principle is one of personal relations.

As was argued above the stress on personal relations is connected with the mode of recruitment to the élite. In Nepal the tradition of the ruler elevating families in the caste hierarchy, or promoting individuals who were able to attract this attention, is still alive and can be seen in, for instance, the selection of Ministers, which is the prerogative of the King. By force of necessity this mode of appointment at the top becomes the model throughout society and hence there appear the personal relationships that range from favours done to equals to the unequal patron-client relationship. The latter is, then, seen as the extreme point on a continuum of increasing inequality between the partners to a personal relationship. In this way "patrons", "brokers" and "clients" are in a sense reduced to descriptive terms within the broader categorization of group relations and personal relations.

As for Kitini the ideals of Pancayat Democracy seem not to have taken hold there. New forms of social relations have not sprung up, and ritual life and ritual in the form of everyday behaviour still express the values of household self-sufficiency, tempered by kin and, to a lesser degree caste loyalties, all of these being set in a hiearchical system of castes which derives its precarious cohesion from the dominant socio-cultural system.

The forms and kinds of social relations which have been brought out in this chapter are of course also part and parcel of economic and formal political and administrative organization, two topics which will be dealt with in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

Economic equality is one of the main objectives of planning for development in Nepal, according to the statements put out in speeches by members of the elite and in newspapers and books on Pancayat Democracy. It is intended that caste and class shall not be of any importance in allocating resources; each individual shall be treated only according to his or her merits. In order to achieve this the government has to take the initiative and help those who find themselves in an inferior position and restrain those who are in a position to profit from the needs of others. It also has to provide opportunities for work and open up careers for all citizens.

If one looks at the economic field in Kitini from the point of view of the central government, it necessarily appears as divided into sectors: agricultural and non-agricultural, for instance, and each one of these poses specific problems to the policy maker. Within any one of these sectors there are a certain number of activities and relations which make it up. For instance, in the agricultural sphere one will find letting of land, cultivation by owners, tenancy, and agricultural labouring. Furthermore, there is caste work, as well as the various sources for agricultural credit, and incentives for the improvement of agriculture, e.g., improved seeds and fertilizers. By legislation and other means the government is able to change conditions and relations both within this sphere and in the extra-agricultural spheres of business and salaried work. If the ideals put forward as the rationale for the whole process of planning for development are adhered to, economic life should reveal the presence of these ideals.

From the perspective of the ordinary citizen in Kitini, however, things may look rather different. Normally he will be aware of the fact the government claims to be working to better his lot and is in need of his help to fight against underdevelopment, exploitation and poverty. But the measures undertaken at the central level are not meant only for him. They are supposed to be applied to all citizens of the country. Since these citizens, however, are divided into various ethnic and caste groups, more or less advantageously placed to make use of new opportunities, and belong to different economic strata, it is up to each individual and each household to make the best of the situation. Ideally, of course, the process should lead to an increasing similarity in the living con-

ditions of all individuals and households irrespective of where they stand at present or stood when the process of planning started. To them development planning will appear in the form of opportunities for income either directly as a result of new jobs being created and loans to improve agriculture, or indirectly through investment in education which results in better paid jobs later. The household at the local level does not have the overview that the government has, and it deploys its economic resources as it sees fit at a particular point of time, a deployment that will change with the cycle of family development. Here I am interested in the situation as it exists at a certain point in time.

A discussion of the impact of the egalitarian ideals of Pancayat Democracy in the field of economic conditions and planning necessitates a two-fold approach in which is outlined: (i) the structure of economic relations and the economic assets available to the various groups in Kitini; and, (ii) the dynamics of economic life in terms of legislation and its consequences at the local level, as well as patterns of recruitment to jobs of various kinds and loans.In line with the above I concentrate in this chapter on the kinds of relationships that exist between different groups and individuals in the economic field in Kitini rather than attempting to give a rounded picture of economic life in general expressed in precise monetary terms.[1]

I start by giving a picture of the agricultural sphere: land ownership, tenancy and agricultural labouring; which people are involved in these undertakings, and how they interact with each other. Then I move on to an analysis of other economic activities such as caste special work, carpentry, traditional curing and other similar activities, which are found in the agricultural community. After this I discuss salaried jobs in terms of personal relations: how people are recruited to these jobs; who becomes a salaried worker or official; how salaried work is related to agriculture. Business is the topic of the following section: what kinds of businessmen there are what caste membership means for the chances a man has to become a businessman; how personal relations enter the picture. Finally, I discuss the activity of borrowing and lending money: again the stress is on the organization of lending rather than providing a complete map of loan transactions. Thus, I concentrate on the bigger loans (above Rs. 100), and I analyze them from three aspects: what are the sources; how big are the loans; for what purposes are they taken. In addition I relate borrowing to salaried employment.

Agriculture in Kitini

The most important crop in Kitini is paddy which needs khet (irrigated) fields.This is also the crop which involves most work in the agricultural year. In preparation of the transplantation of the tender seedlings which have been growing in special plots for about 4 - 6 weeks the fields are both plowed and hoed. This work is done by men. The first day of transplantation is not only an important event in the agricultural cycle it is also something of a festival. The women dress in their best clothes and put on make up, and there is singing during the work. The household offers food for anyone who comes to watch the transplantation, and it has also to send food to all close friends and relatives in the vicinity. The work itself is organized according to sex. Both sexes can carry the seedlings to the field, but only females do the actual work of transplantation. Later on the fields are weeded (twice) and this work is done by women, while at harvest time both men and women help, the latter doing the cutting while the former do the threshing in the field itself.

The whole cycle takes about four months, from transplantation in June - July to harvest in October - November.

The other main crop which is grown on khet fields is wheat. This is sown in November - December. In preparation of the sowing men hoe the fields and women break the clods. Wheat is not weeded and if the winter monsoon is not heavy enough the fields are irrigated once in February - March. Harvesting is done in April - May, women cutting the stalks and the crop is then brought to the house where it is threshed.

Gram and potatoes may be grown instead of wheat but this is not common. Potatoes are weeded once.

Maize is the principal crop on pakho (dry) land. It is sown in March - April after the fields having been prepared by ploughing and levelling by the women. It is weeded twice by women, who also harvest it in August.

Beans may be sown together with the maize, the idea being that the maize plants bind moisture and shelter the bean plants against the sun. Beans are harvested at the same time as maize.

Oil-seeds are sown in August - September on pakho land, the land being prepared by plowing and levelling. Depending on the type of oil-seed that is sown it is harvested either in December or in February - March. Harvesting is done by women.

Millet is also grown on pakho land. It is sown in May - June and transplanted about a month later. It is sometimes grown in rotation with maize, sometimes in other fields. If it is planted with maize this is done when the latter crop is being weeded. It is harvested in November - December.

Normally the household contributes as much labour as it can in order to avoid the cost of hiring agricultural labourers. But this is also a function of status.

Thus, few tagadhari persons would perform work as agricultural labourers for matwali households and never for a pani nacalne, while some matwali people sometimes work for the latter.

Higher caste men who feel that they can afford it do not take part in the agricultural work at all. It is left completely to the women and all the work that is to be done by men is performed by hired workers. Such aloofness is unthinkable for household heads who are poorer in land. It necessitates an agricultural surplus, while a deficit means that one or more members of the household will have to take work as an agricultural labourer.This is the best paid work in Kitini as far as the average worker is concerned and he is also given something to eat by the household for which he works.

Agricultural labouring is of course seasonal and large numbers of labourers will be needed only at rice-transplantation, weeding and harvest of all crops.

Hiring agricultural labourers is expensive for the household and those households which have members to spare will engage in agricultural work on an exchange basis (parma)whereby one or more women (and sometimes men) work a certain number of days for another household which then sends the same number of people for the same number of days. These exchanges are also governed by status considerations in the sense that only households of the same caste rank are included. Ploughmen (hali)are also needed and there are only a few households in Kītini who keep animals for this kind of work. One day of ploughing is rated at five days' agricultural labour by a male and ten days' of female agricultural labour.

Agricultural legislation

Nepal is an agricultural country and it is obvious that the conditions obtaining in the rural sphere are of overwhelming importance to the people in determining their economic standards and prospectives. After the fall of the Rana régime several attempts at reforming the agricultural sphere

have been tried. The efforts have generally been directed towards introducing a single type of land tenure, setting limits to the amount of land a person can own and regulating relations between land owner and tenant, but not concerning itself with landless people. As a result of this legislation the position of the tenants have changed in certain respects. Before 1950 60% of the farmers in Nepal paid rent to intermediaries who held land from the Ranas with the right to collect dues from the tenants. Some of these forms of tenure were abolished during the 1950s with the most widespread, the so-called birta system being abolished in 1961. There were two main kinds of birta called "A" and "B". Both were grants from the ruler to a subject. "A" class birta owners had only the right to collect revenue from the farmers, but had no right over the land itself. Class "B" owners on the other hand had rights in the land and is some cases they also paid a nominal tax to the government.[2]

In both cases the land was converted into raikar, i.e., the state became the owner of the land and the occupant had to pay revenue.Land given as donations to temples or for charitable purposes, guthi land, has so far not been included in the drive by the government of Nepal to put all land under raikar tenure.

The main attempt at reorganizing agriculture came in 1964 when a comprehensive land reform was launched. This aimed first of all to put a ceiling on the amount of land an individual could own. In the Kathmandu Valley this was put at 50 ropanis (about 2.7 ha). The rent to be paid by a tenant to the land owner, kut, has in the Kathmandu Valley tended to be about 1/3 of the crop (Seth, 1970:15). Tenants' holdings have been limited to 10 ropanis (about 0.5 ha). But this figure may sometimes be even lower, since there is a provision that the owner has the right to reclaim land under tenancy if he wants to build a house for himself on it.

Under the Land Reform Act tenants were also given security of tenure. A certified tenant cannot be evicted at the pleasure of the land owner. His rights are inherited by his sons, but not otherwise transferable.

The acquisition of tenants' rights in Kitini seems to have come about mainly as a result of inter-personal rivalries between high caste landowners. The enemy of one land owner would tell the latter's tenants that a new law had been passed under which the tenant's who satisfied the conditions laid down in the law were granted security of tenancy. In this way the knowledge spread rapidly in Kitini. The proximity of the administrative head quarters in Patan made it possible for people to go to court themselves or with the help of some lcoal notable to register their claims to tenancy. This was not, however, always an easy and smooth

process as even the Pradhan panc had to experience. His household had for a long time been the tenants on a piece of land belonging to a household of Mahanta caste, and the Pradhan panc wanted to register his claim to the plot. This was contested by the landowner, however, who maintained that the tenants had not been paying kut to him for a number of years and that they hence were not eligible to become protected tenants. The case went to a court and it decided that Pradhan panc had no evidence of having paid the rent as he claimed to have done. As a result he was denied security of tenure.

Most tenants in Kitini have security of tenure. There are only a few who have not made use of this possibility as a result of pressure being brought against them by their landlords.

The Act also concerned itself with the problem of indebtedness and the raising of capital in the rural areas. According to its provisions interest was limited to 10% and all payments made to the creditor in excess of this during the time a loan had been outstanding counted as repayment on the principal. At the same time there was the proviso that the debtor should pay back not to the lender, but instead to the government. This worked rather well in Kitini and the result has been that money lenders lost a lot of money. Many borrowers have simply refused to pay back and the matter has been left at that. As a result many former money lenders do not lend money any more; but private lending to friends, dependents and kin is still common (see below).

In the absence of wide-spread money lending in the rural areas the government had to do something that would allow credit to flow to the farmers. One attempt to deal with this problem on an institutionalized basis was made with the so-called Compulsory Savings Scheme. A farmer could borrow money or grain,paying it back at the rate of 10%. The initial capital was raised by the farmers themselves who contributed about 7% of the cereal crop to elected representatives in each ward. These savings were to be refunded after five years with 5% interest. The chairman of the ward committee was responsible for the storing of the produce collected. The savings of the wards were brought together through the so-called Pancayat Committee. Above this there was the central agency called the Compulsory Savings Corporation.

Co-operative movement

The co-operative movement in Nepal was started by the passing of the co-operative Societies' Act of Nepal in 1959. The co-ops that were to be established throughout the country were supposed to work together with the local pancayats. After the coming into being of Pancayat Democracy an agency has been created, the Sajha (Co-Operative) Society Ltd., which was given the task of furnishing capital to local co-ops as well as running non-agricultural co-ops as well as running non-agricultural co-ops. In 1963 a co-operative bank was established to furnish credit.

According to Lal (1970:78) it was envisaged that the co-operative movement should tie up with the land reform programme and especially later with the compulsory savings scheme that came into being after 1964.

In the course of time this Co-op Bank was reorganized and called the Agricultural Development Bank. Its task is to provide credit to agriculture, especially in helping to promote new undertakings in the sphere of cashcropping.

Landownership and tenancy

Most land in Kitini is raikar. This means that the owners pay a sum of money to the state every year, since the underlying idea is that the state is the ultimate owner of the land. This land revenue has increased as a result of the abolition of birta land which was either reveneu-free or where only a highly nominal sum was paid by the owner. In the field of tenancy the land reform has brought down the payments by the tenant to the owner in places where this was more than half the main crop. Since birta was a very common form of land tenure in Kitini during Rana times land being given to officers in the army, officials and priests, a good deal of the land is owned by outsiders living in Kathmandu or Patan (conversion to raikar has not led to loss of land for the owners in cases where the holding was less than 50 ropanis). Today there are no big landlords in Kitini.

Most households have only a few ropanis (1 ropani=about 0,04 ha) of land. The distribution of landowning households over the various castes

and the size of their holdings is as follows:[3]

TABLE 2

Caste	Size in ropanis				% of households		% of land-holding households to all households
	-6	6,5-10	10,5-15	15,5-25	25,5-35	35,5-	
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	35	43	22				79
Silwal	16	33	13	21	11	5	98
Tamang	69	19	13				16
Brahman	17	42	13	19	6	2	95
Sarki	71	29					52
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	71	14	7	7			41
Rana Magar	100						100
Newar	71		14	14			39
(Srestha)	(67)		(17)	(17)			(60)
(Jyāpu)	(100)						(14)
Kamar	60	40					36
Mahanta[4]	17	25	33	17		8	71
Kami	100						11
Damai	100						33
Nagarkoti	25	50		25			67
Pahari	67	33					100
Gurung	33	67					100
Total	33	33	13	14	5	3	60

The dominance of the higher castes in the field of land ownership in Kitini is clear from this table. The Katri-Chetris, Brahmans, i.e., the tagadhari castes together with the Mahanta have more land than the average land owning household. Included in this group are also the Nagarkotis, but since this caste consists of only six households in Kitini generalization is in this case more difficult than in the case of the others.

These figures do not give the whole picture of landownership in Kitini, however. Some plots yield more than others, and in this way the division into khet and pakho fields becomes important. Below are the tables for the amount of khet and pakho held by households in Kitini:

TABLE 3

Caste	% of households owning *khet* fields	% of households owning *pakho* fields
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	72	72
Silwal	93	95
Tamang	8	9
Brahman	84	89
Sarki	35	38
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	39	26
Rana Magar	50	100
Newar	39	28
(Srestha)	(70)	(40)
(Jyapu)	(0)	(14)
Kamar	6	29
Mahanta	65	71
Kami	11	0
Nagarkoti	33	50
Pahari	100	100
Gurung	100	100
Total	51	54

Below I give the sizes of the *khet* and *pakho* fields held by households in Kitini:

TABLE 4

KHET

Caste	Size in ropanis				% of khet owning households			
	-2	2,5-4	4,5-7	7,5-10	10,5-14	14,5-19	19,5-25	25,5-
Katri-Chetri,excl. Silwal	24	29	38	10				
Silwal	18	22	17	16	11	4	8	3
Tamang	25	38	38					
Brahman	22	33	24	9	2	9	2	
Sarki	75	8	17					
Magar excl. Rana Magar	50	33		8	8			
Rana Magar	100							
Newar	57	29		14				
(Srestha)	(57)	(29)		(14)				
Kamar		100						
Mahanta	18	36	18	18				9
Kami		100						
Nagarkoti			50	50				
Pahari	100							
Gurung	33	67						
Total	27	28	19	12	6	4	4	2

TABLE 5

PAKHO

Caste	Size in ropanis				% of pakho owning households			
	-2	2,5-4	4,5-7	7,5-10	10,5-14	14,5-19	19,5-25	25,5-
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	29	38	24	5	5			
Silwal	26	25	21	11	4	9	3	1
Tamang	44	33			22			
Brahman	9	28	30	22	10	2	4	
Sarki	38	46	8	8				
Magar, excl. Rana								
Magar	25	50	25					
Rana Magar	50		50					
Newar	40	20		40				
(Srestha)	(25)	(25)		(50)				
(Jypau)	(100)							
Kamar	60		40					
Mahanta	17	8	33	17	17			8
Damai	33	67						
Nagarkoti	33		33			33		
Pahari	33	33	33					
Gurung		100						
Total	24	28	22	11	6	4	2	1

Leaving aside the few Pahari and Gurung households we find that the Katri-Chetris, Brahmans, Manhantas and Sresthas have the highest percentage of khet land of all castes in Kitini. They are also the castes with the highest ritual rank (even if the Srestha are part of the matwali Newars). But looking at the table showing the size of khet holdings one finds that even these castes have at least 50% of their holdings below 4,5 ropanis. That is to say, in most cases the khet land owned is fairly small as far as each household is concerned. This is also true of the other castes. And, turning to pakho land, one finds roughly the same picture here. The only castes with 50% of their holdings above 4 ropanis are the Brahmans, Mahanta and Nagarkoti (the Srestha have exactly 50% pakho in holdings bigger than 4 ropanis). Among the lowest castes it is only the Sarkis who own land on a bigger scale. Most of this land has been bought as a result of members of this caste coming back from work in India with some money which they had been able to save there. Another feature which

emerges from these tables is the low number of Tamang households owning land. Those who do not have enough land may rent it from others. As was said above a lot of the land in Kitini is owned by people who do not live there. In the same way people in Kitini own land elsewhere. But since holdings belonging to people in Kitini are generally small, land letting is not very common. Most of the land let belongs to outsiders. To take the picture of tenancy first, there are people who rent land in addition to being land owners, while others work only as tenants. As was seen above the land reform has given tenants security of tenure, but they are still at a disadvantage, since the rent, kut, paid to the land owner is much higher than the land revenue paid by the latter to the state.

TABLE 6

TENANCY

Caste	Landowner/tenant	% of households	Tenant only	% of households
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	15	52	7	24
Silwal	28	29	2	2
Tamang	11	11	79	77
Brahman	28	52	2	4
Sarki	16	48	16	48
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	10	31	13	41
Rana Magar	1	50	0	0
Newar	5	34	9	50
(Srestha)	(3)	(33)	(3)	(30)
(Jyapu)	(2)	(29)	(5)	(71)
(Tandukar)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(100)
Kamar	4	27	9	60
Mahanta	3	18	5	29
Kami	1	11	8	89
Damai	2	33	2	33
Nagarkoti	3	50	2	33
Pahari	2	67	0	0
Gurung	1	33	0	0
Total	130	30	154	36

Just as could be expected the higher castes, being the main land owners in Kitini are less conspicuous in the category of tenants than are the lower castes.

Turning to the field of land letting one finds the following picture:

TABLE 7

LAND LET

Caste	Land lord	% of households
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	1	3
Silwal	37	38
Tamang	2	2
Brahman	12	22
Newar	3	18
(Srestha)	(3)	(33)
Mahanta	3	18
Total	58	14

These figures are consistent with the trend seen above with the higher castes in a privileged position, and this is especially true of the Silwal group. The Sresthas, too, have some landlords among them, but two out of these three are brothers, who have immigrated from Thimi. They are shop owners in Kitini, but have kept their land back home.

"Sufficient yield"

Although the size of holdings as well as the quality of the land are important to a farmer, it is the amount he can harvest seen in relation to the needs of the household members that is crucial. If the household gets the grain it needs throughout the year from the fields it works, it is obviously in a very good position compared to the household that has to buy or borrow grain. In the table below households with sufficient yield are listed:

TABLE 8

Caste	Number of households with sufficient yield	% of total number of households
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	17	59
Silwal	60	62
Tamang	3	3
Brahman	25	46
Sarki	0	0
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	3	9
Rana Magar	0	0
Newar	7	39
(Srestha)	(3)	(30)
(Jyapu)	(3)	(43)
(Tandukar)	(1)	(100)
Kamar	2	14
Mahanta	7	41
Kami	0	0
Damai	0	0
Nagarkoti	2	33
Pahari	1	33
Gurung	1	33
Total	128	30

Here, the higher castes are again favoured as against the lower. It is only the Newars which come close to them in percentage of households of the caste having sufficient yield. The bad situation of the pani nacalne castes and the Tamangs in the field of agriculture is stressed again in these figures. There are also some households whose yield from their fields is big enough to allow selling some of the produce on the open market.

TABLE 9 Marketing of grain

Caste	Markering	% of households
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	11	38
Silwal	46	47
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	1	3
Brahman	18	33
Newar	4	24
(Srestha)	(1)	(11)
(Jyapu)	(2)	(29)
(Tandukar)	(1)	(100)
Kamar	1	7
Mahanta	4	24
Total	85	20

Here, again the dominance of the higher castes is pronounced, 70 of the 85 households belonging to this category, and only the Newars among the others rising above the average of 20%.

This selling off of some of the yearly produce on the market should not be confused with cash-cropping. If there is a surplus the farmer may sell, but he does not grow primarily with the view to sell.

Land sales

There seems to be very little selling of land going on in Kitini. I have figures for the last seven years and during this time only 28 sales have taken place. Two of these were in the region of 16 ropanis and 12 ropanis respectively, while all others varied between 7 ropanis and 1 ropani. So, apart from being few in number the plots sold are also small. The overwhelming number of transactions were made between people in Kitini or from neighbouring areas. No caste predominates, all are involved both as buyers and sellers. The reasons for selling is often the need to find money to meet contingent expenses of various forms, such as illness, marriage, building a house, lack of food-stuffs as a result of a bad harvest, or inability to earn enough money to defray the cost of the household. This low rate of selling land is connected with the wide-spread land scarcity in the Kathmandu Valley. People hang on to land if they can, since prices are steadily rising, due to increase in population and constant inflation.

Agricultural workers

Below the number of individuals working as agricultural labourers in the various castes is given together with the time they work in a year.[5] The total work force for each caste is made up of individuals above 15 years of age.

TABLE 10

Caste (women)	up to 2 months		3 - 6 months		7 - 12 months		Total work-force
	No.of individuals	% of total work-force	No of individuals	% of total work-force	No of individuals	% of total work-force	
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	3	8	4	11	1	3	38
Silwal	7	4	7	4	1	1	187
Tamang	41	25	20	12	4	2	167
Brahman	1	1	1	1	5	5	96
Sarki	9	18	9	18	8	16	51
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	8	14	15	26	3	5	58
Rana Magar	1	50					2
Newar					1	3	32
(Jyapu)					(1)	(8)	(12)
Kamar	2	8	4	16	2	8	25
Mahanta	1	3	3	8			38
Kami	3	23			1	8	13
Damai	2	33			1	17	6
Nagarkoti			2	13			16
Pahari	1	20					5
Gurung	1	33	1	33			3
Total	80	11	66	9	27	4	737

TABLE 11

Caste (men)	up to 2 months		3 - 6 months		7 - 12 months		Total work-force
	No. of individuals	% of total work-force	No. of individuals	% of total work-force	No. of individuals	% of total work-force	
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	3	7	1	2			43
Silwal	1	1	1	1			144
Tamang	7	4	8	5	3	2	160
Brahman	2	2			1	1	90
Sarki	7	17	7	17	4	9	42
Magar, excl.Rana Magar	5	12	8	19	1	2	42
Rana Magar			1	25			4
Newar			1	3			30
(Jyapu)			(1)	(9)			(11)
Kamar	7	32					22
Mahanta	1	4	1	4			25
Kami	2	18					11
Damai	2	29					7
Nagarkoti			1	9			11
Total	37	6	29	5	9	1	631

It can be seen that the women take care of most of the agricultural labouring in all castes.

The high figure for the Sarki men reflects the fact that they have little alternative opportunities of employment in Kitini due to the decrease in their traditional occupation, shoe making. The Magars, too, being former serfs are in a difficult position. Their new status also means that they cannot count on the protection of a master's house, while at the same time they have not been given any resources with which to start a new life as freed-men.

The figures point to the fact that very few alternatives to agricultural work exist for women. As was seen above, they take care of the daily work on the fields and when the household is in need of money they go out to work as agricultural labourers. The men have a greater choice in this respect. They are often employed in other trades (see below). And for them there is also a greater element of rank involved. They do not want to work the land of someone else unless it is imperative. This element of rank also exists for the women, but it is less pronounced.

Agriculture in Kitini: summary

The picture of social relations with regard to agriculture in Kitini is thus one where the high castes still dominate. They own more land per household than do the other castes. Here the Silwals, the traditional rural aristocracy in Kitini top the list, followed by the Brahmans. Then come the Mahantas and the other Katri-Chetris. When it comes to yield from the land, owned and tenanted, the favourable picture of the higher castes is even stronger.

As was noted above the Land Reform Act of 1964 aimed only at regulating the conditions of tenants and landowners. It did not concern itself with the agricultural labourers. And it has been seen that agricultural labouring is a direct effect of the household's standing with regard to the amount of grain that it is able to harvest from the land which it cultivates, either as owner or tenant. There has been only one feeble attempt to better the lot of some of the households with very little land. The Gaun pancayat wanted to distribute some waste land to a number of needy households in one ward but this attempt failed due to the rivalries between the political factions.

Credit to agriculture and co-operation in Kitini

The new credit-giving institutions that have been established have had little impact on the scene in the Kitini. Very few have availed themselves of the possibilities. And there seems also to be the case that the farmers find it difficult to relate to these new institutions for a variety of reasons. There are some complaints from those who have taken loans either for establishing fruit and vegetable gardens or for poultry farms that the procedure they have to go through in order the receive the money is both bureaucratic and time consuming. There are forms to be filled in and bureaucratic decisions to be taken. In one case an applicant had to wait for seven months before he received the RS. 5 000 he had applied for. There is also the problem of the relations between the applicant and the official. There seems to be the feeling among the farmers that those responsible for granting loans are not really keen to part with the money and that they often treat their customers rudely and do not do anything to help or facilitate the process of application. Such behaviour is to be expected from the way that institutions in Kathmandu are organized (see chapter two). The loyalty of a civil servant goes upwards to his boss; his future promotion is mainly dependent on personal relations with his superiors rather than on the skill he shows in work. In this way, loyalties are not directed towards the customer who comes to seek advice. One would assume, however, that an official would be interested in creating a new client by helping the customer. Establishment of new patron - client ties do of course take place, but they follow a certain pattern. An official who does

not know a favour-seeking farmer who comes to him on business will not ordinarily ask for a bribe or accept one if offered. A person without ties to someone inside an institution has to find someone known both to him and to the official concerned if he wants the latter to work in his favour. If he finds such a broker he will have to pay both him and the patron/ offical or treat them to tea, cigarettes, food and so on while the case is being decided. In cases like this, then, it is not the fact that one has to bribe that is of prime importance. What establishes the connection (and the possibility of bribing)is the existence of personal relations between individuals who know each other and trust each other.

If success in obtaining credit from the agencies in Kathmandu is to a great extent dependent on personal connections, the picture is no different in the Kitini with regard to the management of the local level branches. Thus, the forced savings scheme (see above) collapsed after a few years due to misappropriation of the savings. It turned out that most of the ward members had used the collections themselves or to help out needy relatives and neighbours. Again, this is what could be expected given the social relations obtaining between these kinds of people. A person who is known to have the means cannot readily refuse the appeal from a needy relative by saying that the grain he handles is not his own but the government's.

The collections under the program had to be stopped after a few years, and it seems that the trend of misappropriation was the same all over Nepal with the result that the whole scheme has been dormant for several years (HMG, 1970:50). The Co-operative society in Kitini met with the same fate. Its function was to buy seeds and chemical fertilizers and sell them to the farmers at low prices. However, the same pattern as in the compulsary savings scheme repeated itself and those who were in charge of it used the money for their dependants and others to whom they had obligations. The person who was in charge of distributing the chemical fertilizers did so without asking for payment for two years in a row. He is a politician and catered above all to the needs of his supporters.

The very same confusion between public and private money as well as the need to act in terms of personal relations is clearly brought out in the fate of the co-operative shop that was established following the formation of the Co-operative society. The initial loan was given to the Gaun pancayat by the Sajha Bhandar (Co-operative Society) in Patan. The Gaun pancayat handed over the loan to the Co-operative society and there was agreement that the two of them were to share the profit. The manager of the shop was to deduct some of the profit for himself as payment. During its existence the shop had three managers before it folded. All of these

managers were from the higher castes one a Mahanta and the two others Silwals. The first two managers left because the shop did not show any profit. This was due to the facts that on the one hand the manager would simply take money from the shop in order to tide the household over some difficulty, and on the other he had to give credit to those people who had helped him to get his position and who were his friends. These were the influential Silwals in wards 2 and 3. The shop was located in this very same area. After these two managers had left the Gaun pancayat decided to appoint an individual who was to run it and guarantee the Gaun pancayat and the Co-operative society a fixed sum every year. One person, a Silwal, who turned out to be willing to pay Rs. 1100 a year, got the post (the Gaun pancayat, however, thought this sum too high and reduced it to Rs. 700. This is a good comment on the lack of realism of the shopkeeper). This manager's first action was to increase the loan from Sajha Bhandar by an additional Rs. 4 000, so that the total now reached Rs. 11 000. He had difficulties in paying and altoghether he paid back about Rs. 5400. This caused the Sajha Bhandar to refuse to give any more goods. The merchandise that he already had was rapidly decreasing due to the extensive credit to those who had helped him to establish himself as the manager of the shop and later had lowered the sum he had to pay to Rs. 700. He also gave credit on a smaller scale to his neighbours and relatives. In addition he made use of both the goods and the money that he had obtained by selling some of it for his own household. Thus, the marriage of his son was financed by the co-operative shop as were the big festivals of Dasain and Tihar. In the end he stood there without anything to sell and with a big debt to the Gaun pancayat.But since he had friends on the Gaun pancayat he only had to pay smaller sums until the aftermath of the election in 1973, when the losing faction went to the police and argued that the shopkeeper was corrupt. He was arrested and ordered by court to pay up. This example shows rather well the way in which the measures undertaken by the centre are redefined at the local level and appropriated to serve personal relations by those who have the power to do so. In this case, mainly the high castes, and especially the Silwals benefited. But it was not on a generalized basis. Those who were advantaged had specific connections to the manager and because of these they were favoured. Similarly, these very same people tried to shelter him when the shop had gone bankrupt.

These examples bring out the contradiction between the government plans for realizing an improvement in the conditions of people understood as a mass of individuals and the social reality with which these plans are confronted. The programs look good on paper but once they reach the local level they are transformed according to the kinds of social relations that exist there. In the same way, these social relations are a continuation of and are commensurate with the relations that obtain between officials in the implementing agencies with the result that have very little effect with regard to the original intentions behind them, and they are made to serve interests which have nothing whatsoever to do with agricultural development. Strategically well placed individuals, who are mostly high caste, are able to use the new resources for their own and their groups benefit against other less fortunate people.

The power of high-caste people to appropriate attempts at modernization and change can also be seen from the case when there was a delegation from Kathmandu coming to Kitini to discuss a project of planting 40 ropanis of land with a new Chinese seed. They met with the Pradhan panc and one of his Silwal friends, who is very influential but not then on the Gaun pancayat. The result was that this Silwal was able to have his land, and that of a few Silwal friends and kinsmen sown with the new seed. The Pradhan panc, however, did not get any share since his land is in another part of the Kitini. In this way the decision was taken by one individual and there was never a question of calling the Gaun pancayat or discussing with other farmers in the area. It is perhaps an apt illustration of how the crumbs of agricultural planning may fall from the table of high-caste people to those below that one Kami happened to have one ropani of land in the same area where this project was to be carried out and that he in this way was included without an effort of his own.

Caste-specific work

There are some castes in Kitini which perform special kinds of work for the others as an hereditary right. The two castes most involved in this are the Damari and the Kami. Formerly the Sarkis were also included in this category, but their special skill has been rendered uninteresting to people in Kitini as a result of the selling of imported shoes in Kathmandu, which has been going on for the last twenty years. The shoes of the Sarkis are found clumsy and uncomfortable, and consequently the Sarkis are reduced to cobblery. The Brahman priests also perform their traditional services to the clean Hindu castes in Kitini and the caste of Kamar engages in begging.

The work of the Damai and Kami can conceptually be divided into two categories, that of working for a bista household and that of caste-specific work that fall outside this. The former involves an inherited tie between a Damai or Kami household and a bista household. The Damai or Kami household performs a set number of services to their bista household and are paid a customary due by the latter. Although most castes are involved as bista households it would seem that the Silwal are those which have been most important, which is also brought out by the fact that most of the houses of the Damai and Kami castes are built on Silwal land and that many of these pani nacalne households live closed to or even within the Silwal hamlets in Kitini. Payment for the services of the specialist castes by their bistas is normally made in grain. The payment to the Kamis is fixed while the Damais are paid according to the number of members in the bista household. The Tamangs, however, pay in cash, a fact which is obviously related to their poor agricultural situation. Today many bista households break the customary ties with their service caste households as a result of the availability of modern clothes and tools in Kathmandu. In this way the bista households feel that they do not get the full return on the payments they make to their service-caste households, and as a result they prefer to sever the relationship, instead paying for each service at the current market price whenever they need something done by a Kami or a Damai.

Although the specialist castes have some land and do a bit of farming it is obvious that for them work for bista households has been and still is to the Damai and Kami a substitute for agriculture. Through this arrangement they are assured of grain by performing necessary functions in agricultural society. Even if a bista household does not need the stipulated services of a low-caste household they still have to pay the stipulated amount of grain as long as the relationship holds. The Sarkis are in a worse situation than the Damai and the Kami precisely because of this. When their bistas disappeared they found themselves without work, having very little land of their own, and not being able to find other employment. The result has been a migration to India by some Sarkis, a few of whom have come back with relatively large amounts of money which they have been able to save and have thus bettered their situation.

The network of bista -service caste relations in Kitini is shown in the following table (note that one specialist caste, which is also pani nacalne the Nau (barber) caste is not found in Kitini. The barbers come from

another area not far away):

TABLE 12

% of bista households in the various castes

Caste	Damai Kami Sarki Nau	Damai Kami Nau	Damai Kami	Kami Nau	Damai Nau	Damai	Kami	Nau	Total bista holds	% of house-
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal		63	25	4		4		4	83	
Silwal	2	66	18	6	1	6	1		90	
Tamang			38			41	21		59	
Brahman		62	33			4			82	
Sarki			13			13	75		24	
Magar, excl.Rana Magar		47	47				5		56	
Rana Magar						100			50	
Newar		50	10	30				10	56	
(Srestha)		(75)	(25)						(40)	
(Jyapu)		(20)		(60)				(20)	(71)	
(Tandukar)		(100)							(100)	
Kamar			33	67					19	
Mahanta		38	54			8			76	
Damai							100		17	
Nagarkoti		75	25						67	
Pahari		67						33	100	
Gurung			50	50					67	
Total	1	44	29	4	0,4	13	8	1	65	

It can be seen from this table that the higher castes of Katri-Chetri, Brahman and Mahanta are bista to a much greater extent than the others. Not only do they have the highest percentage of households with ties to specialist castes, but they also have very complex ties to the service castes as well, in most cases involving the castes of Damai, Kami and Nau. The Srestha and Nagarkoti castes also have relations mainly with these castes, but in their case the percentage of households involved is lower than it is in the case of the higher castes. Again I discount the Pahari figure since it is based on such a low number of households.

While all Kamis and almost all Damais are tied to bista households or perform their specialities on a market basis only a few Brahmans work as priests. There are only two Brahmans who are full-time priests pursuing agriculture as well and a handful of others who do it in addition to some other work totalling altoghether 13 households.Two of the Brahmans in Kitini are pandits (priest with a degree from a Sanscrit College), but only one of them is qualified for performing a sapta puja (a rite that lasts for seven days).

The Brahman priests perform their work (jajmani) for specific households who are their clients (jajman). Just as is the case with the ties obtaining between a bista household and its low caste specialist household this is ideally an enduring relationship. The Brahman priests are given gifts, including money, on each occasion when they perform. The magnitude is related to the economic standing of the jajman, a better-off household giving more than a poorer one. The items involved also vary. The priests are sometimes given cows, calves, gold and other valuable items if the jajman is rich and the rite performed is an important one such as marriage, bratabandha, sapta puja, or sradha (commemoration rite for the jajman's ancectors). In most cases, however, the Brahman will have to be content with some grain, fruits and small sums of money. It is also interesting to note that instead of giving a cow and a calf (both of which are given to expiate sins committed by the donator) a sum of 33 paisa (about $ 0.03) can be given. Out of this sum 32 paisa symbolizes the cow and 1 paisa stands for the calf.

Being a priest is not a very lucrative occupation, and it is symptomatic that out of the two households which are full time specialists one has sufficient yield from agriculture while the other is rather poor in land, but on the other hand the priest is alone in his household and the extra earnings he gets from working as a priest gives him what he needs to stay alive. Again, it is above all agriculture which is important if a Brahman household has several members and cannot feed itself from its lands, work as a priest will take secondary place to or be combined with other kinds of work. Its unpopularity can also be gauged from the fact that although many Brahmans come within the category of sufficient yield most of them opt for employment elsewhere. This choice is of course facilitiated by the fact that the Brahmans as a high caste stand a better chance of finding salaried employment than people from lower caste categories do (see below).

The traditional begging of the Kamars and performing of poetry are also religious in nature. They are normally paid with a handful of rice from each house in Kitini. About half the Kamar households engage in this kind of activity. In addition the Kamars engage in agricultural labouring and

a little farming on their own account.

Carpentry, tantra mantra and wood selling

Carpentry is quite common and about a dozen people earn some money from this, by hiring out their services. These carpenters are found mainly in the Tamang and Magar castes, but among the higher castes represented in this profession there are also two Katri-Chetris. Not all of these carpenters work steadily at it.

Tantra mantra (healing or curing) is also practiced by some people,such as the Tamang bombo, but even Hindus do this. These specialists are sought after for minor illnesses, but if the case is considered serious most people would go to the doctor who comes to Kitini for three hours once a week. One Tamang Lama has a special kind of income, going around in several villages over a wide area in the south-eastern part of the Kathmandu Valley and using his power to protect the crop against hailstorms and similar misfortunes. For this he is paid a handful of grain by each household (Lama pathi).

Wood selling is perhaps an activity that is more involved in a competitive market than the ones already mentioned. Most of the households in Kitini collect their own wood, but there is a market for wood in the places of the Kathmandu Valley which do not have a big forest close by as the people in Kitini have. A few travel as far as Kathmandu on their wood-selling trips. Nowadays the Sarkis engage in this to some extent (eight households), while the Tamangs have turned away from it during the last fifteen years due to other opportunities for work.

All of the above pursuits are engaged in addition to farming the household's land and/or agricultural labouring. Apart from jajmani, and other caste specific work of the Kami and Damai they are also expressions of the limited number of salaried jobs that are available. However, one should not immediately assume that people who work in these occupations would always accept a salaried work. Agricultural labouring is better paid than salaried positions and the specialities discussed above can be easily fitted into a pattern of seasonal agricultural labouring something, which is much more difficult to do if one is employed in an office, for instance.

Produce from domestic animals

Households in Kitini keep a number of different kinds of domestic animals. The cow is the most common and it is used, of course, to produce milk which

is consumed by the household or sold to the shops in the area or to the St. Xavier School. In addition cow dung is used as fertilizer on the fields and as fuel. The next most common domestic animal is the goat, which is the main source of meat to the Hindus. Male goats are also used for blood sacrifice, and for this reason some households breed goats and sell them at the big religious festivals, for instance, at Dasain. Hens are also used for sacrifice and the meat is eaten. In addition the eggs are consumed by the household or sold to shops and the St. Xavier School. Only Untouchables keep pigs, since it is a polluting animal: no high caste Hindu should eat pork and this rule is adhered to in Kitini. The buffalo is kept for milk, meat and hides. The milk is sold in the manner of cow milk. There are no shops in Kitini that sell meat so if a buffalo (or a goat) has been slaughtered each household which wants meat sends a member to buy a piece directly at the place of slaughter. Oxen are used for ploughing and only kept by the few households of various castes who do this particular work.

Ritual rank and status aspiration determine the use the various castes can make of domestic animals. No Hindus can eat beef, and no high caste can eat pork. In fact, the two pandits who apsire to the highest ritual rank for their households do not eat meat at all. Other high castes eat goat, hen and sometimes duck. Buffalo meat is looked down on by high castes but is consumed by the others. And the pig, finally, is eaten by the pani nacalne and some matwali castes. In this way, it is easier for the lower castes to get more out of their domestic animals, since for the higher castes several kinds of domestic animals cannot be useful from the point of view of furnishing protein. Thus, their range of usefulness is restricted accordingly. This means, conversely, that the lower castes get more out of the money they invest in domestic animals.

Mills

There are five water mills (ghatta) in Kitini. The households that own them have very little land and so the grain that is paid by the customers is used to make up for the deficit. Only wheat and maize are ground in these mills, never paddy which is ground at home, except by a few persons who go to the electric mill in Badegaun.

Water-mill owners employ only their own household members in their enterprise.

Summary

To sum up this chapter so far a few points can be made. The economic dominance of the tagadhari castes flow both from the land they own and the favourable connections to the ruling élite in Kathmandu that this land is an expression of (it was given as grants). Other castes have less or in some cases no land at all. They make up most of the agricultural working force. This neat categorization into different economic classes is, however, conceptually rather than empirically valid, since in many cases land owner may also be a tenant and perhaps an agricultural labourer as well. The tagadhari castes are also, ideally, the most important bista households, a position which has at its root the ideological conception of the inequality of human beings, expressed in terms of rank with the service castes being Untouchable. It is clear that this ideology based on Hindu thought is in contradiction with the ideals of Pancayat Democracy, which claims to have the ultimate equality of all human beings as its guiding principle. It is also obvious that the fact that Nepal is a Hindu kingdom makes this inconsistency between traditional and modernized ideology a contradiction of the first order.

The attempts made by the government, for instance in financing agriculture, have followed the lines of appropriation of resources through personal relations. In this way the system remains the same today as it was before the introduction of Pancayat Democracy. Those families who were viewed favourably by the ruler in Rana times (or before) and hence rewarded, still form a kind of local aristocracy whose ties to the centre, although not giving them wealth, are still operative and favour them at the expense of others less fortunately connected people.

Importance of salaried employment

Employment outside the field of agriculture or other traditional kinds of occupation plays an important part in the economic life of Kitini. The most important source of salaried work is the government. This is not a new trend. Even during Rana times employment in government service, administration and the army were the main ways of obtaining cash.

Salaried work is coveted by people in Kitini. Agriculture yields little and in most households there are more members than are needed for the agricultural work during most of the year. And even if some of these hire themselves out as agricultural labourers, there are still many months when there is no employment.

Work for cash takes two forms:temporary and permanent. In the latter case

the importance of agriculture shows itself in the fact that people who are permanently employed normally take two to four weeks holiday every year to assist their own households at the peak seasons of the agricultural year. Permanent employees are almost exclusively men: less than 1% in this category in Kitini are women. This tallies with the fact that women are occupied with household chores and daily work on the fields and have less time to spend on other pursuits. The men, on the other hand, have no defined role in this respect. They are free to try for any kind of employment without having to consider household duties first. This is also shown in the make-up of the temporary labour-force. In the lime and marble business, where the Tamangs make up most of the workers the men are permanently employed while the women work temporarily and are mostly engaged in piece-rate jobs. They have to break off now and then in order to tend their own fields or to work as agricultural labourers, this being better paid than the job in the marble and lime quarries. Given the depressed agricultural condition of the Tamangs and the link between insufficient yields from the fields and agricultural labouring it is clear that they will opt for such jobs. And there are also some Tamang men who work on a temporary basis in order to augment the income of the household by working as agricultural labourers as well.

The way that the Tamangs regard agricultural labouring as more remunerative than salaried work is a general consideration. Salaried occupations within the reach of a farmer from Kitini are relatively badly paid and it is impossible for a household to live only by the salary of a household member. On the other hand salaried work is lighter, gives more prestige, and in the case of government jobs, also gives a small pension and is therefore preferred. It is also secure in the sense that is not dependent on seasonal fluctuations in the way agricultural labouring is. But it also means that a household must have some land of its own in order to supplement the small salary. Thus, people working away from Kitini often take with them rice and maybe mustard oil from the farm when they return from a visit to their house in Kitini. The women stay behind and take care of the farm in the absence of the men. If the household has very little or no land at all some of the members will have to work as agricultural labourers, and these will mostly be the women. The men will then also take up such work depending on how serious the economic condition of the household is. In this way salaried work is no substitute for agriculture or agricultural labouring. It can rather be seen as a kind of luxury in those cases where a member of the household is permanently employed in salaried work and spends very little time on agriculture. It is therefore households which either have sufficient yield from their land and/or a certain

number of members who can work as agricultural labourers to satisfy immediate household needs who tend to have members engaged in permanent salaried work.

This is also true of the occupational castes of the Damai and Kami. Here work for bistas and other caste specific work take the place of agriculture, although the women do of course engage to some extent in agricultural labouring. Very few Damai and Kami households have members permanently employed as salary earners, and those who have, also have someone to take care of the traditional occupation. If there are only two adults in the household the man will most likely be working full time in his occupation and will only temporarily go for other jobs such as agricultural labouring or some other job when the need arises.

The case is different with the Brahmans who work as priests and are engaged in jajmani work. This is not very remunerative as can also be gauged by the few Brahmans who engage in it. Most of the priests have other jobs as well or other household members have other jobs.

For the Brahmans as for the other high castes the fact that they have generally more and better land than other castes makes it easier for them to stay away from agricultural labouring and instead they secure for themselves salaried jobs. This is also true of the households which are less fortunately endowed with land. The lowly rated agricultural labouring will be something to which they resort as a last measure. They are also better placed than the lower castes in the opportunity structure as a result of having better connections through the dominance of tagadhari castes in the administration and the kin or other connections which they may have (see below).

Thus, salaried employment is an addition to agriculture and caste specific work, but for the higher castes, who disdain agricultural labouring it may be a means to avoid doing such degrading work. The lower castes have less choice because they cannot secure jobs for themselves as easily as the higher caste people can, and it is also likely that it is less of a loss of status to them to work as agricultural labourers. But this in turn means that a lower caste household may be better off financially than a higher caste household given that both have the same number of household members and the same amount of land, while the former engages in agricultural labouring and the latter resorts to less well paid salaried work and perhaps leaving some women idle instead of letting them contribute to enhance the economic position of the household by working on the fields of other people for cash or grain.

Distribution of salaried employment

There are of course salaried positions of various status and remuneration open to people in Kitini. Some of them I term "qualified" since they demand that the incumbent has some education or is at least literate. In other jobs, which I term "unqualified" there are no such demands made. Then, a person may work in or close to Kitini while others may work in Kathmandu, in other parts of Nepal or even in India.

According to Pancayat Democracy there should be no discrimination as to caste when an applicant to a job is being selected. Only merit should be allowed to be the basis for the selection. As was said above, the facts that agriculture in Kitini (and in most of Nepal) yields rather little and there are more people in most households than are needed for work on the farm mean that many are on the look-out for salaried employment. This means that competition is stiff.

There are 257 households (60% of the total) in Kitini who have members engaged in permanent wage work. In these figures are included people who are pensioned off from government service. The distribution over castes is as follows:

TABLE 13

Caste	No of households	% of households
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	18	62
Silwal	66	68
Tamang	77	75
Brahman	41	75
Sarki	4	12
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	18	56
Rana Magar	1	50
Newar	8	44
(Srestha)	(7)	(70)
(Jyapu)	(1)	(14)
Kamar	4	25
Mahanta	9	53
Kami	3	33
Damai	1	17
Nagarkoti	3	50
Pahari	3	100
Gurung	1	33
Total	257	60

Turning from the households to the individuals engaged in salaried employment (including pensioners) the following picture emerges for the various castes:

TABLE 14

Caste	Men employed	% of total male working force	Women employed	% of total female working force
Katri-Chetri,excl. Silwal	24	56		
Silwal	79	56		
Tamang	85	53	40	24
Brahman	46	51	1	1
Sarki	6	14		
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	14	33	1	2
Rana Magar	1	25		
Newar	9	33		
(Srestha)	(8)	(44)		
(Jyapu)	(1)	(9)		
Kamar	7	32		
Mahanta	11	44		
Kami	6	55		
Damai	1	14		
Nagarkoti	4	36		
Pahari	5	83		
Gurung	1	20		
Total	299	47	42	6

Thus, the 257 households with members engaged in salaried employment turns out to have 299 men and 42 women in such positions. That is to say while 60% of the households in Kitini get some income from such work, only 47% of the male working force and a paltry 6% of the female are engaged in this way. The tagadhari castes score high and so do the Tamangs, who belong to the only caste where women are employed to some extent. Their situation is a special one and related to the fact that they make up the workers in the lime stone and marble quarries as has been pointed above. The Newars, especially the Srestha caste, are also well represented among the salaried people as are, to a lesser extent, the Mahantas.

But, as was said above, there are different kinds of salaried jobs,"qualified" and "unqualified". It might be interesting to see the divisions

between the castes with regard to this difference. Furthermore, some jobs are found in or close to Kitini, while other people may have to travel far away in search of work. Below I show how the different jobs are distributed in Kitini:

TABLE 15

Caste	People working in or close to Kitini, Unqualified		% of total salaried working force for the various castes Qualified
	Men	Women	Men
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	38		
Silwal	19		3
Tamang	80	100	
Brahman	26		4
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	15		
Newar	33		11
(Srestha)	(38)		(13)
Kamar	43		
Mahanta	18		
Kami	17		
Total	39	95	5

TABLE 16

Caste	People working away from Kitini		% of total salaried working force for the various castes	
	Unqualified		Qualified	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	17		21	
Silwal	32		34	
Tamang	13		4	
Brahman	35	100	22	
Sarki	100			
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	42	100	7	
Rana Magar	100			
Newar	56			
(Srestha)	(50)			
(Jyapu)	(100)			
Kamar	29			
Mahanta	55		27	
Kami	3			
Damai	100			
Nagarkoti	75			
Pahari	80			
Gurung	100			
Total	32	5	16	

Pensioners: These are divided into qualified and unqualified categories according to which they belonged to before retirement. There are no women among the pensioners.

TABLE 17

Caste	% of total salaried working force for the various castes	
	Unqualified	Qualified
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	25	
Silwal	10	3
Tamang	2	
Brahman	13	
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	29	7
Kamar	29	
Kami	33	
Nagarkoti	25	
Pahari	20	
Total	11	1

The first thing to note is the fact that there are very few opportunities for qualified jobs in Kitini all being limited to a few posts in government service and work as clerks in the limestone and marble industries. The unqualified jobs, on the other hand, are more frequent, and here the limestone and marble play the most important role, employing most of the Tamangs, followed by the role of government undertakings. It is also noticeable that members from the high castes occupy most of the qualified jobs.

Most of the people working outside the immediate neighbourhood of Kitini work in unqualified jobs, but there are also many employed in qualified positions. Here, about 90% of those employed in this kind of work come from the higher castes while all the others come from the other clean castes. But it should be remembered that although they are here described as qualified it is still the fact that the posts are in most cases low in the administrative or the military hierarchy. It is only in relation to the standard of education and opportunities prevalent in Kitini that they can be described as qualified.

The army used to be virtually the only way of getting away from agricultural work for most people in the Rana days, and it is noticeable that almost all men in the old generation started their careers in the army. As the opportunity structure widened some left military life and joined the swelling bureaucracy, mostly as piuns (errand boys). The army is still a very important source of income for many households in Kitini but today there are other branches of government service available to people. However, the matwali castes are still very dependent on the army for promotion to higher posts. It is worth noticing that all the three Tamangs listed as occupying qualified posts are non-commissioned officers in the army. The only group among the matwali castes, which have access to the higher reaches of the administration in Kathmandu are the Sresthas, who have for long filled bureaucratic positions in the capital, as was seen above.

The pani nacalne castes are the most disadvantaged when it comes to getting work in qualified positions. They do not have a single member in this category. Most of the pani nacalne individuals who have found work outside Kitini work in occupations close to their traditional speciality. That is to say, Kamis have found work as mechanics and the Sarkis as workers in a shoe factory.

Then there are some Sarkis working in India, following the recently established tradition of this caste.

The women are another category that are severly underrepresented in salaried employment. It is only the Tamang women who are employed to any great extent, crushing stones in the marble factory. Only two women work away from Kitini; one a Magar and the other a Brahman, both being cooks in schools in Kathmandu.

Most of the pensioners in Kitini had worked in unqualified jobs, mostly in the army, mirroring the importance of this institution for the older generation. It is also significant that the two pensioners who had been in qualified positions had been officers in the army. Furthermore, one of these two is a Magar and the man behind the initiative to start the guthi of that caste, as well as deciding to change its name from Gharti to Magar.

To get a job in or around Kitini a person may or may not need someone to introduce him depending on where he wants to work. In the case of the Tamangs they may go to the lime stone or marble quarries and ask for a job and stand a chance of getting it. If they want to start work in a government run institution like the Botanical garden they need someone already working within that establishment to introduce them. In the same way the Tamangs who work in the St. Xavier School have been recruited through the help of Tamangs, already working there. One should note, however, that the difference between the marble and limestone quarries and the other places when it comes to recruiting new workers is not that great as it may seem, since the two Silwal businessmen in charge of the former two know the Tamangs, who come looking for jobs, or they will at least know some of their relatives. In this way there is already a personal link between employer and employee, and no intermediary is needed.

To get a job somewhere far away from Kitini, where one is not known to the prospective employer, one needs someone who can help and act as a broker. Often, and this is true of all cases where there is need of an intermediary for recruitment to jobs, a person from Kitini who is established in an institution will try and get his own clients and/or kin into it, too. This is illustrated by the case of the formerly important Silwal (he is now dead) who was the first Pradhan panc of the Gaun pancayat. He held a position in the army and through him a good many Silwals were appointed to the army as soldiers and workers in the construction business that was under the control of the army. This pattern of recruitment was continued by an appointee of that Silwal, also a Silwal, who rose in the ranks to become a Captain. He has recruited at least a score or so of people mainly

Silwals who are his in or neighbours and a few matwali people as well, mostly neighbours. In this way the Silwals have been able to reinforce their dominant position in Kitini by being able to make use of the resources that a salaried career opens, and as the opportunity structure has broadened others have been recruited in more diversified ways. But the common characteristic of many of these ways is the relation they have to a patron-client pattern. An instance of the way patronage is still important in the securing of jobs is illustrated by the case of one of the few young graduates from Kitini, a Silwal. Through a distant kin connection on his mother's side he has been employed by a female Minister in the government. He works as a kind of secretary to her and his work is unpaid. His hope is that she will find him some work in the future, which will be both secure and well paid. In the meantime he works night duty in another government job, which was secured for him by his father who works in the same office(and who was in turn helped by his father).

This pattern of recruitment to salaried jobs is borne out by the data on recruitment that I have on some of the people in salaried jobs(excluding the Tamangs in the marble and lime stone quarries), altogether 109 individuals:

TABLE 18

Caste	Mode of recruitment/Unqualified jobs (in % for caste categories)			
	Relative	Higher-caste (tagadhari/Mahanta) friend or villager	Landlord	Without intermediary[6]
Tagadhari and Mahanta	48	23		29
Matwali	6	50	25	19
Pani nacalne		50		50
Total	34	31	6	29

Caste	Mode of recruitment/Qualified jobs (in % for caste categories)			
	Relative	Higher-caste (tagadhari/Mahanta) friend or villager	Cash payment	Without intermediary
Tagadhari and Mahanta	38	21	4	38
Matwali		50		50
Total	33	24	3	40

Although opportunities for wage work have increased tremendeously since 1951, it is still the case that demand far outweighs supply. Agriculture is still the most important source of income and in fact vital for people who are in salaried positions.However, when the household feels that it has one or more members to spare he or they will go into a salaried job, if it is possible to secure one. In this way, the traditional forms of recruitment are resorted to. That is to say, those who already are in a position to influence decisions about who is to be recruited try to favour their own relatives or dependants. Since the higher castes were in high places already before the coming of Pancayat Democracy, and since no structural upheaval has taken place, they are still favoured. But as was pointed out in the second chapter, one is not dealing with a generalized case of caste solidarity. The people who occupy favoured positions may be high castes, but they are also the relatives or neighbours of someone else who worked there before them. As for the other castes it is often a case of having a high-caste patron who can smooth the way to employment. And they are generally also employed in lower positions (which is true to a smaller extent of the higher castes). It is obvious that the modes of recruitment and the distribution of the various castes over the occupational structure are contrary to the ideal of equal opportunity for all. Here again, tradition reigns supreme and there is no agency to ensure a fair deal to everyone irrespective of caste. This skewed selection of individuals begins at school where especially the tagadhari castes are favoured, both by tradition and economic resources, as well as prospects for furture employment which make schooling seem worthwhile.

Individuals owe their allegiance not to some principle of equality,but to other individuals who are well placed and thus able, as well as willing, to help. But it could also be argued that impersonal modes of recruitment exist, since some people get their jobs after schooling, and this is true. However,it is also true that those who join school are mainly high-caste and without being high-caste and having a patron in the agency within which he works an individual would experience severe difficulties in being promoted as was pointed out in chapter two. It is certainly wrong to say that personal ties are the only way in which people are recruited to jobs, but it is a principle of paramount importance when one tries to understand how new opportunities for salaried work are distributed.

Commercial sources of income

a/ shops

Shops in Kitini range from the little tea shop run by a woman selling from a shed by the road side to the relatively well stocked shops which sell

food stuffs (sometimes canned), kerosene, sweets, cigarettes and similar items. In between, there are other shops selling wine and shops combining a tea shop with a wider range of commodities.

Payment in the shops is in cash, but credit is allowed since the shop-owner has a permanent clientèle, and can always be sure that the customers will turn up and pay sooner or later. Normally people who have credit pay when the shopowner thinks that the sum is getting too high, when a certain time has elapsed from the last payment, or when those in regular employment have their payday. However, the relation between the shop owner and his customers buying on credit is not always one between equals. Thus, in one shop where the Tamangs employed in the marble and limestone business do their shopping adding non-existent purchases to a customer's credit list is a regular thing. The latter knows that he is being cheated but since there are no other shops in this part of Kitini he has no choice but to pay in order not to be denied credit.

The shops are run by the members of the household including children who take their turn at selling or, in tea-shops, serving and cleaning the glasses. The shops in Kitini are owned by clean caste people. The pollution barrier between the pani nacalne castes and the others make it difficult for the former to open shops and selling tea or wine to anyone but pani nacalne people.

b/ business

One of the stated aims of the government in Nepal is to promote business and industrialization, and to this effect various programs have been instituted aimed at helping people to start in these trades. Business and industry are not new to Nepal. They existed during Rana times as well, although they did not have a policy of promoting them in the way that the new government has.

This section of the chapter will deal with the way in which business and industry (subsumed under the former term) are developing in Kitini. It will be seen that there is not only one category of businessmen. Rather, the kind of and the extent of reliance on business has a lot to do with such things as caste rank and personal contacts. In this way business in Kitini shows itself to rely on the same structure as the other economic relations that have been discussed so far. However, it is possible that the first category of businessmen to be discussed below are an example of a new kind of people that Kitini has not known before, a kind that is a result of the new government and its activities. These are the two

Silwal businessmen who run the marble and limestone quarries that have been touched on before. The lime works are of long standing in Kitini, having started several generations ago. When limestone burning was at its height there were five works operating, now they are reduced to two. This business was started around the turn of the century by a contractor from Kathmandu who worked for the Ranas. During most of the time it has existed the owners have been businessmen from Kathmandu. The first locally based limestone owner was an older relative of the two Silwal businessmen (who today own one chimney each). He worked in partnership with some people from Kathmandu, which is also the way in which the present owners started. The latter lived close to the limestone quarry and acted as supervisors as well as owners. And when their partners left they took over the whole business. The marble quarry dates from at least the last century and has been used on a non-permanent basis whenever marble has been needed for buildings in Kathmandu. In the 1940s it was taken over by a son of the Rana Prime Minister Juddha Shamshere. Surendra Shamshere. He ran it alone for about two years when two businessmen from Kathmandu joined him. They lost money in the process, however, and took a loan from the government. Then there was disagreement among the three and as a result of their inability to pay the government took it over (the Ranas had been toppled by this time). During the six years that the government owned the factory there was no proper work done except for that carried out by those who were despatched there to look after the property. When the government eventually decided to auction away the whole thing, Surendra Shamshere turned out to be the highest bidder, paying Rs. 100 000. The year after he formed a joint-stock company and among the partners were the two local Silwal businessmen who ran the limestone works. They were made supervisors of the daily work at the factory.

Most of the produce both from the limestone works and from the marble factory go to Kathmandu. In the past especially during the building of the new royal palace they did good business. During the last few years profits have been declining and both industries have to face competition from India, especially the limestone works, since cement is increasingly replacing lime.

These two Silwals are the only ones in Kitini who are businessmen in the sense that they own their means of production and invest money in their business in order to keep it up and if possible expand it. The most important investment here is lorries. It is absolutely necessary for them to have their own lorry to transport the lime and the marble.

They could of course hire someone else's but this would be costly. In fact, they try to let their own lorries in this way when they are not urgently needed in their own businesses.

These two businessmen are independent of agriculture, but both continue to farm their lands, although they themselves do not do any agricultural work. This is left to their wives and hired labour.

In this sense both are part and parcel of Kitini but as was pointed out in chapter three there is a vast difference between the two, the younger being motivated by reasons of efficiency and profit and a life centred on Kathmandu to a much greater extent than the elder, who in fact not only gives loans generously, but also often gives gifts in the form of money and is likened to a good and generous god by people. He lives up to the ideal picture of a patron who is always ready to help and who in turn can always count on the loyalty of those whom he helps. The younger Silwal is not interested in being a patron; if he lends money it is against interest or as advance on wages to his workers.

These two businessmen are, then, the rural end of a new class of people who make a living out of business only and as such could be described as the archetype of the kind of people that the government tries to bring forth through its planning in the field of and business. The truth is, however, that neither of these two has been helped by the government. On the contrary the younger of the two maintains that it would be impossible for him to get a loan from the government, since he does not know anyone who could obtain it for him, and furthermore, he feels that the conditions imposed on borrowers are so strict that he would not be able to make use of it. Consequently, he feels that he has to expand through his own efforts. Since new outlets are difficult to find he invests the money that does not go into his business into land and houses. He has bought a few plots of land in Kitini during the last ten years and constructed four houses there. He is at present planning a fifth. Thus, whether he be right or not, this businessman feels that he is not big enough to get a loan and that he would not be able to repay if he were given one. He entertains the notion that only those who are already privileged will be able to make use of the new opportunities, while moving from the category of small businessman to becoming a large-scale industrialist or businessman is out of the question, and this both for financial reasons and circumstances that have to do with a lack of influence with the top bureaucracy.

More numerous in Kitini are the part-time businessmen. They do not own any factories but make a living out of tendering for contracts (something which the two Silwal businessmen also do), mostly with the government. When they have completed a contract they return to Kitini for some time until they get another contract. Sometimes they are unsuccessful and then it is necessary for them to have a farm. Thus, they are not independent of agriculture in the way the two Silwal businessmen are. But like the latter, they do not work the fields themselves.To operate as a part-time businessman one has to have contacts, that is to say, one should be of high caste, and this is in fact the case with the part-time businessmen in Kitini: four are Silwal, one a Brahman and one a Mahanta.The history of one of them can stand as an illustration of the typical career of such a part-time businessman. He is a Mahanta and had no special job up to some 15 years ago, when he and a friend bought a lorry. He got money through pledging some land. He had the job of being its driver; eventually he met with an accident and had to sell the lorry. As a result he lost most of the money he had spent on it. Then he got a job with the Forest Department as a driver and worked there for a few years and saved some money. After this he drove for a businessman, but stayed only for one year. Again he became the driver of a businessman, and when he left this job after a couple of years he had been able to save a few thousand rupees. He went back to Kitini and became a partner of the elder of the two Silwal businessmen. They bought a lorry together, with the Silwal paying most of it. They were able to get a contract for wood from the Pulchoki area behind Kitini for the government. A police officer in Patan acted as a broker in securing the contract. When this contract had expired he started up with the younger of the two Silwals, doing wood business in the Terai, but they fell out with each other, the Silwal accusing him of cheating. When he came back he had enough money to pay the older Silwal some more on the lorry they owned together, and at the same time he made an instalment on another lorry as well. The Silwal businessman helped him to pay the rest on the lorry. Again they got a wood contract. This time in the Botanical Garden, and after that they were back on Pulchoki for yet another wood contract, this time with a third partner from Kitini. Here it can be seen how the first attempt failed, and the Mahanta had to work for several years before he had saved enough money to try to start on a business career again. He also had the help of a seasoned businessman with good contacts and money enough to pay for the lorries, which are needed in businesses like these.

It is also apparent that he leads a rather insecure life in his business, not being able to start anything permanent or investing his money in the

kind of business that the two Silwal businessmen have. If he were to do this, he would have to join forces with someone of the economic élite in Kathmandu, since his own resources are far too small for this kind of undertaking. This is what the Silwals did, but they had something to offer in return. They were living in the area and had been engaged in the work with limestone before they were offered a place in the marble. And they did not need a lot of money in order to start with the limestone. But this Mahanta does not have any similar advantages as seen from the point of view of a prospective investor, and he has to carry on with his part-time business. In this way his business does not gain a monentum of its own and if he fails to get a contract one year he is forced to go back to Kitini and stay there living off his farm. It is also noticeable how he is dependent on full-time businessmen most of the time.

Among the lower castes there are very few businessmen indeed. In fact, there is only one, a Tamang who came to Kitini in 1964. He started work with a Brahman from Kathmandu who also deals in marble, which he takes from Kitini. This was a lopsided partnership. The Tamang was rather a kind of foreman to the Brahman, employed because he knew local conditions and could find other Tamangs to work. Thus, he had certain assets that the Brahman could make use of. Perhaps it is wrong to call him a businessman, but he is paid a certain percentage of the profit and in this way he has a greater interest in the success of the business than he would have if he were only paid a salary every month. It is clear that the options of this Tamang are fewer than those of the high-caste part-time businessmen. He cannot tender for contracts. He needs a senior partner who takes care of the running of the business. These things are mainly due to the fact that he is Tamang, which automatically excludes him from the kinds of contacts that could make a bigger business possible. Furthermore, being a Tamang, he is not a credible executor of a contract in the same way as a high-caste man is. And lastly, being a Tamang he starts lower down with regard to resources in the material sense. He has no money of his own to finance any under-takings. This is of course something that is true of many high-caste people as well, but it does not follow almost automatically for than as it does for someone who is a Tamang.

There are also some kinds of business that have not been considered here. These are the few attempts at what one would call "cash cropping", i.e., those few vegetable and fruit gardens that have been established and which cater to the St.Xavier School and some shops. Furthermore, there are a couple of poultry farms operating in Kitini. These have been started with the help of government loans (see above), and are the only examples of government sponsored undertakings in Kitini in line with the desired

development of village based industry and business. The markets of these undertakings are based on the immediate locality and the profits are small in no way big enough to support the households. Thus, these kinds of business are an addition to subsistence agriculture and not a substitute for it, which is the ultimate goal of the government (HMG, 1972). Only people from tagadhari castes have been able to avail themselves of the government loans, and there are no others operating these kinds of business.

Business in Kitini then, is in most cases second to agriculture for the households concerned. Only the two Silwal businessmen are an exception to this, coming in a category of their own. Moreover, all businessmen except one are from the higher castes and the exception is not an entrepreneur in his own right. These facts tally with the other aspects of life in Kitini that have already been analyzed, but they go very much against the conditions that the government says that it wants to create in this field. Finally, the reason for the existing picture is in large measure to be understood in terms of socio-cultural traditions and caste categories, which define the roles the actors can aspire to play through the medium of personal relations.

Loans: significance and categories

One important aspect of economic life in Kitini is related to the existence of loans. From an analytical point of view they are interesting because a knowledge of the sources of loans as well as an understanding of what kinds of people borrow will shed light on the existence of ties of dependency between individual households in so far as the lending takes place locally. It will also show to what extent the public institutions have been able to substitute for private loans. These public institutions are of course part and parcel of Pancayat Democracy and as has been seen already the most important of them are geared to the development of agriculture and for the establishment of co-operatives. Then, there are also the funds available for people employed by the government. Under this scheme a certain amount is then deducted from their monthly salary until the loan is repaid. Loans may mean anything from a few rupees borrowed from a friend to buy cigarettes or other small items, to several thousand rupees needed for starting a business or buying a lorry. Lending is always going on, but it is obviously easier to borrow small sums of money, which can be paid back in a short time, or if the borrower should be slow in repaying that are not felt by the creditor as to imperil his economic security. Then, as the sums increase the lender will be more particular about

to whom he lends money and some people will find it very difficult to get a big loan when they need one. It is obviously impracticable to record and analyze all loan transactions that take place in Kitini. However, I tried to get an idea of the bigger loans, of Rs. 100 and upward and to find out who the creditors and debtors were and to what use the money was put. All loans of this magnitude are in cash, while smaller loans may also be made in grain (painco). Altogether there were 124 such loans outstanding in Kitini in the summer of 1972 taken by 114 households. The majority of these loans are interest bearing (rin), with the stipulated interest being 10%, but in some actual cases going up to 20%. A few borrowers work for the creditor for some days every year as payment of interest. Although most of these loans have been outstanding for several years and interest should be paid annually there are many cases where this has not been done, signifying the fact that these loans are not given for purely economic reasons. There are also other considerations involved. In short, they are expressions of personal relationships.

There are also many loans which are given without interest (sapat). These are normally short-term loans given by friends and relations. However, in Kitini there are a number of these that have been outstanding for a number of years.

In bhog bandhaki loans the lender takes land as security and enjoys usufruct rights over it until the loan is repaid. In Kitini fields were pledged in this way before the land reform, but this practices dying out, since under the new law the borrower will be able to get the land back when the lender has made use of the produce of the field long enough for the value of the produce to equal the sum of the loan plus interest (not more than 10%). Before the land reform the lender could keep the field until the borrower was able to pay back, which might never happen. Today, only banks take fields as security for a loan.

Sources of loans

Altogether 50 loans of the outstanding 124 are without interest. This reflects the importance of local borrowing where one tries first of all to go to friends and kin or other people with whom one has many and close contacts, including patron such as landlords or politicians living in

Kitini. The concentration on the local area in finding creditors is brought out in the following table:

TABLE 19

Caste	Local tagadhari (excl. Silwal)	Relative/ caste fellow	Silwal	Govt.	Priv. instit.	Other outside sources	Other	Not known
Katri-Chetri, excl.Silwal	5	2	2	1				
Silwal	3	(20)	20	6	4		1	
Tamang	2	1	4			3		2
Brahman	3	9	9	2		2		
Sarki		9	5					
Magar, excl.Rana Magar	2	1	4				1	
Newar		4	1					
(Srestha)		(3)						
(Jyapu)		(1)	(1)					
Mahanta		1	3					
Kami	1		1					
Damai			5					
Nagarkoti	1	2						
Pahari								1
Gurung			1					
Total	17	29	55	9	4	5	2	3

From this table the dominance of the Silwals as lenders can be clearly seen. Relatives and caste fellows are also a very important category of loan givers. Among the borrowers from outside sources there are some interesting points to be made. First of all, three of these are Tamang borrowers who have borrowed from their land lords in Patan and Kathmandu, while two of the others are Brahmans. One is a former party politician who was a member of the district executive of the Samyukta Pratantra Party in Lalitpur (Patan). The other is a high-school teacher. Thus, out of these five who have borrowed from private persons in the capital three loans are between landlord - tenant,[7] while two are taken by people who have very good contacts with Kathmandu. Furthermore, the relative unimportance of sources of loans located outside Kitini can also be seen from the few loans taken from the government and private credit institutions. These are limited to the tagadhari castes who can be expected to have the best connections within these institutions.

One interesting point to make is the fact that the Sarki borrow mainly from their own caste fellows. This is made possible by the fact that a few individuals have come back from India (as was seen above) with quite substantial amounts of money, and are in this way able to act as money lenders to the others.[8]

Reasons for borrowing

In the following table I give the uses to which the loans recorded are put. Unfortunately I have data for only 92 loans out of the 124:

TABLE 20

Caste	Medicine	Marriage	Food	Field work	Business	House constr.	Studies	Buy land	Festivals	Death rite	Other[9]
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal		1	1			4			1	1	1
Silwal	3	5	3	3	3	5	1		2		2
Tamang	1		2			1		3			
Brahman	1	4	2		1	5		1	1	2	
Sarki		6	2					1	2		
Magar, excl.Rana Magar		2	2			1		1			
Newar		2	2			1					
(Srestha)		(2)	(1)								
(Jyapu)			(1)			(1)					
Mahanta	1		1								
Kami									1	1	
Damai			0							1	1
Nagarkoti		2	1								
Pahari		1									
Gurung			0								
Total	6	23	16	3	4	17	1	6	7	5	4

Some of the expenses listed above recur more or less frequently such as the money needed by people with very little land to buy food, or expenditure for festivals, which are celebrated every year. In other cases, such as marriage, death ritual or house construction the sums involved may be big, but the expenditure has only to be made a few times during the life of an individual. In this sense, then, the use to which the borrowed money is put makes a lot of difference to the household budget. A recurring need for

borrowed money to feed the household members or to buy medicine for someone chronically ill affects the economic standing of the household in a different way than does a once-and-for-all loan to hold a wedding. In the first cases the sums borrowed accumulate over the years and one or more members may have to spend a considerable time working off the interest on the fields of the creditor. In fact, they cannot afford to refuse to do this since it would mean that they might not be able to secure a loan the following year. People with such continuous need for larger sums of money cannot, in the absence of government-provided loans, make use of the provisions inherent in the Land Reform Act concerning the security of the borrower against excessive demands made by the lender. In the case of those who borrow once, things are different. They are in a better position to delay repayment, since they are not in urgent need of new loans. This partly accounts for the fact that many borrowers default on paying back the loans, often not even paying the interest. The other part of the explanation is of course related to what was said above about the complex of different ties that link the lender and the borrower and makes the transaction something more than a purely economic one.

Size of loans

Below I give the sizes of the loans of the indebted 114 households in Kitini:

TABLE 21

Caste	100-300	301-600	601-900	901-1500	1501-2000	2001-3000	3001-4000	4001-5000	5001- (Rs.)
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	2	3		2	1		1		
Silwal	3	6	1	6	3	2	2	2	4
Tamang	6	2	2	1		1			
Brahman	4	4		8	2	2	1		1
Sarki	7	3	1	2					
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	1	3		1		2	1		
Newar	1	3			1				
(Srestha)	(1)	(1)			(1)				
(Jyapu)		(2)							
Mahanta	1	3							
Kami	1	1							
Damai	4		1						
Nagarkoti		2		1					
Pahari		1							

As is shown by this table the sums borrowed are not very big, more than half the loans are Rs. 600 or less and 76% are Rs. 1 500 or less. The biggest sums of money are involved in such undertakings as investment in business, construction of a house, wedding and buying of land. Out of the 26 loans of Rs. 1600 or more 22 are for these purposes.[10]

Private and institutionalized borrowing

The patterns of private borrowing in Kitini can be contrasted with the institutionalized lending by the government. As has been noted already employees are able to borrow a certain sum of money and then pay back through deductions from their salaries. This means first of all that they have greater chances to get a loan than have those described earlier trying to borrow to start new agricultural schemes, since they are known in the institutions and probably already have personal relationships with their superiors. Still, it is the case that very few use this possibility of borrowing. Most stick to the old established ways. However, this is not any kind of conservatism. It is rather an expression of the fact that this new form of borrowing does not tally with social reality as government employees in Kitini experience it. There are in fact several reasons why people should prefer to borrow locally rather than trying for government funds. First of all, there is the bureaucratic procedure that has to be followed and money that is needed today may not be forthcoming until two or three days later. Secondly, most of the loans involved consist of rather small sums of money and most employees do not want to go to the government fund for loans which they often can get very easily elsewhere. Thirdly, most government employees from Kitini are in low positions earning only a small salary. Deduction from this means that it becomes even more difficult to try to support a family on it. Fourthly, a person cannot borrow unless he has paid back an earlier loan. The most important principle, however, on which the government fund is built and which makes it difficult for individuals to borrow has to do with the fact that an amount of money has to be paid back by the same amount of money plus interest before a new loan can be taken.

In Kitini rules are more flexible. Small debts can be converted into labour, for instance, or a debtor can work for a few days for his creditor every year as payment of the interest. Similarly, a loan can be given as an item in a chain of exchanges in a patron-client relationship, where the debtor repays by supporting his patron at elections, or by performing other services that the patron finds useful. The point is that while the government fund operates on bureaucratic principles in which the loan itself

is the central concern, lending and borrowing in Kitini operate in a network of personal relations, where often the loan is only one expression of a relationship which was established before the act of borrowing. This does not mean, however, that all loans are between people who have multistranded relations with each other. There are of course degrees of complexity of the relationship between lender and borrower. A person, who desperately needs to borrow may not have access to anyone who is well enough to do to lend him money. He will then have to try to borrow from someone whom he may know only superficially. In such a case the prospective creditor is more interested in the solvency of the would be debtor than a close relative would be, if approached for a loan.

In the same way, a person with money to spare will lend it to a client whom he knows will be able to pay rather than to a client whose ability to honour the debt he strongly doubts. The most common way of assessing the creditworthiness of a prospective borrower, now that the taking of fields as security is not so lucrative any more as a result of the land reform, is to find out whether he is in a salaried position or not. If he is, he can be expected to have money to pay at least the interest. This is brought out in the following tables.

Salaried employment and indebtedness

A breakdown by caste of the relation between different kinds of borrower (whether salaried or not) and various categories of lender (whether kin or caste fellows of the borrowers or not not) is given in the table below:

TABLE 22

Caste	Non-salaried borrower/ lender relative or caste fellow	Non-salaried borrower/ lender not relative or caste fellow	Not known
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	2	2	0
Silwal	9	2	0
Tamang	0	0	0
Brahman	5	2	0
Sarki	6	3	0
Magar, excl. Rana Magar	0	1	0
Newar	2	1	0
(Srestha)	(1)	(0)	(0)
(Jyapu)	(1)	(1)	(0)
Mahanta	0	1	0
Kami	0	2	0
Damai	0	4	0
Nagarkoti	1	1	0
Pahari	0	0	0
Gurung	0	1	0
Total	25	20	0

TABLE 23

Caste	Salaried borrower/ lender relative or caste fellow	Salaried borrower/ lender not relative or caste fellow	Not known
Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal	0	6	0
Silwal	11	12	0
Tamang	1	9	2
Brahman	4	14	0
Sarki	3	2	0
Magar,excl, Rana Magar	1	6	0
Newar	2	0	0
(Srestha)	(2)	(0)	(0)
(Jyapu)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Mahanta	1	2	0
Kami	0	0	0
Damai	0	1	0
Nagarkoti	1	0	0
Pahari	0	0	1
Gurung	0	0	0
Total	24	52	3

These tables bring out, first of all, the fact that people in salaried positions are represented among borrowers to a higher degree than non-salaried people. The most important point, however, is that while non- salaried people rely on relatives and caste fellows to about the same extent as persons outside these categories, salaried people rely to a greater extent on the latter. The Silwals are an exception to this, as can be seen from the tables above in which their figures mirror their position in Kitini as the main source of loans. Since many people approach them for loans many relatives are bound to be among the loan-seekers.

However, expectations of rapid repayment of loans by salaried people are not always fulfilled as can be gauged by the number of unpaid loans in Kitini, referred to above. Thus, although money lenders prefer people with a steady income as debtors, this is in itself no guarantee that the money will be paid back - a process that is in turn related to the total web of relationships in which the loan is only one instance, and in which non-economic factors may sometimes be stronger than the desire for a profit in purely monetary terms. In Lionel Caplan's (1972) terms convergent ties act to reduce the area of economic choice open to debtor and creditor.

Conclusion

From the point of view of the realization of the ideals of Pancayat Democracy in the field of economic relations there are a number of things to note. The high castes enjoy a favoured position both in the agricultural sphere and with regard to the new opportunity structure that has been created mainly in the post-Rana era. Among these high castes the Silwal clan stands out as the by far most influential and able to use new possibilities to its advantage. The other high castes are in most cases markedly below the level of the Silwals. It should, however, be remembered that even in the case of the Silwals we are still dealing with a group that does not dominate the area by owning large tracts of land. In the agricultural field they are simply better off than the rest. In other fields of economic activity, they are still better off, but it is only in the case of the two Silwal businessmen owning the limestone and marble quarries that one can talk about domination in the economic field. This is the only instance where the Silwals have a large group of people employed permanently in their service.

The lower castes are worse off in agriculture and the new opportunities for jobs that have been created have to some extent had their effect on them, too, but differently from the way they have worked on the higher castes. The latter have a near monopoly of qualified jobs and they are also able to get jobs further away from Kitini, while the matwali and pani nacalne castes are in most

cases reduced to finding work in the immediate are.

A traditional division of labour is present in Kitini in the form of relations between jajman households and Brahman priests on the one hand and bista households and households of the service castes on the other. Here, too, the Silwals emerge as the most important patrons, especially with regard to the Kamis and Damis. These castes are also the ones that are worst off in terms of agriculture, and they do very little work outside the sphere of traditional caste work.

The Tamangs are also a caste that is poorly off in the agricultural sphere, working small areas of bad land which is owned almost completely by outsiders from Kathmandu. They rely heavily on the marble and limestone businesses and agricultural labouring to supplement their income.

The Sarkis have been able to partially offset the declining trade in shoemaking by migrant labour and have to some extent become economically independent of the higher castes, at least as regards borrowing.

The land reform of 1964 has wrought a few changes in Kitini. Most tenants have been given security of tenure and in this way they have achieved a measure of independence from their landlords. Loans from big moneylenders have not been repayed and as a result it is difficult for the ordinary farmer to obtain money for necessary expenditure. The official channels for distributing loans have not worked and with a few exceptions they have been completely ineffectual.

The picture is, then, one of high-caste dominance in virtually all fields of economic life and official policy has been able only to smoothen rough corners here and there, but the basic structure remains unaltered.

Furthermore, the appropriation of new resources and the inability of the centre in Kathmandu to effect any greater change are to a large extent explained in terms of personal relations, which effectively distribute favours unequally in Kitini while at the same time making it difficult for those who do not have connections in the ministries and government agencies to make use of the resources which are there according to the plans meant for them.

The findings of this chapter raise the question of the strategy behind the legislation and the creation of new opportunities of work. If everyone is supposed to enjoy equal opportunity, why is it then that one can find, in one sphere after another within the economic field a high caste dominance which seem to go against all ideas of equality? One obvious reason is the historical and political situation of Nepal. The country emerged

from the Rana régime poor and backward. There has not been any thorough going upheaval, which means that the same groups that were dominant up to 1951 are still calling the tune. Even if the elite want a change in accordance with the ideas put forward and expressed in Pancayat Democracy, there are limits to what can be done. The people who rule in Kathmandu belong to the same sociocultural systems and castes are inferior in every respect. Those who are at the top of the system whether it be in Kathmandu or in Kitini, cannot institute a machinery for checking the dominance of the elite to which they themselves belong. It would amount to abolishing themselves as a privileged category in the economic field. Thus, a system of personal relations filters plans made at the top and continues to furnish new recruits to the administrative bodies and other agencies at the centre. These recruits then become part of the patron-client relationship of the institution where they work and can in turn help clients at the local level. In this way the ideals are constantly defeated. How far this picture holds true in the field of formal politics, i.e., the way certain officals (politicians) are selected through the medium of general elections is the subject of the newt chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

This chapter will be concerned with the problem of how the politico-administrative system under Pancayat Democracy has worked in Kitini, and to what extent the ideal of Pancayat ideology has been fulfilled, that there should be equal opportunity for each individual to stand as a candidate for the governing bodies, as well as to take part in the selection of representatives to them.

Political history of Kitini

In order to describe politics in Kitini under the Pancayat system I shall use the term faction and it is therefore necessary first to outline what I mean by that term. "Faction" and "factionalism" have been used by many anthropologists to cover a wide range of empirical phenomena. Nicholas (1965) has gone through the literature and tried to reduce the manifold variations to a manageable number of characteristics that underlie all kinds of factions. He finds that factions are conflict groups; they are political groups; they are not corporate groups; they are recruited by a leader; and the members are recruited on diverse principles. These criteria deal with the very features that distinguish factions from other groups or categories. There is however, another dimension to factions and that is the fact that they are simply a creation, or rather an aspect, of societies where personal relations are strong. That is to say, factions cannot be understood apart from the rest of such a society. They are the political expression of the fact that one needs personal relations in order to obtain goods. In this way the faction as such becomes an epi-phenomenon, dealing only with the political aspect of social life in such a society. Factions may indeed have special characteristics as Nicholas points out, but these are a consequence of the way that social relations in that society are structured and not something that appears haphazardly in some societies and not in others. In fact, factions are to be found in all societies in situations where personal relations are intense, but the frequency with which such situations arise varies from society to society. In Nepal they pervade most aspects of social life as I have pointed out above.

Turning now from the general considerations of factionalism to political life in Kitini seen in their light the important events are as follows.

In the first election held in Kitini under the new Pancayat system in 1963, a Silwal (we can call him A) who was the most powerful person in the area stood for the post of Pradhan panc and there was no-one to oppose him. The Up-pradhan panc also a Silwal, B. (who is today the Pradhan panc) was also elected without opposition. In fact, at that time there were no factions in existence in Kitini which made their presence felt in the election. The opposition started at the election two years later in 1965, when a Silwal from ward no. 3, which is dominated by Silwals, C, challenged A for the post of Pradhan panc. There were apparently several reasons for C standing against A in this election. C had just come back in somewhat suspicious circumstances from service as a forester. There was a rumour that he had been involved in corruption and had had to leave. One day there was a message to the Pradhan panc from the Jilla Adalat that a letter for a person in Kitini was lying there waiting to be delivered. The letter was in fact addressed to C. He tried to persuade A to reply to the court that there was no such person in Kitini, but the latter refused and forced C to go and fetch it. It now turned out that the letter was not for C, but for another person in Kitini with the same name. However, C took a grudge to A after this, suspecting that the latter tried to set the authorities on him. Bad relations between the two men were aggravated when there was general dissatisfaction in ward 3 with the ward member on the Gaun pancayat. C went around with a petition to have him removed and most people signed it. A promised to see to it that the vote of no confidence would be duly carried out, but later made an agreement with the ward member that nothing was in fact to happen. This made C and the others in ward 3 further dissatisfied with A. And then came the case between the Silwal household and their former Magar serf, which was described in chapter three. C acted in favour of the Magars and they won the case when the Silwals quietly withdrew their complaint.

In the 1965 election C had another Silwal, D, as candidate for the Up-pradhan panc post, challenging the incumbent, B. However, since C and D had only ward 3 behind them they were easily defeated by A and B.

A died shortly after the election and in the following election, in 1967, B became the candidate for the post of Pradhan panc with a Mahanta neighbour as his running mate for the Up-Pradhan pancship. C and D stood again, but the latter was now running for the post of Pradhan Panc and the former for Up-Pradhan panc. B and C were elected,

that is to say, one from each faction. It turned out that of the two it was in fact C who became the leading politician on the Gaun pancayat, although the two of them worked well together and started liking each other. However, C decided to levy a tax on the lorries from the limestone and marble quarries to augment the funds of the Gaun pancayat. B was not very enthusiastic about this since the two Silwal businessmen were his close relatives and they helped to ensure his re-elections mainly by their influence over the workers in the limestone and the marble. The tax was decided on, however, and a person was employed as the collector. Once the driver of the lorry of the younger of the two Silwal businessman drove off without paying. This was reported to the tax-collector, and when the empty lorry returned later that day it was stopped and a quarrel ensued between the driver and some people from the neighbourhood. C was involved in this quarrel as the Up-pradhan panc. The incident led to enmity between the Silwal businessman and C, which has gone on until recently. This conflict led to the Silwal businessmen, especially the younger of them, opposing C at every election. while supporting B, who would be working together with C in the planning and execution of their respective campaigns. The lorry-tax was quietly dropped shortly after, mainly due to the efforts of the Pradhan panc.

Although there were factions at work inside Kitini at this time, there was so far no evidence of the importance that the leading politicians of the neighbouring Newar village of Badegaun were later to play in the political life of Kitini. The reason for this was that after the death of A, the leading politicians B and C were allies and it was simply due to the unwillingness of the younger Silwal businessman that there were divisions in the election campaigns. He would persuade people to stand against C and then help them in their campaigns, sometimes successfully. But he had no political ambitions for himself and he did not care about politics at the Jilla level and hence was not interested in working together with opponents of C from other pancayats (these were the opponents of B, too, anyway). His interest in politics was highly personal and centred around the problem of how to keep C out. It was only in 1970 that the factions in Kitini came to be more closely modelled on the two factions in the Jilla pancayat, which are referred to as "Democrats" and "Communists", evoking the two most important political forces during the parliamentary era between 1951-1959. Up to then there had been only "Democrats" in Kitini but now the "Communists"

were to become represented as well. The person who introduced the new faction in Kitini was a Silwal,E, a close relative of A's. He had been away from Kitini working as a forester, just like C. In fact C and E had spent some time together in training. E lives at the western end of ward 2 which is also dominated by Silwals, and rather close to Badegaun, and he spends a lot of his time with his friends the Newar politicians there. E is in violent opposition to the younger of the Silwal businessmen whom he terms a "capitalist", and by extension opposes B although the latter was an ally of A.B and C are of course also in his mind associated with the "Democrat" faction in Jilla level politics, and C was in addition the very person who once opposed E's father's brother A. E is the first politician to openly maintain that he opposes someone else on ideological grounds, making a division of people into rich and poor and arguing that B and C defend the interests of the rich people, while he stands for the poor.

In the election of 1970 the faction building in Kitini gave the result that B and E stood against each other for the post of Pradhan panc, while C was running for the post of Up-pradhan panc and had against him a Mahanta, a neighbour of B's and of the Silwal businessmen. In fact, it was the latter who had persuaded the unwilling and apolitical Mahanta to run in order to oppose C, against whom the Mahanta bore no grudge. In the end the Mahanta gave in and announced his candidacy. Now, he was supported by E, who did not want C to win the Up-pradhan-ship, and the Mahanta, too, spoke up in favour of E now and then. Thus, the Mahanta was hired by the opponents of E to fight another opponent C, and was supported by and partly supported E against his own neighbour B.

The result of the election was that B and the Mahanta won leaving the younger Silwal businessman victorious. And in the course of work on the Gaun pancayat the new Up-pradhan panc changed sides and joined the faction of B and C. The latter was still probably the most active politician in Kitini despite the fact that he was not in office. E's influence has gradually declined since this election due to his many exaggerated attacks on the leading faction which turned out to be false and made people less ready to believe what he said. Furthermore, it was said that if it had not been for his father canvassing for him in the election, he would not have received many votes. His father is a highly respected man in Kitini and in his old age gaving a great deal of influence with people. But although E was no longer the candidate

of his faction, it still continued in the two elections that followed, one in 1972 an extra-ordinary election to the post of Up-pradhan panc and the election in 1973 to both the top-posts on the Gaun pancayat (see below). In the first it was successful and in the second it lost. The first of these elections was also remarkable because it saw the end of the hostility between the younger Silwal businessman and C. The candidate of E's faction for the Up-pradhanship was a Silwal, F, with whom both B and the Silwal businessman had been engaged in business. Although not a politically ambitious man F decided to stand in order to defeat the candidate favoured by B as a result of a legal dispute between them which F had lost. They had been business partners in the 1950s furnishing wood for government offices in Kathmandu. Recently, however, F went to court charging B with having deceived him and not acting fairly when dividing the profits they had earned together. He said that B had promised him his money, but never paid. B, on the other hand, flatly denied the accusation and said that F had had his share of the profit. F lost the case, and the decision was announced not long before E asked him to be a candidate against B's faction.

Thus, F, stood because of his enmity for B, and for the younger of the two Silwal businessmen with whom he was at odds because of business rivalry between the two relating to some wood business they had been doing together in the Terai. The Silwal businessman decided that he could not put up a candidate of his own who had a chance to win and decided to back C, who apparently was the lesser evil. C lost, however, and F became the new Up-pradhan panc.

In the election about a year later, i.e., in 1973 both the post of Pradhan panc and that of Up-pradhan panc were up for re-election. B stood as usual for the post of Pradhan panc and C for the Up-pradhanship. Both were supported by the two Silwal businessmen. Against them they had E's faction where a young Brahman from Patan, whose family came from Kitini, was the candidate for Pradhan panc. This Brahman was college educated and working as a civil servant. No-one in Kitini had ever heard of him before and he had to spend a lot of energy to make himself known, which he did with the help of E's faction. F stood again for the post of Up-pradhan panc. B and C were victorious and captured the seats of Pradhan panc and U-pradhan panc (see below).

So far I have limited my discussion of political life in Kitini to the sociologically most important aspect: the struggle between the main factions. But in each election there are often more candidates than those which come from these factions. Other people may stand for reasons of personal rivalry with a politician or just in an attempt to get a seat on the Gaun panchayat or even to become Pradhan panc or Up-pradhan panc. Thus, a Gurung has appeared in all elections campaigning on his own. He has been unsuccessful except for one spell as a ward member.

As for the elections to the two top posts on the Gaun pancayat, the trend has been for an increase in the number of candidates at each election. The election in 1973 was and exception to this, however, when only two filed candidatures for the post of Pradhan panc. As was said above, only representatives of the main factions have stood a reasonable chance of winning.

During A's time there was no opposition to the incumbent officials of the posts of Pradhan panc and Up-pradhan panc, until C turned up and challenged A. Then, in the following two elections there were two and four candidates respectively for the post of Pradhan panc and three for the post of Up-pradhan panc. In the extra-ordinary Up-pradhan panc election there were three candidates, and then, in the latest election, two for Pradhan panc and four for Up-pradhan panc.

Factional politics

There are, then, today two main factions in Kitini and these mirror the factionalism at the Jilla level. That this congruence between the gaun and Jilla level is not always perfect was seen in the fact that there were other alliances as well between individuals belonging to different factions. Similarly the Silwal businessman tried to have things his way without consideration for the wider political field.

Factions are expressed most clearly in elections, but they are constantly there and the leaders always try to score a point at the expense of their opponents by supporting claims put forward by people against members of the opposing faction, or through law suits.

The first category of politically motivated legal actions are those initiated as a result of an already existing conflict, such as in the case of C helping the Magars against A (see chapter three). Another

case of the same kind involved the conflict between the two leading families in the two Tamang hamlets of Upper and Lower Poudel. In the legal action that was taken by the Lama family of the former after they had been attacked by the Cokho family of the latter, which has already been referred to, the faction headed by B and C acted as brokers for the plaintiff while their political opponent, E, adviced the defendant. In the same way E assured one member of the same Cokho family that he could help him in a quarrel over land boundaries, which he was conducting with another Tamang, after the Pradhan panc had wanted to refer it to the Land Administration Office. Secondly, there are also attempts to hit directly against some leading figure of the opposing faction, making a move in an on-going struggle. Thus, B and C's side sent a letter of complaint to the Jilla pancayat charging E with having cut down trees that were government property. Now, it is a fact that the felling of trees in this way are by no means unusual occurences, but in this case it was something that could be used to embarass a political opponent, and at the same time stress the division between the two factions.

The struggle between the factions also goes on between elections on the Gaun pancayat itself. The parties constantly oppose each other's suggestions and try to make use of influential allies higher up in the politico-administrative system. In 1972 the struggle came to a head when C's and Pradhan panc's faction declared that the four members who supported E, among them the Tamang member, were to be suspended from the Gaun pancayat as a result of failing to attend the meetings. The Jilla pancayat refused to ratify the decision, however. The opposing faction had a majority there at that time and the whole question was left hanging in the air, with the four members continuing to stay away from the Gaun pancayat meetings. It was not until 1973 that the problem was solved and the members re-instated, but by that time the Jilla pancayat Sabhapati (Chairman) had joined forces with B and C who were now the majority faction. This reorientation on the part of B and C had started already in the election of 1972 when C was in need of money and thought that he could strike a deal with the Sabhapati, promising his support for the latter if he was elected. He did not tell B of his plan since the latter was the representative to the Jilla pancayat from the Gaun pancayat. C, too was known to be an opponent of the leading faction on the Jilla pancayat and to make his offer more credible he selected a highly place civil

servant known to the Sabhapati to make the offer. There was no reply, however, and the deal fell through. In the election of 1973, on the other hand, the Sabhapati was ready to endorse C's faction in Kitini.

This case shows the interesting fact that politicians at the Jilla level are swayed in favour of one or the other factions in just the same way as politicans on the local level. Thus it would be wrong to see the two main factions, "Communists" and "Democrats", as rigidly dividing the politicians between them. Some are of course impossible to sway, but there are always enough people who can be persuaded one way or the other to make power change hands. The same is true of the Gaun pancayat but there the "Communists" have never been able to form a majority. This seems to go back to the era of political parties in Nepal when the then leading person, A, supported one of the "Democratic" parties as did the other politically and socially important people in Kitini.

Political leaders

There are three types of political leaders in Kitini which can be distinguished according to how they influence the selection of candidates and the process of promoting the candidates. One, typified by C is both a leader and an active politician. That is to say, he sees himself and is seen by others as someone who both takes part in politicking inside and outside Kitini while at the same time being involved in the competition for office. The second type is represented by E after the 1970 election where he lost. In the two elections, in 1972 and 1973 which followed he has not taken part as a competitor for office himself, but in the 1972 election for the post of Up-pradhan panc everyone knew that F had been persuaded by him to stand for the post. E retained the leadership of his faction and kept up his relationship with the Badegraun politicians of the same faction, and was generally active off the stage. His dominance was less marked in the 1973 election but he was still seen as a very influential force behind the Brahman candidate for the Pradhan pancship. It may be that he is simply on the way out and that the two last elections mark two different stages on his way into oblivion. Still, he was apparently the moving force behind the spate of law suits lodged against the victorious faction in the 1973 election, and I think that it would be premature to write him off completely as a political factor although he may not stand for office himself again.

The third leader is examplified by the younger of the two Silwal businessmen. He has never sought office himself and he is not involved in the struggle between the "Communists" and the "Democrats". The only thing that interests him is thwart the attempts of individuals whom he does not want to reach office, and to achieve this he will be prepared to support anyone whom he thinks will have a chance to win. In fact, he will even make a candidate out of an unwilling person.

There are both similarities and differences with regard to the assets these three leaders in Kitini bring to bear in political competition. They are all from the higher castes all three being Silwals. And this fact is congruent with the assertion made in earlier chapters that only higher caste people can aspire to positions of influence and command in Kitini no matter what walk of life one is talking about. It has also been seen that connections with the outside world and, by implication, literacy are important assets when a man wants to become a broker or a patron, and that these characteristics (and especially the former) are mostly confined to high castes. Then, money is of course important in order to buy votes, which frequently happens either directly or through the treating of the voters to feasts. There is also of course the personal factor which is rather difficult to analyze. After all, there are many people who satisfy the above conditions but still do not become politically active. They decide that they are better off doing something else. Then, there is the factor of credibility which is rather important. E lost his credibility after the 1970 election and as a result he will not be able to stand for political office and expect to be elected. Credibility is a personal factor, which individuals are seen to have in different degrees. And it is of course the credibility aspect of a candidate which is under attack most heavily in political arguments. The more a person's credibility is erased in the eyes of the electorate the less his chances of becoming elected even if he is of superior caste, has excellent connections and a lot of money to spend. Balloting is secret after all and people who may appear to have been successfully bought may nevertheless vote for someone else, whom they trust more.

At first sight it might appear contradictory to assert that political life in Nepal is to a great extent to be understood through the importance of personal relations, while at the same time arguing that credibility on the part of a politician is important, i.e., a factor that does not seem to have

any overt connection with personal relations. In fact, it has. There are people who are tied to one faction through economic dependence on a candidate, for instance; but since (as was pointed out in the first chapter) Kitini pancayat is not a unit in economic or cultural terms, there are many voters to whom the candidates have constantly to establish and maintain personal links, either directly or indirectly through a supporter. Consequently, the reputation that a politician enjoys is of great importance to him, increasing or decreasing his possibilities of forging new links to formerly unattached individuals.[1]

C, E and the Silwal businessman differ very much between themselves with regard to connections (and willingness to use connections for a client, which is the most important aspect) and wealth.

C is constantly short of money, subsisting on agriculture without taking part in the work himself. He has established a little fruit and vegetable garden and is heavily indebted partly as a result of that and partly as the result of starting a poultry from where almost all the hens died. When he needs money his brothers who are all rather highly ranked civil servants may help. Thus, C has no money to spare in election campaigns and that has hampered him. And his ally, the Pradhan panc is equally short of funds since his relative the Silwal businessman does not give donations for the fighting of elections, unless it is directed to certain key individuals who may be able to sway others (see below). E was more fortunate in this respect. He had by various means acquired some land in the Terai and having sold that land he came back to Kitini to launch himself on a political career. In the election in 1970 he spent a considerable amount of that money, and he also helped finance the two later campaigns on behalf of his faction, even if his contribution to the 1973 election was less than that of the Brahman candidate himself who had money at his disposal through well-placed relatives. In addition E's faction receives money from the politicians from Badegaun.

With regard to financial resources, then, the Silwal businessman is far ahead of the other two, but he uses his money discriminatingly, which is to be expected since politics to him is, after all, second to business. E has an advantage over B with regard to money, although his funds have been severely depleted by his vigorous campaigning. And C is left behind struggling to obtain money to treat at least some of the electorate to tea, cigarettes or wine which is mandatory

for a candidate.

All three faction leaders have good connections with the world outside Kitini. C and E have, apart from purely political connections, both professional (both have been foresters) and kinship connections to people in the administration. Furthermore, both are literate and hence able to help a client to put his case to bureaucracy. But as was pointed out in chapter three, connections to the administration does not imply a generalized access to all branches of the bureaucracy. Ties are highly personal and a person who is in other respects well-connected may be helpless if he is faced with the task of asking for a favour in a Department where he does not know anybody. In this way the ability to help clients or to extract favours for oneself may be severely skewed. But it would probably still be true to say that a determined high-caste person who is well versed with the workings of the bureaucracy stands a greater chance of being listened to even by people to whom he is completely unknown than is a person of lower caste rank or someone who is not used to dealing with bureaucrats. The Silwal businessman also has connections in the administration, but his contacts are more of the business type and he does not normally use them for other ends. Where he and C and E differ mostly is in the interest they take in using connections on the part of clients and to file cases against each other. The Silwal businessman does not play the role of a broker, and consequently he does not have clients whom he helps, while C and E build a great deal of their influence on being brokers and use brokerage against the other faction. The Silwal businessman is interested in business because it yields money and the dealings of a more traditional kinds derived from a patron-client system does not interest him at all. Such activities rarely yield a profit in monetary terms. In this respect he is oriented away from the local system of gaining influence and attuned to the city-based life of Kathmandu and the goods that a successful business career may bring. It is only when he feels that a certain person's candidacy to political office is a personal affront that he acts. And then he uses his influence with the workers under him, almost wholly Tamang and threatens and promises them to make them vote for B and who ever else may be in his good books. If this is not enough he may use some money. In this way he commands influence over many more people than C and E do, and he does not have to prop it up by engaging in brokerage and continuously showing his usefulness and righteousness.

Factions and electoral campaigns

The numbers and composition of the supporters of the various factions change little from election to election. This is an expression of the fact that many people although far from all, are tied to a small number of high-caste individuals as tenants or debtors, or have been or are their clients in other ways. In addition kinship plays an important part in faction organization. Sometimes territoriality is important, with his neighbours supporting a candidate, but this tends to be overridden by factionalism (in the case of politically active individuals) and by kinship. Thus one faction leader, B, is normally able to get most of the votes in the wards close to where he lives, while another, C, will not get the votes of the relatives of the late A as a result of his having opposed the latter during his lifetime, although they may be neighbours.

Before an election the candidates campaign very actively throughout Kitini pancayat, trying to drum up support. They visit virtually every house in the area, except for those where they knew that it would be pointless to go, because of the household's outspoken support for some other candidate. This active campaigning takes place during the week preceding the election. First, they go around asking people whether they think that the prospective candidate should stand or not, and then they confine their attention mainly to those people, who are known to be influential within each ward. The next trip is made when the candidates have been given the colours which are to symbolize and distinguish them, a necessary exercise because of the low rate of literacy among the voters. A third round is made by the two candidates who obtain the highest number of votes in the first day's election (if no-one gets at least 50% of the votes), to tell the electorate that there will be another round the following day.

When a candidate is engaged in touring the pancayat he is in the company of a small group of men of at least some influence in the different wards visited. The candidate then uses the house of an important person in the ward, known to favour him, as a headquarters. Then other supporters are called and a plan for convincing the households of that ward to vote for the candidate is drawn up. Each one gets a certain number of households to visit, and these are allocated on the basis of his relations with them, so that the visits will have maximum effect.

Sometimes a candidate does not visit a ward in person. Important people who favour him canvass on his behalf. Someone who stands in a personal relationship to the leader controls a number of people, who may in turn control some individuals such as kinsmen or household members.

The programs put forward by the various candidates are often stated in very personal terms. Thus, in the 1972 Up-Pradhan panc election the candidate F stressed his opposition to the main supporters of C (not to C himself) as the reason why he was standing. D, for instance, had reported him twice to the Gaun pancayat saying that F had used some of the land belonging to the Gaun pancayat as a site for his new house, and furthermore D had together with another Silwal, J, tried to build a teashop in front of his house. This all happened some 7 or 8 years ago, but he still quoted it as an important reason for denying them the advantage of having their friend C on the Gaun Pancayat. It is obvious from F's statements, picturing his personal enemies as villains who had accused an innocent man, that he pinned his hopes on popular acceptance of the personal motives he had for standing as a candidate. It is also notable that he did not criticize C, with whom he had no argument. And he also added religious arguments to the reasons why people should vote for him. His basically apolitical stance can also be gauged from the fact that he did not spend his time on specific promises. It was left to his backer E to come out with the ideological arguments which set his faction in opposition to C's.

C on the other hand concentrated on undermining F's credibility as a politician, by asserting both that he was a stooge of E and his brother and that even if he was elected he would not be able to function as Up-pradhan panc. C kept personal attacks out of his arguments and tried to sound concerned about the welfare of people in Kitini rather than being personally vindictive. In this he showed himself as a seasoned politician, in contrast to F who was a beginner and let his personal motives shine through. Fortunately for the latter E was in the background taking care of the functions of support and planning. And there can be no doubt that had it not been for E, F would never have won the election. His appeals were too limited to interest anyone but his closest friends and neighbours.

As was noted above, E has introduced a new base for support in Kitini politics in that he stresses the ideological differences between the factions more than the others do. This has made him popular with a handful of young students at the High School who are in favour of his ideas and who have good contacts with students in Badegaun who

are also more ideologically committed than the average young Nepali. These youngsters are very active in campaigning for E's faction in Kitini. They all live in the western part of the area close to Badegaun but the tour the length and breadth of Kitini except for those places where they know that it is useless to go. And just like their opponents they spend a lot of time with the Tamangs, who are important voters, because of their numbers. As has already been seen there are two particularly important families among the Tamangs for a candidate to secure. One is the Lama family of Upper Poudel, and the other the Cokho family of Lower Poudel the leading member of which is also the ward member of the Gaun Pancayat. The former is associated with the two Silwal businessmen and hence with B, and thus also nowadays with C; the other is leaning towards E's faction, although he does not openly commit himself. These two Tamangs have a great deal of influence on the people in their respective hamlets and can sway an election. As a result of this the Tamang hamlets are the scene of a lot of campaigning from all sides, particularly among the Tamangs of Lower Poudel, who are less dependent on the marble and limestone factories and hence more open to other candidates than are the Tamangs of Upper Poudel who are heavily in favour of B. In this way the Tamangs (and other prospective voters, too) let themselves be treated to wine, cigarettes, tea and even food if a candidate can afford it, by all the factions, sometimes going directly from a feast sponsored by one candidate to that of another. Many Tamangs are very cynical about the candidates, saying that the candidates are only thinking of themselves anyhow so it is only right that they should have to go to some trouble to get their votes.

The pani nacalne castes who are dependent on bistas and traditional work are in an uncomfortable position when an election draws near since they have clients in all factions and they cannot afford to alienate them by favouring one or the other candidate. When asked about whom they support they try to stay noncommittal and say that they are neutral. The case is easier for the Sarkis who are less dependent on other castes since they have no bistas. And in the 1972 election the Sarkis were active on their own behalf and got a member of their caste on the Gaun pancayat as the first untouchable caste member. This case illustrates rather well the close fit between elections to the posts of Pradhan panc, Up-pradhan panc and ward member on the one hand and factionalism on the other.

In this ward-member election, which took place in ward no. 8, the Sarkis, who are a majority there, wanted a Sarki member of the Gaun Pancayat and decided to put up a candidate. But the Sarkis are not politically united, some of them being supporters of C and others of E. C´s faction had nominated a Brahman candidate. E´s faction put up a Sarki candidate. Then C decided to put up a Sarki too, a cousin of E´s Sarki, while keeping his Brahman candidate. E´s faction put up a Sarki candidate. Then C decided to put up a Sarki too, a cousin of E´s Sarki, while keeping his Brahman candidate. But it turned out that C´s Sarki decided to support E´s Sarki for reasons of kinship, and at the same time another two Brahmans entered the contest. They were engaged in a long feud and when one of them entered the elections the other decided to do so as well in order to try to prevent the first one from winning. They were both neutral in the conflict between C and E. One of the neutrals and C´s Brahman discussed among themselves whether one of them should resign in favour of the other. Then E intervened and persuaded both to stand, this of course increasing the chances of his candidate, since the two Brahmans would attract many of C´s supporters. This was indeed what happened.The Sarki won, but if one of the Brahmans, the neutral one who had considered withdrawing, had in fact opted out, then the Brahman from C´s side would have won, since many Sarkis were not in favour of the successful candidate from their own caste. But the story does not end there. The close relative of the victorious Sarki, who resigned his candidature in the latter´s favour, persuaded him, with the help of the land lord of the new ward member, to switch from allegiance to E and work for the victory of B in the Up-Pradhan panc election, which he in fact did.

This example points to the fact that although the Sarkis were successful in having a Sarki on the Gaun pancayat and wanted one there, they were far from unanimous as to whom it should be. Thus, it is very hazardous to suppose that since a Sarki won it shows the unity of the Sarki caste. What it shows, however, is an awareness on the part of the Sarkis of the new possibilities that the Pancayat system has brought. Now a pani nacalne can take part in the deliberations of how to run Kitini pancayat. Furthermore, they showed that submission to tagadhari people is in no way automatic in all spheres. That is to say, they dared to make use of the formal possibilities they had to play a part in the running of the administration in Kitini pancayat.

It is significant,however, that this stand on the part of the Sarkis was incorporated into the continuing struggle between the two factions.

The 1973 election

In order to round off the discussion in this chapter and in order to elicit some more conclusions about political life in Kitini I shall examine the election held in 1973 in some detail.

a) preparation

In 1973 new elections were to be held for the posts of Pradhan Panc and Up-Pradhan Panc on the Gaun pancayat. The side of the incumbent Pradhan panc got together very early and started discussions about tactics to be followed in the election.

Elections were to be held in the neighbouring Newar pancayat of Badegaun as well and the faction of Pradhan panc and C decided to join forces with their opposite number there. Consequently they all met in the house of a most influential Newar from another village called Thaiba which lies further away along the road to Kathmandu. This Newar had joined the ranks of this faction a couple of years ago after being one of the leading members of the area of the opposing group at the Jilla level of the Farmers'organization.

To signify the shift in allegiance that had started tentatively in the preceding Up-Pradhan election the Sabhapati of the Jilla pancayat had also come to the meeting.

The conclusion of the meeting was that they should try to persuade the opposing group of Newars not to meddle in the election in Kitini. If this proved to be impossible they decided to pull in as many outsiders themselves as they could, and they even vowed to fight psysically if it became necessary.

There were also points raised on the possibility of winning over some of the members of the other group to their own.

The Jilla pancayat Sabhapati promised to talk personally to some of the people of the other faction who were judged to be most favourably disposed toward them and try to make them change their minds about whom to support. In the same way he promised to deal with the brother of E, who was away in Eastern Nepal on service in the Forest Ministry. He had promised to come back and fight for his side if there was an election in Kitini. The Sabhapati said that he would see to that this

person did not get leave, since it is forbidden for a government employee to take an active part in elections.

b) candidates

When the deadline for filing nomination had expired it turned out that the post of Pradhan panc had drawn only two candidates, while four had filed for the post of Up-Pradhan panc. First of all, the incumbent Pradhan panc, B, decided to stand for another period. He was supported as usual by the two Silwal businessmen as well as C. And this time he could also count on the Silwals of ward 3 and most of those from ward 2. The reason for this was the fact that E did not stand this time and there were no conflicts of allegiances among most of the Silwals for this reason. B could also be sure of the votes from his neighbours in ward 4 (all except the Mahantas) and from ward 5 and 6. In addision he was supported by the Sabhapati of the Jilla pancayat and the above mentioned Newar from Thaiba.

The other candidate was new to Kitini. He is from Patan and an educated Brahman. His family owns land in ward 1 and as a consequence of this he is eligible for posts on the Gaun pancayat. He is much younger than C.

Since he was unknown to the villagers he started his campaign very early. He brought fertilizers once and at least once a week he toured the length and breadth of Kitini, concentrating on the Tamang wards, together with some youngsters from ward 1,who had been the supporters of E in earlier elections. He was also given support by the dominant faction in Badegaun. and in this way he came to replace E completely as the opponent of B and C. E was reduced to the role of supporter, but very few people listened to him and it was clear that he was for the moment at least, a spent force in the politics in Kitini.

Candidates for the post of Up-Pradhan panc also included some new faces in the political life of Kitini. One candidate was a Mahanta, brother of the former business companion of the Silwal businessmen. This Mahanta had joined forces with the Brahman Pradhan panc candidate before the election, but in the end it turned out that the latter broke their agreement and supported another candidate for the Up-Pradhan Panc post, the ever-present Gurung. The reason for this was that the Brahman thought that the Mahanta did not have much support in Kitini, since he had been associated with the unsuccessful Co-operative society, and he had not been very successful in his work as ward member of ward 4 on the Gaun pancayat. On the other hand the Gurung candidate might be able to sway the votes of some of his fellow wor-

kers in the marble industry and to some extent combat the influence that the Silwal businessmen enjoy there. He could also campaign among his neighbours in wards 8 and 9.

When it became apparent to the Mahanta that he would not get support from the Brahman candidate he considered withdrawing his candidature, but after discussing the matter further with his brother he decided to stay in the race. The opposing group, that of B and C interpreted his change of mind as a result of his being bribed by the other faction in order to split the votes of wards 4 and 5, who would otherwise vote with them.

The Gurung candidate stood, as usual, for the sake of it. As he was supported by the Brahman he lost votes in wards 4, 5 and 6 who were sympathetic to the Pradhan panc´s group. In this way he partly undermined his own chances.

A Silwal from ward 3 became the choice of B and C as their candicate for the post of Up-Pradhan panc. Many wanted C to stand, among them the Silwal businessmen. However, C planned to leave Kitini and go back to government service again, so he was unwilling to stand. He then chose the Silwal who became the candidate. This person was at first unwilling to stand, but other Silwals of wards 2 and 3 helped in persuading him, and finally he yielded. The fourth candidate was a Brahman from ward 6 who had never before taken an active part in political life in Kitini. His sole reason for becoming a candidate was to fight the Mahanta candidate with whom he was at odds, and he had earlier vowed that if the Mahanta ever became a candidate in this election, so would he. This Brahman´s decision to stand upset the scheme of the Pradhan panc faction. Since the Brahman was a neighbour of Pradhan panc the Silwals in wards 2 and 3 thought that the latter only pretended to endorse the Silwal´s candidacy for the Up-Pradhan panc post so that he himself would get their votes in the Pradhan panc election, so they decided not to vote for him. When C and D heard about this turn of events they started to try to convince their neighbours and relatives that the Brahman was not in fact allied with B, but these attempts were fruitless. Then, they learnt that the Silwal candidate together with some close relatives were on their way to ward 1. Alarmed that they were going to strike a deal with the opposition group there, they hurried to B to tell him to do what he could to make the Brahman withdraw his candidacy. On their way they met the Brahman but could not talk to him then, as he was busy with the preparations for burning the dead body of a close relative of his who had just died.

After that, C and D returned to look for the Silwal candidate and while doing so they met the elder brother of the Brahman candidate. He was not very keen on his brother standing in the election and he promised to do his best to make him withdraw.

Next morning the Brahman's brother told the Pradhan panc's group that the Brahman refused to step down and he was determined to stay in the race even if it was clear that he would not receive a single vote. He had, however, agreed not to canvass for votes. Next the Brahman candidate's brother personally told the Silwals of wards 2 and 3 that his brother did not stand for the post of Up-Pradhan panc with the approval of B. He furthermore told them that he himself was against the idea of his brother taking part in the election and that he would work for him in the election campaign. As a result of this the Silwals agreed to give their votes to B.

c) support

Support for the candidates, and especially for the two who stood for the post of Pradhan panc followed to a great extent the divisions of earlier elections. Thus, in ward 1 the Brahman candidate had by far the greatest influence, in particular,the young people who had earlier supported E rallied to his side. These youngsters were rather fanatical in their campaigning for their candidate and virtually forced people who sympathized with B's group to support the Brahman candidate. In this way a Kamar who was known to be favourably disposed towards Pradhan panc's group through good contacts with C had to declare his support for the opposition candidate.

Apart from the facts that the Brahman candidate owned land in ward 1 and was endorsed by the leading Newar group in Badegaun he also spent a good deal of money on feasting members of this ward. In ward 2 all households, apart from a few close to ward 1, which had formerly supported E and now supported the new opposition leader, supported the incumbent Pradhan panc. The dissidents were the former Silwal followers of E and Newars who voted with their fellow Newars in ward 1. The Kamis of this ward supported B, as they are tied to Silwals who supported him. All those who campaigned publicly in this ward, for either side, were Silwals. B was helped by a resident of this ward who had been transferred by his employer the Ministry of Forestry to the area a few months before the election, and through his work he

influenced several people in Kitini in voting for B (including a few from ward 1).

In ward 3 C's influence with most of the households secured a vast majority for B, but there were people who supported the Brahman as well. These were the people who had been on E's side in earlier elections (mostly kinsmen).

The advantage that B had through the returned Silwal forester was balanced by the return of E's brother (apparently the Jilla pancayat Sabhapati had slipped up) who campaigned on behalf of the Brahman. Apparently he was a more credible authority than his brother E.

In ward 4 the campaign was low key, with the Mahanta Up-Pradhan candidate and his brother active for the Brahman, but they were successful only within the Mahanta group. Only a Magar was canvassing for C. This Magar was running for the post of ward member on the Gaun pancayat which had been left vacant as a result of the Mahanta joining the race for the Up-Pradhanship. Against the Magar stood the former member's brother, the business associate of the Silwal businessmen. In this election the Mahanta won by a narrow margin and it was later discovered that he had bought some votes by distributing fertilizers to certain households.

In wards 5 and 6 B had no opposition from anybody. The Silwal businessmen, the ward member, A Brahman, the Brahman Up-Pradhan candidate's brother, all from ward 5 played a leading role in canvassing for B. In the Tamang hamlet in ward 6, the senior Lama and his brother were on the side of B, but they were forced to work for the Brahman by the dominant group in Badegaun who threatened not to give the customary tribute to the Lama for the protection that he gives to fields against hailstorms. As a result, these Tamangs worked against their will for the Brahman group. But the Pradhan panc had an advantage with the Tamangs since the hotly discussed issue of drinking water for the Tamang hamlets, which had been one of the bases for opposition candidates against B in earlier elections was about to be solved, and B had put the pipes on display in his courtyard.

In ward 7 the leading Tamang, who is ward member stayed out of the campaign until the day before the election. This was seen as a way of getting money from the candidates and the Brahman group was apparently the highest bidder. Two other Tamangs supported B, but they did not campaign publicly.

In ward 8 the seasoned Brahman politician and pandit, who had been active in local politics since the time of A, supported B, while his enemy the other pandit and former Secretary of the Gaun pancayat gave his support to the Brahman candidate. Another government-employed Brahman who would have canvassed for the Brahman candidate did not appear since C had managed to secure the promise from his superiors that he would not be granted leave.

The Sarkis did not take part openly in the contest. Some were tenants of the Silwal Up-Pradhan panc candidate and would vote for him, while others did not want to antagonize either group, and also hoped for money, which some of them got from the Brahman's group.

In ward 9 a Silwal and a Brahman supported B, and this secured the vote of the Silwals, while the Gurung Up-Pradhan candidate supported the opposition group, and he secured the Magar and Gurung votes for it.

d) interference from outside

Since the election was for the two top posts on the Gaun pancayat and since furthermore, there would later be an election of the representative from the Gaun pancayat to the Jilla pancayat it was a very important event which would also have repercussions outside Kitini.

Consequently, there was frequent interference from outside politicians. The involvement of the Jilla pancayat Sabhapati has already been mentioned. He arranged a meeting with one of the leading Silwal supporters of the opposition group and with the Tamang ward member of ward 7, and urged them to vote for Pradhan panc's group. He also campaigned personally in ward 1, going from door to door. On the other side the leading Newars from Badegaun played a very active role constantly appearing with the Brahman candidate on his canvassing tours in wards no. 1, 7 and 9, and they frequently visited his house at night to discuss election strategies.

The importance of this outside interference in the election campaign was brought out one day just before the election when B and his opponent happened to meet in ward no. 1. The Brahman said that it looked to him that he was not fighting the election against B, but rather against the Sabhapati of the Jilla pancayat, while B was of the opinion that he was confronting the leading Newar of Badegaun rather than the person who was supposed to be the candidate.

e) concluding remarks to a b c and d

From the above description a number of points can be made about the candidates and the way they arranged themselves in this election. First of all, the two factions "Communists" and "Democrats" form the backbone and rely heavily on help from outside the gaun pancayat. Membership in a wide-ranging faction also means that the material benefits are more tangible than they would be if one were to stand alone. A successful election may mean that one becomes the representative to the Jilla pancayat and can join the faction struggle there and theoretically reach the Rastriya Pancayat. As Chauhan (op.cit:249) points out, money and other benefits are much more of a possibility at the higher levels in the Pancayat system than at the lower. In terms of patron-client relationship, too, a well-placed person is obviously better equipped to attract clients than one who remains on the lower rungs of the politico-administrative ladder.

Second, interpersonal relations play a great role in deciding who is to become a candidate, whom to oppose or whom to support. The willingness of the Brahman candidate from ward 6 not to canvass for votes for his attempt to win the Up-pradhan panc post shows that it is not always the office that is most important. To him it was enough to be able to oppose the Mahanta candidate. Similarly, the importance of interpersonal relations are brought out by C´s fear that the Silwal candidate he himself had chosen might go and strike a deal with the opposing faction. Another striking point is the unwillingness of the ward 7 Tamang member to strike a deal with the very faction he had himself supported and even been deposed from the Gaun pancayat for having been loyal to. Now he held out until the price of buying his influence had gone up. It is likely that he had planned to vote with this faction all along, but he did not apparently feel any obligation to the Brahman who was now the representative of this faction in the election. This is of course also consonant with the Tamang view that the high-caste candidates are only after their own success and when elected they do not care for those who elected them. Thus, there are only a few individuals who can be termed professional politicians in that they are the leaders and full time politicians. The other candidates are often picked by them and less ideologically motivated and prepared to change sides if they deem it necessary. This is also mirrored in the fact that only a few individuals will appear as candidates from one election to the other and, apart from the individualistic Gurung,they are all leading figures of the two factions.

f) main arguments

The arguments in the campaigning centred on the following points: The opposition candidate charged that Pradhan panc´s group were passive and corrupted, and they were not fighting the election to serve the public but to prevent the financial position of the Gaun pancayat from being made public, and thus reveal embezzlement. They also argued that B had no will of his own, but was led by C, who always led him astray. Furthermore, they said they knew of cases of bribery where both B and C were involved, and that they knew other highly damaging things about B and his main followers.

The Brahman candidate also introduced pamphlets in the election for the first time in the history of Kitini. There he spelled out his position. In the first part of the pamphlet he introduced himself with name, place of residence, education, travels and work done especially in the Ministry of Education, where he claimed to be especially interested in social services.

He promised to speed up the development works in Kitini by providing each ward with drinking water and by providing electricity, to construct paths in every ward, and to construct canals for irrigation as well as to repair the two temples in the area. He also promised to establish a health centre in Kitini and, having worked in the field of education, to arrange for primary schools and start a program for adult education.

In the field of agriculture he promised to provide everything necessary for the farmers, and to reorganize the defunct co-operatibe society. At the end of the pamphlet he also promised to root out corruption and exploitation which he regarded as endemic in Kitini.

Apart from this main pamphlet the opposition candidate also distributed shorter leaflets with exhortations to the people to vote for him. Pradhan panc´s group also found it necessary to distribute leaflets, but they did not have any possibility of printing them, so theirs were written by hand. These leaflets concentrated on the long experience of the Pradhan panc in his post, and they urged the people to vote for experience.

The Pradhan panc promised to provide drinking water to wards 6,7 and 8 very soon. As for wards no. 1,2,3,4 and 5 he detailed his attempts at solving their problem by telling how he had been to the Indian Co-operation Mission several times and it had promised him to repair the

water pipes which had been destroyed as improvements were made on the road between Kitini and Kathmandu. As for electricity in Kitini he said that he had tried and would continue to try his best, and that he was certain that he would soon be successful.

The faction of C employed the same technique here as they did in the extraordinary election for the Up-pradhan pancship a year earlier. They appeared as statesmen who knew how to take care of troubles facing the people in Kitini and pointed proudly to achievements (the water pipes) they had made. They also made a point about the difference in age between the opposing faction's candidate and the Pradhan panc, hinting at the inexperience of the former.

The innovation of the leaflets must have been of limited use since only about 11% of the people in Kitini can read, and they must have completely missed such important segments of the electorate as the Tamangs and the Sarkis.

The difference in manner of producing pamphlets points to the fact that the Pradhan panc's group, as usual, was in a bad position financially and had fewer resources to buy votes or arrange feasts to treat prospective voters. The pamphlets of the opposition group were printed and they also arranged three - four feasts where they cut goats and chicken, where people from ward 1 and 9 were invited. Furthermore, they spent a good deal of wine,meat, tea and cigarettes for the people of ward 1 as well as on the Tamangs and the Sarkis. In addition to all this they distributed tea and cigarettes daily to those present during the daily tours of the pancayat. Then, there were of course the money that went directly to selected individuals who were deemed to be able to influence others, mainly Tamangs and Sarkis. The Pradhan panc group depended on contributions from interested individuals but they could not provide much compared to the opposition group. Tea and cigarettes were of course indispensable when touring the constituency, and they also payed for food and other items for the election commission on the two days of election, but they did not arrange any feasts.

g) campaigns

The election campaign started about a month before the election was to take place. The main points of the activities were the shops in various parts of Kitini where small groups assembled at least once a day to discuss the issues in the election. The centres of these

groups were the candidates themselves and their main supporters. If the candidate was present he provided tea for everyone around. The active campaigners from the opposition group were mostly drawn from ward 1, while those of the Pradhan panc came from wards 2, 3, 5 and 6.

Interest grew as the election drew closer and from about three days before it was to be held the groups at the shops had grown to 20 - 25 people, and the groups involved in the election started visiting all households in the pancayat, going around at least twice a day.

The canvassing centred on the Tamang hamlets, and especially at night when the day's work was over representatives of the two sides could be seen at various places in the Tamangs settlements offering raksi (Nepali wine). At the same time the canvassing was being carried out and the stress was laid on the benefit the Tamangs would get from the victory of that particular side. Development works would be started, and especially the drinking water problem would be solved.

Many Tamangs of course took advantage of the generosity of the canvassing politicians and could be seen visiting both groups on the same night and letting themselves be treated to wine.

The crescendo of the campaign came on the night before the election when an incident took place which has seen by many after the election as being one of the deciding moments of the whole campaign.

It had been a busy day for both the groups, having been all over the pancayat, and after supper making a last visit to the Tamangs to ensure their support. In order to be able to cover as much as possible of the Tamang households the group of the Pradhan panc split into two, one going via ward 1 and the other via wards 4,5 and 6. They were both also to talk to people other than Tamangs on their way, but the group that went via ward 1 soon had supporters of the other group trailing them, and since they knew that no-one would stick his neck out in this area, the group continued to ward 9. There the person they wanted to see was not at home and everyone else was sleeping so they carried on to the Tamang hamlet. There they met a Tamang known to be sympathetic to B together with some of supporters of the Brahman candidate. The people in Pradhan panc's group asked where they were going but did not receive a satisfactory reply. Pradhan panc's group tried to follow, but the others disappeared in the dark and were gone. Therefore, they continued to a shop where they found some of the members of the other half of Pradhan panc's

group which had taken the other route. Some of these were assempled in the house of A Tamang treating about 10 people to wine. These Tamangs agreed to vote for the Pradhan panc in the coming election. They also said that they were invited to a feast sponsored by the opposition group in another Tamang house, but assured that the fact that they would vote for them.

When the two parties had thus rejoined forces again they were 32 people strong, and the members decided to attend the opposition party's feast. The house was packed with people eating chicken curry and drinking wine. Those present included the Brahman candidate, some Silwals, including the incumbent Up-Pradhan panc, F, the Pandit from ward 8, who supported the opposition, some people from ward 9, the Gurung candidate, the Tamang member of ward 7 and several other Tamangs. A good number of these people were in fact supporters of Pradhan panc like the Silwal from ward 9 whom they had just tried to see, some other Silwals and several Tamangs.

The Pradhan-panc group stayed outside the house and peeped through the door. Since it was dark and the people inside the house were busy they did not notice the visitors. At the moment the Brahman candidate was speaking. He was bitterly denouncing B and C. He was especially vicious about the Pradhan panc whom he charged with being corrupted and completely under the spell of the Jilla pancayat Sabhapati. He continued by saying that Pradhan panc has been in political life for the past twelve years but he has not achieved anything to better the lot of people. Instead he was making things in Kitini worse by not using the Gaun pancayat funds properly. He also charged that the tax funds on lorries had gone to B and C and not to the Gaun pancayat.

Then he said that he himself was dedicated to the progress of the pancayat. He had a good education and could find himself a nice job in Kathmandu, but instead he had come to them to work for them. He denied the charge levied against him that he was interested in the post of Pradhan panc only as a stepping stone for himself in the higher tiers of the Pancayat system. After his speech there were a few who applauded.

Then the Gurung-candidate began speaking. He repeated what had just been said, and added that he asked for a chance to serve the people in Kitini.

His speech was also applauded by some people. After this speech Pradhan panc entered the house together with his supporters. Due to the fact

that there was very little space left for the latter only a handful could follow him inside the house while the rest had to be content with staying outside.

There was immediately a hot discussion between the two sides. Apart from Pradhan panc himself the Silwal Up-Pradhan panc candidate took an active part in this discussion, but towards the end two Silwal brothers from ward 9 who had been enjoying the feast also started criticizing the opposition group.

On the other side there was the Brahman candidate and three others from ward 1 who were actively defending themselves.

The Silwal Up-Pradhan candidate spoke up against the incumbent Up-Pradhan panc, F, and said that those present now were the same people who had canvassed last year for F, and promised that he would work for the people, but in fact he had done nothing. In reply to this the other group argued that this was wholly the fault of the Pradhan panc who did not let F do anything on the Gaun pancayat. The Silwal candidate came back and said that if F really had wanted to do something he could have taken his case to the people. The Pradhan panc could not stop him if he really wanted to improve things. Then he asked F to detail what he had wanted to do,but had not been able to as a result of B's opposition. This F refused to do, and this was greeted with a round of hand clapping from Pradhan panc's group.

After this the opposition group took up the question of the money collected from the trucks carrying lime and marble, which was supposed to be collected for the benefit of the Gaun pancayat.B was accused of having spent the money himself, since the accounts had not been made public. The Silwal Up-Pradhan candidate again took the role of defender and said that the money existed and that they had a tax-committee of which F was a member, and the Pradhan panc would not be able to spend the money just as he liked. The arguments extended to issues such as the distribution of waste land in ward no 1, water taps, the building of a resting-place (pati) and other related problems in development work. The Silwal candidate was very effective throughout and had the upper hand. This incident made several of those present who were uncommitted seriously considering voting for B. After the discussion had subsided the opposition group left the place and went to the house of the pandit from ward 8 who was with them. Here they met with some Brahmans, but were interrupted by the Pradhan panc's group which was now in a state of euphoria as a result of the earlier encounter.

After a short verbal exchange the opposition group continued to the Sarki hamlet and were again follwed by the Pradhan panc party. About fifteen of the most important Sarkis were assembled there feasting on meat and wine.Again the canvassing got nowhere, and the opposition party left for ward 1.

The whole night had been spent in this way and it was 4 o´clock in the morning before this last canvassing tour ended, only a few hours´ before voting was to begin.

This was the final confrontation, and Pradhan panc´s group scored a victory which according to those involved on both sides was to influence the outcome of the election.

One important point to note here is that people who may be in favour of a particular candidate often dare not show this if they live in an area dominated by the other faction, or when then the other faction comes around campaigning. This is of course especially true of the lower castes, such as in this case the Tamang woman who was walking with the opposition party although B and C knew that she was in favour of them. The idea that candidates should pay for the votes which may propel them into a good life in politics is also widespread, with people attending all the small feasts or treats at the candidates´ expense.

In the verbal exchange that took place between the two sides in the Tamang hamlet it is clear that C´s faction concentrated on F, who lacks political talent. They reckoned, quite correctly, that they would score more points by attacking him than by attacking the Brahman Pradhan panc candidate. The latter was well educated, could answer for himself, and he had no past mistakes to atone for. F, on the other hand, had been very passive during the year during which he had served as Up-pradhan panc,frequently being away from Kitini on business trips. By concentrating on him C´s faction was able to hit at the oppositions´s weakest point. The importance of F´s inability to defend himself was increased by the fact that he was the one of the two leading candidates of his faction who was personally known to people in Kitini. The Brahman Pradhan panc candidate could not intervene and point to himself as a local citizen who could vouch for the efficiency and honesty of this faction. In this respect the fact that he was not a representative of Kitini turned into a disadvantage.

h/ voting

At 8 o´clock in the morning the voting started, and two to three hundred people were gathered in front of the Pancayat house in ward 3,

which was the scene of the election. Canvassing was still going on, the candidates and their main supporters talking to people in the crowd. More and more people arrived in groups, mostly neighbours coming together, and the workers of the marble and limestone quarries came from their place of work where they had been told to assemble in the morning to be reminded again by the Silwal businessmen to cast their votes in the white boxes, the colour of Pradhan panc´s faction. At 4 o´clock in the afternoon voting stopped, and the counting of the votes started. This was finished by 6 o´clock when C was declared the winner with a margin of 183 out of a total of 1068 votes. Since the electorial register had 1375 names in it, the turnout was about 78%, a relatively high figure.[2]

The Up-Pradhan panc election was to be held the next day between the two who had the highest number of votes, since no candidate had managed to get 50% of the votes in the first round.

While the votes were counted the candidates were not present at the Pancayat house. After the result had been declared B came to be greeted and garlanded by his followers, while the supporters of the opposition group dispersed and started for home. Damais were called by the victorious party to play music, and a crowd of about 300 people started to walk towards ward 1. The Damais played, the Tamangs played, sang and danced, while the Brahmans, the Silwals and the others shouted slogans. On the way B was greeted by the women standing in front of their houses with garlands and red powder (abir).

But when the joyous party reached ward 1 there was only one household, a Kamar, out to greet them.

When passing the houses of prominent opponents, especially those of E and his brother, the shouting grew louder, charging them with co-operating with the defeated candidate.

In ward 1 Pradhan panc´s group was told by the friendly Kamar that the opposition was waiting nearby on an open ground armed with sticks and stones. Soon the hurling of stones began, but it had grown completely dark and the crowd had only a few torches with which to find their way so it was impossible for them to see from where the stones came. As a result of this the crowd started retreating and as they did so,throwing stones aimlessly into the dark in the directions where they thought that their opponents were. And in this they had some success. It was revealed the next day that several had been injured by their stones. At the same time several of the Pradhan panc´s supporters were hit by stones. It was also learned that the people from ward 1 had been reinforced by some Newars from Badegaun.

Then the Pradhan panc party turned back and walked towards the eastern part of the pancayat.On the way they told people who were standing in the doorways to see the procession that they had been attacked in ward 1. This incensed the bystanders and decreased the support for the opposition group's candidate, the Gurung in next day's Up-Pradhan panc election. When they reach ward 5 the party started to disperse, with many going home. Those who stayed on were mainly Tamangs employed in the marble and limestone industries.

The remaining supporters then started towards the house of the younger Silwal businessmen, who welcomed his relative B, and there was dancing and singing for a while by the Tamangs outside the house.

At about 11 o'clock the procession reached the house of B, where he was welcomed by his two wives and some other women, mainly from wards 2 and 3. Here he was again greeted with garlands and red powder. The Tamangs danced and played music, and the hired Damais also played for about half an hour. At last B addressed his followers, thanking them for having voted for him and requesting them to vote for the Silwal candidate in the following day's election.

Early next morning C, D and a few others went campaigning for their candidate, and the Silwal candidate himself went to ward 1 for the same reason. From the other side only the Gurung candidate put in an appearance, and he was criticized for the fighting that had taken place on the night before. The voting started at 9 o'clock and lasted until 4 o'clock in the afternoon. There was much less activity than on the previous day and people dropped by in small groups except those from ward 1, who came in a big group fearing the consequences of what had happened the night before.

Shortly after the voting had stopped, the votes were counted and the Silwal candidate was declared the new Up-Pradhan panc with a majority of 157 votes out of 893 votes cast.

On the day follwing the final election for Up-Pradhan panc,the election of the representative from the Gaun pancayat to the Jilla pancayat was to be held. The candidates were B and the new member from ward 4, and the voters were the members on the Gaun pancayat.

B was elected and only the ward 4 member, the member from ward 1, a Srestha, and the member from ward 8, a Sarki, were against him.

Two other ward members whom one would have expected to vote against Pradhan panc were the Tamang member from ward 7 and the Silwal member from ward 3 who had supported the opposition group in the election. However, C had taken care of the latter, threatening that a no-confidence motion would be filed

against him if he voted for the wrong candidate, and given the situation in the ward with C's strong influence, it would get the support of at least two-thirds of the voters in the ward.

The Jilla pancayat Sabhapati was responsible for the Tamang's decision to vote for C. He had had a talk with him about the matter, and the Tamang had agreed to vote for C on this occasion.

Furthermore, they knew that C had a majority anyhow and that it would be foolish to antagonize the majority group.

Some attempts were also made before the election to make the Sarki member change his mind, but it was in vain. The Srestha member was deemed to be irrevocably committed, and no-one tried to persuade him.

i/ aftermath

This election in Kitini was to have an unexpected aftermath. One day not long afterwards police appeared and arrested Pradhan panc, C, D and the shop-keeper of the Co-op shop who was also a Silwal and part of C's group.

Pradhan panc was charged with embezzlement from the Gaun pancayat's funds, C with embezzlement on the occasion of the big celebration in the temple not far from Kitini six years previously when he was in charge of collecting parking-fees from cars and buses, D with misappropriating funds in connection with the co-operative society, and the last Silwal was charged with misappropriation in connection with his running of the Co-operative shop.

People in Kitini felt the defeated group to be behind this, and since the Brahman candidate's father has a high post in government service this suspicion grew very strong. Some suggested that E was behind the whole thing, helped by the Brahman, something which the Silwals and especially his relatives refused to believe. But gradually it turned out that he was indeed the schemer, behind the charges.

After about two weeks in jail all the accused were released on bail. The cases of C, D and the shop-keeper had been tried before. C and D had been acquitted. The co-operative society had taken action against the shop-keeper and it was understood that he should pay back the money he owed. So, these three were regarded as being out of danger, while the charges against the Pradhan panc were new. He was, however, released after the police had checked the Gaun pancayat accounts for three days.

An indication of the loss of popularity in Kitini that E has suffered as a result of his machinations can be gauged from the attendence at the sapta

puja which he gave a few months after the election. Anticipating the negative view people took of his actions, he had sent invitations to the Silwals of wards 2 and 3 three times, when once would normally have been enough. Still, only his close relatives came to attend regularly for the seven days that the sapta puja lasted. The other households only turned up briefly once and then ignored the whole thing.

j/ conclusion

There are a couple of points in this account of the 1973 election that should be elaborated.

It has been shown that the Sarkis and the Tamangs are two castes that are the objects of a lot of interest from the point of view of the two factions. Put in this way they emerge as units that the candidates have to capture. The truth is, however, that both these castes are divided within themselves (as was seen with respect to the Sarkis in the 1972 election for ward representative in ward 8). At the same time they each have a semblance of unity, since the important individuals do not openly commit themselves for either faction. This is first of all a strategy that pays, since the candidates then try to bribe them to vote for them. Secondly, both the Tamangs and the Sarkis feel that they are only used as tools and that they will not get anything tangible out of voting for the one or the other candidate. Consequently, they are not highly motivated to work for either faction. Those who work in the limestone and marble quarries can of course be told to vote for the Pradhan panc, others are told how to vote by some influential Tamang or Sarki in their neighbourhood, but many will be uncommitted. Thus, the apathy of the Sarkis in the 1973 election compared to the election in 1972 when they pressed for a ward member of their own caste is very marked. In the latter instance there was something at stake which concerned them, while a Pradhan panc or Up-pradhan panc election is too remote and they run the risk of incurring the enmity of some influential high-caste person supporting the other candidate.

The fickleness of some of the politicians is also brought out in the continuous change of mind by the Sarki ward member. He stood in the ward member election in 1972 as a candidate for E's faction, but immediately switched in the Up-pradhan panc election that followed, persuaded by a kinsman and his own landlord. In the election of Jilla representative from the Gaun pancayat that follwed the 1973 election he again changed factions and voted against the Pradhan panc.

Finally, politics in Kitini cut across caste lines and furnish the opportunity for men to express very personal enmities by opposing candidates

against whom they have a grudge.

Pancayat ideals and the political process

If support for candidates from election to election is relatively stable, there are frequent changes of candidates, save in the post of Pradhan panc, which has been held by the same individual for a long time. Othervise, candidates come and go, but on the levels of Pradhan panc and Up-Pradhan panc those who win are always those who have the strongest connection to either of the two main factions that exist. One faction always takes for granted that the other will put forward a candidate, although it may not be entirely clear who it will be.

In this way, it seems fair to assume that a Gaun pancayat election, which according to the ideals behind the Pancayat system should elect the most able at the local level and then send a representative to the higher body which sends representatives to the Rastriya pancayat, may not after all be a kind of local affair where people are able to exert their power as they see fit. Instead it appears that local elections in Kitini are in fact a kind of fighting out of political strife that exists higher up in the Pancayat system. The meddling of people from outside Kitini, the way the main candidates are tied in political alliance with politicians from neighbouring pancayats, and the tendencies for discussing the elections in one than more constituence when meeting to draw up a strategy all suggest the same. This would mean that politics on the national level intrudes directly in local elections and to a certain extent limit the choices open to people by providing two candidates who are backed in various ways by people from outside who are more interested in the success of their faction at the Jilla level and perhaps ultimately in the Rastriya Pancayat,[3] than what is happening in the local arena. It was just this split between different parties that the Constitution of 1962 wanted to avoid by instituting Pancayat Democracy. One could perhaps say that it has been able to reduce the split from one where many parties were engaged to a situation where there are two main forces opposing each other.

The division into "Communists" and "Democrats" may roughly tell the truth about the situation at the centres of the national administration, but in the inter-play between Gaun pancayat and Jilla pancayat the picture is more complex. The change of heart on the part of B and C with regard to the Sabhapati on the Jilla pancayat cannot be seen in connection with the division into Democrats and Communists, neither can F's candidature for Up-Pradhan,or the emerging co-operation between B and C and the Newar poli-

tician who has changed sides in Jilla politics. In all these cases the reasons for the coalitions and oppositions are to be found in interpersonal rivalry which is given the form of a clash between two political movements at the Jilla and national levels. To a certain extent it would be true to say that those who are influential at the higher levels give the political struggle at the local level its structure, while candidates motives for standing in an election may be purely personal. In this way Pancayat Democracy is able to deflect the impact of national political divisions at the local level by leaving it up to each candidate to muster those voters he can without the help of a party organization, and without being able to use other items in his propaganda than the most general or those specifically related to certain problems at the local level. At the same time the profound division between politicians which existed even before the introduction of the present system is there to some extent by arranging the main contenders at the local level into two opposed groups. This factionalism is brought out even more clearly in the eyes of people by the fact that it is publicly known that the leading candidates and influential individuals in Kitini have allies in other pancayats, and that in this sense the same higher level factions stand against each other over the whole district.

Politics of the class organizations

The class organizations are also a venue for the struggle between the factions. There is extensive overlapping of people active in the pancayat organization and within the class organizations, both at the local level and at Jilla level.

The common thing about all the three class organizations (Farmers, Ex-Servicemen and Youth) that are found in Kitini is that they are all inactive, functioning mainly as stepping stones for the Jilla representatives. Through the election to the Rastriya pancayat from the class-organizations, which takes place at Jilla level, these representatives from the various gaon and nagar pancayats become involved in national politics.

The Farmers' organization is by far the most important. The old Farmers' organization, which existed in before the introduction of Pancayat Democracy, was dominated by the Communist party.

In Kitini the first Farmers' organization was set up by people who belong to the "Democrat" faction. It led only a marginal life under the leadership of the Brahman who worked with A, and this Brahman was also the Jilla representative. But this set-up was never recognized as a proper class organiza-

tion by the Jilla level of the Farmers' organization. During this time it served mainly to as a vehicle for the ambitions of this Brahman. It was only after E had put some life into it and made it a proper Farmers' organization that it started to have some influence and people took an interest in it. He did this after he had lost the election to the Gaun pancayat in 1970. After collecting signatures from people he knew would support him, elections to the executive were held. C was not aware of what was going on since E had not informed him, knowing that C would oppose his plans. Then C tried in vain to make D stand as a candidate for the Farmers' organization representative to the Jilla Farmers' organization, after the latter had been voted Sabhapati. D refused, however, and E was voted Jilla representative. Now D is in opposition to E and so is the majority of the executive. E still remains the Jilla representative however, since his opponents have not been able to muster the 2/3 majority of the members needed to oust him. At the Jilla level, however, his faction is faring less well. In 1972 there was an attempt made by the opposing faction to get rid of E's faction which commanded the post of Sabhapati and had been dominant up to then. C's faction (with C playing an important part in the planning although he is not on the Farmers' organization) tried to put through a motion of no confidence against E's faction. The vote was in fact passed and E and his associates were to lose their seats, as new members from the other faction were elected. The matter did not end there, however, since the Minister concerned declared the result void and consequently the situation is unsettled. In addition the Jilla Farmers' Organization are up in arms against this Minister since he gave the money which constituted the grant it should have from the government to a person in the Farmers' organization from E's faction rather than giving it to the organization itself in an official manner, which would mean giving it to the victorious faction. The Minister maintained that the dispute was unnecessary since he gave it to a person who had the formal right to receive it on the behalf of the Farmers' organization (he was the ousted Sabhapati).

These conflicts both in the pancayat organization and in the Farmers' organization were made manifest when B's and C's side staged a big feast with participants from five pancayats at a temple near the village of Capagaon in the south-east of the Kathmandu Valley in early 1972. This function was attended by several hundred people and it was a full day's outing. The Sabhapati of the Jilla pancayat also came as a guest of honour. Apparently he tried to straddle the gap between the factions and not to alienate either, since he was known at this time still to favour E's faction. It may also have been the first sign of his changing allegiance. Towards evening when it was time for the participants to go home the route was taken through Badegaun in order to embarass the leading Newar supporter of E.

Towards evening when it was time for the participants to go home the route was taken through Badegaun in order to embarass the leading Newar supporter of E. Outside his house people jeered and they walked past it several times. From the windows he and E could be seen peeping out at the demonstrators.

Another example of the strained relations which existed at this time was to be seen at the meeting of E's group of the Farmer's organization from five pancayats around the area, which was to be held in the Newar village of Thaiba. People started arriving on the night before the general meeting was to be held and as a result of the excitement and the drinking, the house of the leding ally of C's faction was attacked, and a brother of the intended victim was badly hurt while the target of the attack was able to disappear through a back door. He was then in hiding for several months before he returned to the active life of a politician again.

The Youth organization in Kitini was set up by E at about the same time as he reorganized the Farmers'organization. It is staffed with youngsters from around ward 1 who work for E's faction in elections. They are mostly High School students but there are a few others as well. The membership is drawn from both tagadhari and matwali Newar castes. Apart from generally supporting E's faction and sending representatives for Jilla Youth organization meetings this Youth organization does not have any active members apart from the eleven on the executive and not trying to broaden its basis. The use of the organization as a stepping stone for ambitious individuals who want a place higher up in the hierarchy is brought out by the fact that the Sabhapati comes from Patan. Just as was the case with the Brahman candidate for the post of Pradhan panc in the 1973 election his family hails from Kitini and still owns land there which gives him the right to become a member of its Youth organization.

The Ex-Servicemen's organization is recruited only among the higher castes within C's faction, and it seems to be the one where members are least willing to take on responsibilities. All of the officials on the executive claimed that they were there only because no-one else wants to.

One could well ask what are the relations between the pancayats at the various levels and the class organizations in the political process. Since they only come together in the Ancal Samiti the interrelationship at other levels will be based on informal contacts between the politicians.

As is seen in Kitini there is the potential for conflict between a class organization and the Gaun pancayat. The Farmers' organization in Kitini was dominated by the faction that made up the minority group on the Gaun pancayat, and this state of affairs was repeated at Jilla level. As things stand now, however, the tables are about to be turned and if nothing un-

forseen crops up the same faction that dominates the Gaun pancayat and the Jilla pancayat will also dominate the Farmers´organization at these two levels. But it is clear that the class organizations can sometimes function as alternative avenues for power and influence for a faction which is unsuccessful in obtaining posts on the Gaun pancayat or Jilla pancayat.One could then envisage a situation where these institutions were divided between the factions, a split which could reach right into the Rastriya pancayat.Unfortunately it is impossible to analyze the proceedings of this institution since the sessions are not open to the public. That there are opposing interests represented within this institution is clear, however, from a tumultous session where members were injured and brought to hospital, and as a result of which several of them were expelled from the Rastriya pancayat.[4]

Why a two-faction system?

If factions are the inevitable result of personal relations expressed in political terms how is it that in Kitini and in Lalitpur district there are two main factions and not a number of squabbling coteries of people? The first answer might be that current politics are only a continuation of politics during the parliamentary era when there were two political forces in Lalitpur, that of the Nepal Congress with allied parties and the Communists. However, since it follows from my argument about the nature of politics in a society based on personal relations that even the party politics of the 1950s must be viewed as competition between factions this explanation does not take us very far. There are, however, two other possible ways of explaining the two-faction situation. The one would be that since only one faction can be in power at a certain moment all the others have to be in opposition or join the ruling faction. There is a dichotomy ruler - opposition. And although the personnel involved may change over time it is always possible to discern this dichotomy operating as an ordering principle.[5] As was seen in the above this does not mean that there are two monolithic bodies standing against each other. In Kitini the situation was more complex with the Silwal businessman playing his own game without regard to the two-faction system. However, as was seen, the politicians whom he made or broke had to align themselves with one or other of these factions.

The other way of explaining the two-faction situation is really a corollary of the first one. Since an individual who stands for office will have little chance against someone else who is supported by a big faction which can use its large resources of material means and personal relations to support its candidate, he is virtually forced to join the other faction in order to have a reasonable chance of winning. In this way most political compe-

tition is fed into the existing factions making them even stronger and more viable.[6]

Conclusion

The findings of this chapter point to the inevitable conclusion that the ideals of Pancayat Democracy concerning the way it is supposed to work are at odds with social realities at the local level and all the way up to the Rastriya pancayat.The ideals presuppose here as they do in the other contexts that have been analyzed in this study a society where each individual counts. In Nepali society of today some individuals count more than others, and this fact of social existence shape the way the formal organization of the Pancayat system with its class organizations function on the ground. However, there is also a slight movement in the other direction, where some individuals and groups have been able to express their views more clearly through the help of the new system where numbers count. But this has been a purely local affair, broadening the caste spectrum on the Gaun pancayat to some extent without in any way upsetting the power structure in Kitini or elsewhere in the administrative structure. It is impossible to see how the Sarkis, for instance, shall be able to have their overall position in society changed through the fact that they are represented on the Gaun pancayat.If they are in any way favoured it will be by higher-caste politicians who are eager for their votes, and the concessions they are able to wrest from the latter will be marginal anyway. Since political parties are banned there is no way for disadvantaged people like the Tamang and Sarki to organize and work for an improvement in their situation. The organizations that are allowed comprise people from various castes and with different economic standing, and they are, as has been seen, dominated by the privileged. In this way, Pancayat Democracy cannot be a way for the weaker segments in society to better their lot without relying on the good will of the better off groups, and so far that good will does not seem to be forthcoming.

CHAPTER SIX (CONCLUSIONS)

Social organization and Pancayat ideology

It was seen in chapters two and three that Nepal, and especially the Kathmandu Valley is characterized by relations in the form of personal relationships characteristic of a small principality with the ruler as the central patron. This structure exists today and determines how favours are distributed. But it does not exhaust the forms of social relations that are to be found. In Kitini as in Nepal as a whole caste determines a great deal of an individual's existence. Pani nacalne castes are beyond the pale of society and their members have virtually no chance of ever, in the present structure of society, wielding power as bureaucrats, politicians or businessmen. Hence, they are not patrons except in petty affairs. The matwali castes are in a better position, but still a tiny minority as patrons and power holders except for Sresthas, while these positions are more or less monopolized by the highest castes. But, as has been pointed out, being of high caste does not automatically mean that the avenues to influence are open. The personal relationship operates here, too, and the individual must have personal connections to the high and mighty in order to gain favours.

There are also other divisions at work affecting the place of an individual in society, chief among which is what, in relation to Kitini, I have called socio-cultural systems. The most important, is the one established by the conquering Hindus that dominates social life in Nepal as a whole. It is the fact of this dominance which has led to the adoption of other sociocultural systems to its ideology that there is a fairly uniform order of caste ranking in Nepal today.

The second most important socio-cultural system in the Kathmandu Valley is that of the Newars. Although the highest caste within it, the Srestha, occupy important positions in the administrations it is still true to say that its existence is made precarious by the dominant system. The Newar socio-cultural system shows the same linkages on a personal basis that the dominant system does.

The third socio-cultural system in Kitini is that of the Tamangs. It is encompassed by the other two socio-cultural systems and there are no intra-systemic avenues to power on a scale bigger than the Tamang community itself. Consequently, inter-systemic ties in the case of the Tamangs have to be between Tamang clients and patrons from the other socio-cultural systems. It is, then, in the absence of any deeper economic change that might restructure social relations in Nepal, and against the background of these categories of caste and socio-cultural systems plus communication

between the centre and the periphery in terms of personal relations, that one has to evaluate the headway made by the ideals of Pancayat Democracy and the way in which "democracy from the top" [1] has worked so far. The field in which Pancayat Democracy seems to have been most effective is that of disseminating its ideology. In contrast to the fields of economics and politics one does not need a patron to get access to propaganda. In fact, the idea people have of their own rights under the new system could be said to go further than is the real case, since legislation concerning caste is less far-reaching than many Nepalis think. It is only before the law that caste is irrelevant, but still the eradication of untoucable status, for instance, is not enforcible in courts. This means that caste discrimination is in fact not prohibited and here the relevant clauses of the constitution are in conflict with the oft-repeated slogans of Pancayat Democracy of the equality of men and the abolition of all prejudice and oppression. People are generally aware only of the latter and in Kitini the consciousness of the disadvantaged castes on this point was much in evidence, especially, as has been pointed out, among the Tamangs. This consciousness is of little value, however, as long as concrete reforms are not realized by the government to reinforce it.

And these actions are not likely to be taken as long as the position of the dominant part of the population rests on the structure of caste and personal relationships. That is to say, to realize the ideals there has to be a change in the structure of society. This is the dilemma facing Nepal and it explains very well why so little has happened. The dispensing of favours from above and the reinforcement of the system by the local élites in the rural areas via the pancayat tiers are in conflict with the ideals, which are, consequently, reduced to mere phrases. Thus, a noted Nepali commentator (Rana, op.cit:7ff) frankly admits that he fails to see how social justice is to be achieved given the present conditions and strategies. This is the limit to "democracy from the top". In changing society and raising those at the bottom the executing élite is in fact asked to abolish itself.

The economy and Pancayat ideology

The basis of economic life in Kitini continues to be subsistence agriculture and the jobs that have been created have not been able to change the fact that agriculture and agricultural labouring continue to be required ways of earning a living. In fact, the low salaries of, for instance, work in the administration means that the household must have a certain economic standard before it can afford to let one member work in a salaried job on a permanent basis. Thus, the new sources of cash to the rural popu-

lation does not in any way change attitudes to agriculture. The village continues to be the focus of an individual's interest. This is not denying that a salaried job with the government carry some advantages such as a regular income, pension and the opportunity to borrow money more easily than those without such a job. But these benefits alter in no way the basic fact of agriculture as a must for the people in Kitini.

Improvement of the lot of the population dependent on agriculture is seen by the planners and administrators as taking place through modernization of agriculture and redistribution of land on the lines envisaged in the Land Reform Act. To take the latter first, there are no big landlords in Kitini and looking at the Kathmandu Valley as a whole it is obvious that there is not that much land to distribute. Land scarcity is a fact and if each household were to get some land of its own the plots would be small indeed. And, furthermore, the government has not shown any interest in catering for the agricultural labourers. The land reform concentrated on the tenants and excess land, very little of which was found (nothing in Kitini). In Kitini the tenants were given security of tenure, but they still have to pay part of the crop to the landlord.

As for the modernization of agriculture the government together with the foreign experts have voiced the desire to integrate the whole of Nepal into one market with various parts of the country specializing in certain products, buying from the others what it needs in addition. So far, this is just a dream on the part of the planners and it seems unlikely that it will be realized in the near future, mainly because the government does not have the resources to convince the farmers that they should give up growing for subsistence and instead rely on the market to provide them with what they need, or to guarantee a market for the farmers' products that would ensure a stable income. In the same way, mass industrialization of the country does not seem feasible, due to lack of communications, relative lack of natural resources and a more or less complete absence of a market for selling the products. There is no doubt that in the foreseeable future Nepal will remain a country dominated by subsistence agriculture and that planning for social justice, and implementation of the ideals of Pancayat Democracy, will have to take this into consideration.

If there have been few changes in economic relations between the various strata and groups within the country the sources of capital available to the government have certainly changed with the massive influx of foreign aid and loans. The point is, however, that while capitalization of the economy creates new economic categories and classes which make their demands on the government, the flow of foreign capital is distributed by the élite and hence has very little effect in reshaping economic relations. In other

words, aid money does not in itself play a dynamic role in the transformation of social relations in a country.

At the same time those who are already well off are exhorted to invest their money in industry, making Nepal richer and more self-sufficient. The reasons behind this are both economic and political. Economically, it would help Nepal's balance of trade and make it less dependent on India, which now completely dominates Nepal's import and export business, and so wields a tremendous political influence. At the same time industrialization is seen to be the way out for a poor country and in the view of the Nepali welfare state philosophy this will be the solution to the country's ills.

It is to be noted, however, that the plea for investment in the industrial sector is made in plain economic terms with no appeal to a glorious past or other ideologizing themes. This is perhaps attributable to the fact that those who have that much wealth to spare are already strongly favoured by the present system.

When it comes to concrete results of economic progress in consonance with Pancayat Democracy the examples given are invariably of some development projects which have been completed. These are of course important enough, but a new air strip or the building of a new school do not suggest how inequalities between various castes and classes of people are to be eradicated. In this way the ideals of freedom from exploitation are being constantly confused with specific achievements in the field of economic planning. A new air field may be used by everyone, but some will be in a position and have reasons to use it more than others. A new school may be formally open to all, but some will not be able to afford to send a child to school, and others are not in a position to help their child to a job where his newly acquired abilities can be put to use. The economic achievements have no necessary bearing on the postulated goal of social equality in the country. And it is precisely with regard to this aspect that Pancayat Democracy shows itself to have no real potential to transform the diffuse ideals into reality; it seems to rely on a "magical" belief in some sort of transforming capacity inherent in economic growth itself. But as was seen above, this is unlikely to happen, if Nepal is to depend on foreign capital, which will be distributed from above. There is no discernable movement resulting from economic changes emanating from below, which could transform people's lives and the way in which they view the world and make hitherto dependent strata of the population self-sufficient and self-reliant in the ways envisaged by Pancayat Democracy.

Politics and Pancayat ideology

It is obvious that the attempt to keep the country together by stressing unity and the march towards freedom from exploitation along the road of gradual economic development are seen by the political élite as the only means of holding the disparate regions, ethnic groups and economic classes together. Nepalese nationalism is fairly recent and a great stress is laid on the use of symbols in making people conscious of it. Hence, poverty, illiteracy as well as other inanimate "forces" are held to be responsible for the plight of the majority of the people. This ideology is designed to counteract any tendency to brand certain segments, such as high-caste officials, landowners and so on as corrupt and exploitiative, since this would threaten their dominance. The "popular forces" that attempted to rule Nepal from 1951 to 1959 are still very much remebered by the "traditional forces" (Chauhan, op.cit.) that rule Nepal today. And any dissension may mean the return of political parties with the concomitant risk, as the élite sees it, of the return of the expert party politicians. As has been seen the Pancayat system organizes people on various bases and in this way splits them up. There are no mass organizations on the local level which include categories of the population with common political and economic interests on a permanent basis in the way a political party might do. In this way concerted action by various groups which might be a threat to the élite is made virtually impossible.

The divisive function of the Pancayat system also has repercussions on the way people in Kitini view it. I have already described the fact that the disadvantaged groups use the official ideology as a way of asserting their equality with the higher castes, although this is not done in face-to-face interaction with the latter. And those who on one day will assert their equality with the high castes will on the next approach one of them as a client in a language which expresses dependency rather than equality. Perhaps this will be seen as presenting too pessimistic a picture. After all the Sarkis and the Tamangs are able to wrest concessions from high caste candidates at election time. It should be remebered, however, that on these occasions it has not been a question of one group standing against another. There is thus no polarization along caste lines similar to those reported for West Nepal by Patricia Caplan (1972:74 ff).

The direction from above which continuously takes place despite the official ideology can be seen in Kitini in the selection of candidates at election time. The two-faction system which reveals itself in Kitini at each election makes it almost impossible for an independent candidate to become a successful contender for the posts of Pradhan panc or Up-pradhan panc. Similarly, election campaigns cannot be fought on platforms arguing in favour of political systems different from Pancayat Democracy. This means that the promises made by the various candidates are fairly similar and the personality of the politicians become the most important factors, leading to vilification and personal back biting. And in this way the official system actually reinforces the traditional style of personal leadership. In the end it is the social connections that a candidate has that determine whether he will be elcted or not, and not the ideas he puts forward.

There seems to be a certain congruence between the fields at the central level where Pancayat Democracy has had an impact and those in Kitini. The structure of social relations has not changed in accordance with the ideology of Pancayat Democracy in either place. In terms of material advantages and power the high caste groups and traditional élite still reign supreme in Kathmandu as they do in Kitini. However, in terms of rhetoric there has been an accommodation in favour of equality and social justice. But so far this has not been followed up with actions that would seriously challenge the present power structure. And just as desire for a new society is voiced by national figures so they are echoed in Kitini. In this context micro and macro show themselves to be really "the same thing", aspects of the same society, expressing the same conditions.

The wider setting: personal and group relations

So far, I have dealt with the empirical situation as it exists in Nepal today with regard to planned development. Turning now to the more theoretical side of this study, I once again point out that the main argument is that in the little principality the corporate group will give way to personal relations between individuals. The particular structure of the caste system in Nepal and the mit relationship were seen to be two institutions favouring this. Kitini is, through its location in the Kathmandu Valley, in the very centre of Nepal, and it was found that personal relations explain a good deal of the particular effect that Pancayat Democracy has had there. Considering Nepal as a whole, however, there seems to be a more intricate interplay between personal relations and groups in the process of integrating peripheral parts of the country into the dominant

socio-cultural system. This process, although not directly pertinent to the situation in Kitini, is still of such general interest that it might be worth while to expound on it and set up a tentative framework for anthropological studies beyond the localized community that has hitherto served as the relevant field of interest for anthropologists in Nepal. D.B. Bista (1971) gives an interesting picture of the changing fortunes of the Thakalis of the upper Kali-Gandaki close to the Tibetan border in the middle section of Nepal, which may serve as an example for the kind of process that I am referring to.[2] The Thakalis were originally a tribal group, who during the 18th century came to act as middle men in the salt trade between Tibet and Nepal in this area. This activity brought wealth and a rise from tribal obscurity to political power. These changes had to be legitimized and this in turn had to be done on a basis that integrated the Thakalis into the dominant political and economic power in this part of the Himalayas, the Buddhist north. Since legitimization of the Thakalis' new-found wealth and power had to be achieved as defined by the superior power (recognition by inferiors does not count as a rise in rank) the Thakalis had to give up their tribal religion and become Buddhists. This they did, achieving some recognition in the process.

As relations between Nepal and Tibet deteriorated the Thakalis were brought closer to the former for security reasons. The Nepali government gave them a monopoly of the collection of salt customs, part of which they had to pay to the government. At the same time the Thakali leader was made Subba (government appointed headman). This turning away from the north towards Kathmandu had to be symbolized, again under conditions and in forms that were defined by the stronger power. Consequently the Thakuris turned Hindu.

This need for symbolic recognition by the élite in Kathmandu was reinforced by the trade relations that developed between the family of the Subba and the capital. After 1950 the situation has changed again with the leading Thakalis moving to Kathmandu in search of jobs and education. Some of them have even been assistant ministers in the administration. Integration has proceeded one more step and the stage has shifted from Thak to Kathmandu, from the dream of creating a tribal principality in the first half of this century to becoming a part of the élite in Kathmandu. But it should be noted that it is only the leading strata of Thakalis who have been able to become integrated in the capital in this way. Left behind are the majority of Thakalis who resent the new developments and who would have preferred a tribal state.

The shifting fortunes of the Thakalis raise some theoretically interesting points. First of all, it should be noted that the different modes of gaining recognition have more or less been forced on them. When their trade was directed to the north, they had to become

Buddhists to legitimize their position. To turn to Hinduism would have been a meaningless symbolic statement. Not until connections grew stronger with Kathmandu was it possible to turn to Hinduism. Secondly, the case of the Thakalis is interesting from the point of view of the role of the group that, for instance, Cohen (1969, 1972)[3] has been studying. In his view groups tend to defend their economic privileges through developing an ideology that defines the group in its own eyes and in those of others, thereby making concerted action possible. This view of the corporate group presupposes that all members gain from membership. In the case of the Thakalis, however, corporateness seems to be a passing phenomenon, and it may be that this is a general feature of the process of integrating new categories of the population into Nepalese society. The group, first Buddhist and then Hindu, came about as a result of some leading families achieving wealth and power, through apparently their followers stood to gain,too. After 1950, however, the leading familes have been accepted into the Nepalese élite and become part of the system of personal relations obtaining in the capital. It seems likely that the relations between these leaders and the rest of the Thakalis in Thak, who are still Hindus, but without corporate function, will be based on patron-client ties. In this way, Hinduism as a definition of Thakaliness will be still important, since anyone not being Hindu would probably be excluded from patron-client relationships with the leaders. In this sense the group can still be said to exist, but only as a background to the leaders who very likely aspire to further integration into the dominant socio-cultural system, perhaps through advantageous marriages on the part of the richest families.

There is reason to belive that this process of integration of new areas and categories of people into Nepalese society will continue to go on for the forseeable future given the little headway that the spread of central administration and the creation of a common market have made so far. An awareness of the way that this process works will be of utmost importance in understanding what kinds of consequences it will have for those whose lives it affects. Thus it also poses problems for those who plan the new society according to the ideals of Pancayat Democracy.

Personal relations and corporateness: concluding remarks

The argument throughout this study has been that the ideals of Pancayat Democracy have failed to materialize as a result of the important role that personal relations play in the Kathmandu Valley (and probably in Nepal as a whole). The logical question to ask would then be: would

Pancayat Democracy have fared better if Nepalese society were to a greater degree based on corporate groups? There are several possible answers to this question. Corporateness solely in terms of caste would mean that those castes which are big in terms of numbers and powerful in terms of wealth and office would have an advantage. This would mean a continued domination by the tagadhari castes, since they, according to Gaborieau (1972:95) make up 65% of the population of Nepal, while the figure for matwali castes is 20%, which leaves 15% composed of the pani nacalne and other castes. Furthermore, as has been pointed out the tagadhari also occupy most posts of influence in the government and bureacracy as well as being privileged when it comes to material resources. Thus, it is difficult to see how the less privileged castes would be able to secure a bigger slice of the cake. The effect would be a patron-client structure within the castes, especially within the tagadhari castes, since their members range from those who rule Nepal to very poor peasants in the hills. Sooner or later such a system of corporate groups based on groups would collapse and give way to a full-fledged system of personal relations, since members of the weaker castes would be forced to attach themselves in order to survive physically, given the current distribution of resources in Nepal.

The second basis for corporateness would be economic class. Here the underprivileged, those with little or no land who make up for the deficit by manual labour are the vast majority of the people of Nepal. They are also distributed over all castes. Such a group,if it came into existence, would of course be able to wrest leadership from the present élite. However, it is impossible to see how this could happen in Nepal given the current situation. Many individuals and kin groups are land owners, tenants and agricultural labourers at the same time, or constitute a rural élite (as many members of the tagadhari castes in Kitini) with salaried jobs in lowly and badly paid positions in town. Thus, the situation is far from clear-cut in terms of economic class, and it is consequently not a dichotomous situation at present.

Such corporations based on economic interest are also prevented by the Pancayat system itself. By banning political parties which could organize people from different castes along corporate lines, it encourages the building of coalitions on the part of individuals who want to rise in the hierarchy. In a party-less system organization is necessarily discouraged and each elected representative is supposed to speak for everyone in his constituency at the same time, something which is clearly impossible, if that constituency is not very homogenous indeed.

But simply to adopt a party system is not enough either, as was witnessed

by the political development of Nepal during the 1950s. The organization of the people along party lines has to be accompanied by a decline of the direct power of the ruler in order to move from personal relations to corporate groups. In Europe this was achieved by the emergence of new economic classes that stood outside feudal society. In Nepal no such economic development is at hand and the ruler can maintain his power without being seriously challanged. That the Nepalese monarch does not willingly give way to corporations based on political power was shown by King Mahendra when he over-threw the parliamentary system.

Thirdly, it could be argued that a corporate bureacracy would produce the results in accordance with Pancayat Democracy better than the present one. A corporate bureaucracy means that it is impartial, rational in Weber's terms. Bureaucrats do not confuse their positions as kinsmen or part-time politicians with their role as civil servants. No doubt, such a bureaucracy would go a long way to solve the problem of the realization of Pancayat ideals. However, as has been pointed out before, the bureaucracy is a dependent variable. It expresses rather than shapes the kinds of relations that characterize a society. And in a society like that of Nepal where the sivil servants are exposed to the power of the ruler they will not be able (as has been seen) to function on a basis independent of the web of personal relations that pervade Nepalese society.

The answer to the question whether corporate groups would have been able to deliver the goods of Pancayat Democracy better than the present system based on personal relations seems to be that they would with the proviso that not just any kind of corporateness would be sufficient. At the same time, however, it is important to note that the conditions necessary for such corporateness to form do not exist in Nepal at present.

NOTES

CHAPTER TWO

1. The Terai is sometimes divided into two eco-zones: the northern part which constitutes a region of valleys between the Siwalik and the Mahabharat Lekh mountain ranges is called the Inner Terai.

2. "Caste" in this study is used to refer to the ideally endogamous groups, which are in Nepali called "jat".

3. See Bhattacharjee (1970); Gupta (1964); Husain (1970); Rose & Fisher (1970); Joshi & Rose (1966).

4. See Fürer-Haimendorf, (1966a:35).

5. There is a complication with regard to the names of these units which is inconvenient for my purposes. The village pancayat in its territorial aspect is also called gaun pancayat.To distinguish it from the executive of the gaun pancayat I shall spell the former with a capital G. Thus, Gaun pancayat: the board of executives of a gaun pancayat.

6. Husain (op.cit.); Mihaly (1965); Rawat (1974); Shrestha (1967).

7. Brar (1971) argues that in what he calls "the small feudal state" a rise in the hierarchy is individual, while in a situation such as that of the rural areas of the North Indian plains, with its great distance between the controlling agency (the apex of the total political structure) and the ruled, the relevant units are groups (castes or subcastes); a rise in the hierarchy can then only be effected by the group, since it takes a group to dominate a group.

   According to one authority, however, (Carter, 1974) caste as a basis of mobilization in today's political life in India is a myth. He uses a transactional model in trying to prove that politics are the prerogative of the political élite, the members of which form coalitions to fight each other. In those cases where caste has been seen to form the basis for such a coalition it is in fact, according to Carter, the result of either:(1)a leader using kinsmen or followers from various castes, with members from one caste being regarded as the leading force, or (2) one caste dominating the coalition, with other, ritually inferior, castes being promised membership in the leading caste. In none of these cases is it, argues Carter, possible to talk of caste as being the basis for the alliance. It seems to me, however, that Carter is confusing two things here. The point is not whether a person will join a political faction because he belongs to a certain caste, which Carter seems to believe to be the basis of the argument. The point is whether or not the political faction is a group. And using notions of caste as an ideology, especially when promising to allow outsiders to join the leading caste appears to be a case where a group is formed by appealing to a particular ideology. So, while politics in India may very well be conducted by a political élite (as in Nepal), the group seems still to be important in a way that it is not in the politics of the Kathmandu Valley, and caste sometimes seems to be symbol of the group. (See also Béteille, 1969:151).

8. Dumont (1964) finds that the prevalence of women marrying down (anagamy in his terms) within an overall framework of the ideal of the ritual equality of the two spouses or the slight superiority of the man is characteristic of Nepal. In fact, these characteristics are evidence of the stress on individualized ties where the group has lost some of its importance. While in the main being a variation on an Indian theme marriage in Nepal is clearly marked by this individualizing feature.

9. Ritual kinship is also known from Madya Pradesh in India (Jay, 1973; Mayer, 1960:139-44, 146). This area seems to have been characterized by small-scale states up to modern times (Gordon, 1976).

10. For the difference between broker and patron see Blok (1969), and Boissevain (1969).

11. For personal relations in administration see also Pradhan (1969) and Smith (1974); see Lionel Caplan (1971) for illustrations from local administration.

12. Cf. Kaufman (1974).

13. Doherty (1975) argues that the reason for person-oriented politics in Nepal is to be found in the kinship system of the Brahman-Chetris, which stresses hierarchy and individualism among other things. This he contrasts with the Gurung stress on the group, implicit in their kinship terms and values. He does not, however, treat the aspect which would seem to be most important for the student concerned with the question of the continuing integration of the various ethnic groups into the state of Nepal, viz., how do these two different ways of looking at one's social environment combine when they are forced into contact with each other. In other words, what factors decide the form that integration takes given the contrasting ways that various ethnic groups structure relations with other individuals and groups? Does one give way to the other or is there some synthesis between the two? I would argue that in such a situation kinship ideologies are secondary to the kinds of relations that obtain in the society, i.e., whether personal relations or group relations predominate. After all, the importance of the caste group on the plains of India goes very well with an Aryan high-caste kinship system.

14. Chauhan also mentions the facts that these Pradhan pancas and Up-Pradhan pancas are generally old and lack formal education. He sees this as a hindrance to development efforts. Professionally he found them to be oriented towards agriculture and petty business, which he also holds to be characteristics favouring the status quo.

15. See, for instance, the Fourth Five Year Plan (1970).

16. In December 1975 King Birendra announced a sweeping re-organization in Pancayat and class organizations, which will strengthen the hand of the centre at all levels through nomination of members.

17. See Regmi (1971:117 ff).

18. See Frank (1974): Fürer-Haimendorf (1956); and Höfer (1969, 1971) for data on Tamangs.

CHAPTER THREE

1. See Regmi (1963). There is also some guthi land in Kitini. This is land given to a temple or for charitable purposes. Such land is tax free. See Regmi (1968).

2. See Dumont (op.cit);Fürer-Haimendorf (1966a); Nepali (1965).

3. Gotra is the name of a putative sage or mythical ancestor of a clan. Some clans within a caste may have the same gotra while others may have different gotras. The same gotra is also found in several castes. Organizationally gotra is important since it regulates marriage. A man should not marry a woman of his own gotra (although there are exceptions to this rule, for instance, Fürer-Haimendorf, 1966a:29 foot-note; for an area in the Indian Himalayas see Madan, 1965:104-105). Note that gotra is transmitted only partilineally. A women takes her husband's gotra on marriage. The Tamangs and Newars do not have gotras.

4. For details see K.B. Bista (1972).

5. See Regmi (1965).

6. The clan name of the two households of "real" Magar are Rana and I shall refer to them as Rana Magar, while the Gharti-turned-Magar will simply be called Magar.

7. Not long after the establishment of the guthi a man and a woman, both with the new clan name of Thapa wanted to marry. Ordinarily two people from the same clan are not allowed to marry among the Magars, but the Captain ruled that since they were not in fact related they were allowed to marry. Since then another couple from the Thapa clan have married.

8. Members of different castes also come into contact with each other through agricultural work. It will be dealt with in chapter four. Suffice it to say here that this is a field where interaction is strongly patterned by considerations of caste rank.

9. Gambling is done with cards (tas), shells (kauda)or walnuts (okhar).

10. For details of this festival, see K.B. Bista (1969).

11. Cf. Mitchell. (1969).

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Cf. Bêteille. (1965:10).

2. For birta tenure, see Regmi (1964).

3. Two Tamang, one Brahman and one Magar household are missing from this table, since I was not able to record the land in their possession.

4. Most of the Mahanta land is guthi (40 khet and 60 pakho),which is managed by one Mahanta household.

5. There are 16 households which engage in agricultural labouring where I do not have the figures for the length of time which the household members work. They are 1 Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal, household; 2 Silwal; 4 Tamang; 2 Sarki; 2 Newar; (1 Srestha; 1 Jyapu); 2 Kami; 1 Nagarkoti; 1 Pahari; 1 Gurung.

6. It is very likely that the figure under "without intermediary" should be lower since friends and neighbours of several people who claimed to have obtained their jobs without help maintained that there were in fact intermediaries involved. As can be expected those who are in qualified jobs have a much higher figure under "without intermediary", since they are promoted within an agency to which they already belong (from soldier to non-commissioned officer or officer, for instance). The most difficult part of a person's career is to gain entrance in the first place.

7. The relationship tenant - landowner is also of some importance for borrowers from other castes. Thus about one-fourth of the loans taken by indebted households rent land (67% of all indebted households) have landlords as their source. In this way an already existing link between two households is reinforced.

   With regard to smaller painco loans the landlord is very often the lender and is paid back by the tenant/debtor working for some days on his land. (See also Lionel Caplan, 1972).

8. The two loans under "other" are as follows: (1) A Sarki landowner who has lent money to his Silwal tenant. This is an extremely uncommon thing in Kitini, which highlights the subversion of some caste rules that the Sarkis' new economic independence may lead to. (2). A Magar who was helped by his patrons on the Gaun pancayat to borrow money from a person in Kathmandu in order to buy some waste land in the eastern eastern part of Kitini.

9. Two loans to repay money which they had embezzled (both Silwals);one loan for the purchase of a sewing machine (Damai); one inherited loan (Katri-Chetri, excl. Silwal).

10. Out of the remaining four loans two were taken to buy food for the household members: one for a festival; and I do not have any information about the final one.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. The difference from a political system such as that of Sweden, for instance, is obvious. There the voters are given lists with a number of candidates, most of whom are unknown to them. They are asked to vote for the party; personal relations which each candidate, and hence his or her reputation become secondary.

2. The figure 1375 is probably too high since both sides charged the other side with including names of people below 21 years of age of whose support they were certain.

3. It is of course impossible to know what factions exist in the Rastriya Pancayat since the sessions are not open to the public, but it is surely reasonable to assume that the factions there will be similar to those at the lower levels in the Pancayat system.

4. For an account of opposition groups in the politics of Nepal, see Baral (1972).

5. For a game-theory approach to this problem, see Barth (1959).

6. Although factions may draw on existing personal relations it is also the case that they create them. This happens when, for instance, a quarrel between two individuals is translated into political terms. That is to say, one of the two decides to stand for political office and the other stands to oppose him. The likelihood is then that they will be drawn into opposing factions and through this become members of a network of personal relations that may later be made use of in seeking jobs, support in litigation and so on. Similarly, faction leaders may try to exploit enmity between two individuals for their own ends by promising help for one or other of them in exchange for political support as was seen above.

CHAPTER SIX

1. Cf. Worsley (1964).

2. For other descriptions of the evolution of Thakali society, see Fürer-Haimendorf (1966b, 1975).

3. For an example pertaining to Nepal, see Lionel Caplan (1970).

GLOSSARY

The words below are transcribed according to the system devised by Turner (1931). Names and terms commonly met with in Western literature on Nepal are not italicized in the text and do not appear in the glossary.

abīr	red powder used in ritual
ãcal	zone (adm. unit)
adālat	court
beti	traditionally unpaid compulsory labour
bhog bandhakī	loan with land as security
birtā	land grant from the state to individuals often taxable and conditional
bista	employer of service caste household
bombo	shaman
bratabandha	initiation rite for boys of Brahman and Katri-Chetri status
cakāri	service
chewar	Tamang initiation rite for boys
cokho	traditional Tamang official
dāl	lentils
gāũ	village
ghānbā	Tamang official
ghatta	water mill
ghaurai	traditional Tamang official
ghiu	clarified butter
gotrā	parallel clanship regulating marriage
guṭhī	religious or economic association
hãgā	branch, lineage
hali	plowman
jājman	priest's client
jājmanī	relation between a priest's household and that of his client
janāī	sacred thread
jāt	caste
jhãkrī	shaman
jharrā	full-status Katri-Chetri man
jillā	district (adm.unit)
kar adālat	revenue court
katak	traditional Tamang official
kauda	shell used in gambling
kheppā	traditional Tamang official
khet	irrigated land
kipat	form of land tenure where the kin group owns the land
kul devatā	clan god
kut	land rent
lāmā	Tamang priest
māl addā	land administration office
mathi	upper
matwālī	drinking castes
mīt	ritual kinship
nagar	town (pancayat)
nau dhārā	nine taps (temple in Kitini)
okhar	walnut used in gambling
pãcā	member of pancayat
pãcayāt	elected council
pãico	small interest free loan in kind
pakho	dry land
pandit	priest with a degree from a Sanscrit college
pānī nacalne	Untouchable castes

parma	mutual labour exchange
pāthī	unit of measure (about 8 lb)
pāti	resting place
piun	errand boy in offices
pradhān pāc	hairman of a pancayat at gau or nagar level
pujā	worship
purohīt	Brahman priest
raikar	form of land tenure similar to freehold
raksī	Nepali wine
rāstriya	national
rin	interest bearing loan
ropanī	area of land (about 0.04 ha)
sabhā	assembly
sabhāpatī	chairman
samitī	council
sāpat	interest-free cash loan
sapta pujā (or saptāha)	seven-day religious celebration
sarbocca adālat	supreme court
sewak	official at village level
śrāddha	rite of commemoration of ancestors
subbā	government-appointed headman
tāgādhāri	twice-born castes
talo	lower
tāmbā	traditional Tamang official
tantra mantra	traditional healing
tās	playing cards
thar	clan
thimsal	Katri-Chetri man of lower status
topi	Nepali hat
tupi	tuft of hair left on the head at initiation
up-pradhān pāc (or) upa-pradhan pāc	vice-chairman of a pancayat at gau or nagar level
up-sabhāpatī (or) upa-sabhapatī	vice-chairman
varna	traditional division of Hindu society



Maps adapted from Donner, 1972

Note: Lalitpur district extends further to the south outside the Kathmandu Valley


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